Institutional power and the rise of Milošević

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Notes

For the most sophisticated exposition of the former view see Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 43–74; for the most detailed and informed attempt to substantiate the latter view see Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin and BBC, 1995), pp. 37–47.

Interview in Duga, 7 June 1991.

See Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making since 1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). The collective character of leadership did not preclude frequent conflicts among regions over the distribution of material resources at the disposal of federal organs.

Dragiša Pavlović, Olako obecana brzina (Zagreb: Globus, 1988); Ivan Stambolić, Put u bespuće: odgovori Ivana Stambolića na pitanja Slobodana Inića (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1995); and Mirko Djekić, Upotreba Srbije: optužbe i priznanja Draže Markovića (Belgrade: Besede, 1990).

I conducted interviews with Dragoslav Draža Marković and Boško Krunić, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Yugoslavia and its Presidents in 1983–1984 and 1987–1988, respectively; Špiro Galović, Vaso Milincˇević and Milenko Marković, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Serbia; Danilo Marković, a minister in the government of Serbia; Slobodan Jovanović, a high official in the Belgrade Committee and editor of a popular Belgrade daily; nine high officials who wanted to remain anonymous, including prominent members of the federal party Presidium, regional party Presidium, state Presidency of Serbia, government of Serbia, Presidium of the Provincial Committee of Vojvodina and the Belgrade Committee; and a senior aide to Draža Marković and Ivan Stambolić (Belgrade and Novi Sad, July 1999, July and August 2000, July 2001).

A number of personal accounts of the politicians who took part in these events have been published in book form—including: Pavlović, Olako obećana brzina; Djekić, Upotreba Srbije; Stambolić, Put u bespuće; and Dušan Čkrebić, Zapis na pesku: sećanja (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1995)—and numerous interviews appeared in the local press. For speeches of the two leading figures of the period in Serbia see Ivan Stambolić, Rasprave o SR Srbiji (Zagreb: Globus, 1988) and Slobodan Milošević, Godine raspleta (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989).

The most important documents that shed light on the September 1987 showdown are: “Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SK Srbije,” held in Belgrade, 18–19 September 1987 (unauthorised transcript, CK SKS, Predsedništvo, 0300 No: highly confidential, 290/1), Vols 1 and 2; and “Osma sednica CK SK Srbije,” held in Belgrade, 24–25 September 1987, Dokumenti Saveza komunista Srbije (Belgrade: Komunist, 1987). I am grateful to a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Serbia, whom I have interviewed for this article, for the permission to read his personal copy of the transcript “Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SK Srbije,” a document that is still unavailable to the public.

Milošević was born in Požarevac, a small town in central Serbia. His parents, who were originally from Montenegro, settled in the town on the eve of the Second World War. His father, a catechist and teacher of Russian and Serbo‐Croat, later separated from his wife and returned to Montenegro, so Slobodan and his elder brother grew up with their mother, a schoolteacher and devoted communist. Their childhood passed without much disturbance and excitement and Slobodan was remembered as a quiet and diligent pupil. See Slavoljub Djukić, Izmedju slave i anateme: politicˇka biografija Slobodana Miloševića (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1994), pp. 13–17.

For a highly informative and balanced portraits of leading members of the older generation in Serbia see the account of their younger long‐term associate in Čkrebić, Zapis na pesku, pp. 271–340.

For details about the “liberals” and their removal from power see Slavoljub Djukić, Slom srpskih liberala: tehnologija politicˇkih obracˇuna Josipa Broza (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1990). For more information about purges in other Yugoslav republics see Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974 (London: C. Hurst, 1977).

See Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 143–144.

Djukić, Slom srpskih liberala, pp.105–262.

Draža Marković, interview with the author.

The post was subsequently renamed “President of the Presidium of the Central Committee.”

Draža Marković, Špiro Galović, Vaso Milincˇević and two influential members of the regional party Presidium who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author.

Draža Marković, interview with author.

Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 66–67. See the full text of the “Blue Book” in Djekić, Upotreba Srbije.

“Osamnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije,” held in Belgrade, 23–24 November 1984, Dokumenti Saveza Komunista Srbije (Belgrade: Komunist, 1984).

See “Osamnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije.”

In April 1984 Stipe Šuvar, a chief party ideologue in Croatia and a member of the younger generation, initiated a sweeping attack on the partial liberalisation by singling out tens of “anti‐socialist” and “anti‐Titoist” authors who thrived under the new policy. See a full text of the “White Book” in Intervju, No. 11, 1989. Others responded quietly by unanimously rejecting the nomination of Ivan Stambolić for President of the Federal Executive Council (government). See Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 114–115.

Jerry F. Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991 (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 80–86; and Robert V. Daniels, “Soviet Politics since Khrushchev,” in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years (New York: Van Nostrand‐Reinhold, 1971), p. 20.

Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fansoid, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 260–61; and Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, pp. 80–86.

For more information about constitutional and party reforms and elite conflicts and alliances of the late 1960s and early 1970s see Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia; April Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party (London: Frances Pinter, 1982); and Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment.

Steven L. Burg, “Elite Conflict in Post‐Tito Yugoslavia,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1986.

Draža Marković, interview with the author.

Čkrebić, Zapis na pesku, pp. 278, 302–303.

Draža Marković, interview with the author.

A prominent member of the regional Presidium who wanted to remain anonymous, interview with the author.

An anonymous high party official who was in charge of the cadre selection process in the regional party Presidium, interview with the author.

Draža Marković, Boško Krunić, Špiro Galović and two anonymous high party officials, all present at the meeting, interview with the author.

Two influential, anonymous members of the regional party Presidium, at the time a supporter and an opponent of Ivan Stambolić, interviews with the author.

High party and state officials, regardless of their age and proximity to either Stambolić or Milošević at the time, repeated this time and again in interviews with the author.

An anonymous member of the regional Presidium, interview with the author.

Two prominent members of the regional Presidium from the younger generation who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author.

Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 141–142.

Špiro Galović, Vaso Milincˇević, Milenko Marković and another, anonymous member of the regional Presidium, interviews with the author.

Draža Marković, Špiro Galović and two influential members of the regional Presidium who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author.

See full text of the memorandum in Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić, Memorandum SANU: odgovori na kritike (Belgrade: SANU, 1995), pp. 99–147.

Pavlović, Olako obećana brzina, p. 51; and Stambolić, Put u bespuće, p. 131.

Interview with Stipe Šuvar, RFE/RL, South Slavic Service, 3 December 1999, <http://www.danas.org/programi/interview/1999/12/19991203100229.asp>.

For details about the meeting, the grassroots protest of the Kosovo Serbs and their relations with Milošević see Nebojša Vladisavljević, “Nationalism, Social Movement Theory and the Grass Roots Movement of Kosovo Serbs, 1985–1988,” Europe–Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 5, 2002, pp. 771–90.

Pavlović, Olako obećana brzina, p. 52; and Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 167–170.

Vaso Milincˇević, Milenko Marković and another, anynomous member of the regional Presidium, interviews with the author.

Pavlović, Olako obecana brzina, pp. 94–99.

“Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SKS”, Vol. 1; and “Osma sednica CK SKS”, pp. 155–164.

Only 11 out of 20 members of the regional Presidium voted to remove Pavlović from membership of the body. “Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SKS”, Vol. 2, p. 128/3. Other participants of the meeting, members of federal party organs and high state officials, did not have voting rights.

High party officials from the younger generation, including supporters and opponents of Milošević, interviews with the author.

An anonymous member of the Presidium who assisted Stambolić and Milošević in the cadre selection process, and Špiro Galović, interviews with the author.

Draža Marković, Špiro Galović and three anonymous high party officials, interviews with the author.

Špiro Galović, Vaso Milincˇević, Milenko Marković and two anonymous high party officials, interviews with the author.

Pavlović, Olako obećana brzina, pp. 48, 59, 188; and Stambolić, Put u bespuće, p. 162.

“Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SKS,” Vol. 2.

Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 111–12, 171–172; and Pavlović, Olako obećana brzina, pp. 75–76.

Stambolić, Put u bespuće, pp. 147–148.

“Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SKS” and “Osma sednica CK SKS."

“Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SKS,” Vol. 2.

An anonymous member of the regional Presidium, interview with the author.

High party and state officials from the Milošević's group repeatedly stressed the seriousness of the threat in interviews with the author. Another episode fully reveals the extent to which many from the Milošević's group feared Ivan Stambolić, even many years after he had retired from politics. In August 2000, a month before the presidential election that set in motion the demise of Milošević, there were rumours that Ivan Stambolić might enter the presidential race. This should not have been a reason for concern for either Milošević or a democratic opposition candidate, since Stambolić had never enjoyed popular support in Serbia and could not realistically win but a very small fraction of the vote. Nonetheless, some people from the regime apparently believed that he had become a serious threat again. Stambolić was promptly abducted and murdered. His body was found two and a half years later, during the police investigation following the assassination of Zoran Dindić, the Prime Minister of Serbia.