The “mortar massacres”: a controversy revisited

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Notes

Case No. IT‐98‐29‐T, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion.” In Trial Chamber I, Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Judge Amin El Mahdi, Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia. Released 5 December 2003.

Case No. IT‐98‐29‐T, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia.” In Trial Chamber I, Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Judge Amin El Mahdi, Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia. Released 5 December 2003.

Citation from a JNA manual?

Bihać, Goražde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Žepa.

P2261 (U.N. report) p. 43.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 819 (1993) designated the city of Srebrenica and its surrounding area as a Safe Area. UNSCR 824 designated Žepa, Goražde, and Bihać and their surroundings as Safe Areas.

These attacks were only disputed long after the incident by General Galić's defense team as reported in the Judgment and Opinion and Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of the ICTY Trial Chamber.

Dobrinja is in southwest Sarajevo adjacent to the international airport and close to the line of control at the time.

Eyewitnesses at the ICTY testified that between 11 and 16 people were killed because of the explosions. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 376. The post‐attack Canadian UNPROFOR investigation determined that the attack killed 13 people and injured 133. William J. Fenrick, Annex VI.A, “Incident Study Regarding Mortar Shelling, Dobrinja, Sarajevo on 1 June 1993.” UNSC. 28 December 1994.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 376. “81 mm” refers to the diameter of the mortar shell and barrel. This paper discusses 82‐ and 120‐mm mortar shells, and 130‐mm artillery shells. For additional information, see Figures 2 and 3.

Ibid., paragraph 377.

The post‐attack analysis states that “the shells came from the Serbian side, approximately 300 meters south of the Lukavica Barracks.” See Figure 1 for the general location of the Lukavica Barracks relative to the Dobrinja district. William J. Fenrick, Annex VI.A, “Incident Study Regarding Mortar Shelling, Dobrinja, Sarajevo on 1 June 1993.” UNSC, 28 December 1994.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 382.

Ibid., paragraph 388.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia,” paragraph 65.

The UNPROFOR incident investigator stated, “the mortar shell killed 11 persons and wounded 13 others.” ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 389.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 391.

Ibid., paragraph 388–389.

Ibid., paragraph 397.

The defense conclusion “that the direction of fire of the shell was most probably from an ‘East‐Southwest direction’ was based on inverted pictures.” ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 393.

ICTY, ‘ “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia,” paragraph 70.

“Six children had been killed by the explosions and another three children and one adult had been seriously injured.” ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 333.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 335.

“The Trial Chamber finds that Mirza Sabljica employed the correct methodology to determine the direction from which the shells had landed.” ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 341.

Sabljica testified “that all three shells originated in Nedarići, in the vicinity of the Institute for the Blind,” an area occupied by the SRK forces. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 335.

Ibid., paragraph 345.

“The Trial Chamber reiterates that a mere hypothesis is not a basis for reasonable doubt. Some fact or allegation must be relied on to turn a mere possibility into a reasonable one. Moreover, concerning the alleged possibility that the ARBiH mistakenly hit Alipašino Polje while aiming at Nedarići, for which there is not the slightest factual basis, the fact that the two locations are about a kilometre apart, would necessarily exclude such allegation.” ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 342.

Ibid., note 1351.

“The investigation team into the incident was headed by Zdenko Eterović, a judge and investigative magistrate.” ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 403.

Ibid.

Ibid., paragraph 404.

Ibid., paragraph 406.

The attack “was, at the very least, indiscriminate as to its target (which nevertheless was primarily if not entirely a residential neighborhood), and was carried out recklessly, resulting in civilian casualties.” Ibid., paragraph 410.

Chuck Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 232–234; Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 147–150.

Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), p. 385.

Ibid., p. 387.

Alexander G. Higgens, “Tuzla, First Anniversary,” Associated Press World Stream, International News, 25 May 1996.

Shoup and Burg, War in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, pp. 162, 165; Sudetic, Blood and Vengeance, p. 248; Charles G. Boyd, “Making Peace with the Guilty: the Truth about Bosnia, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, 1995, pp. 22–38.

Tom Gjelten, Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View (Washington, DC: Carnegie Corporation of New York, June 1998), <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/gj/gjfr.htm⟩.

Leonard Doyle, “Muslims Slaughter Their Own People,” The Independent, 22 August 1992, p. 1.

Mackenzie tells Gjelten, “It will take other investigations, other than somebody who saw it from afar or only saw bits and pieces of the evidence, to come to a conclusive finding.” Tom Gjelten, “Blaming the Victim,” New Republic, 20 December 1993, pp. 14–16.

Ibid.

Gjelten, Professionalism in War Reporting, p. 17.

Keith Doubt, Sociology after Bosnia and Kosovo: Recovering Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Letter presented as evidence item D138.1. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 440.

Bosnian Muslim representation refused to comply with this request. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 440.

Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), pp. 229–230.

The origin of incoming fire is calculated in degrees, beginning with true North (0°) and proceeding clockwise in a 360‐degree arc, with East 90°, South 180°, and West 270°.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 445–447.

This team comprised Major Sahaisar Khan, Commandant John Hamill, and Captain Jose Grande.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 446–449.

P2261 (U.N. report).

With an absolute minimal angle of 49.15 degrees due to structures blocking lower flight paths.

P2261 (U.N. report) p. 4. ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 449 and note 1628.

David Binder, “Anatomy of a Massacre,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 97, 1994–1995, pp. 70–78.

Interview with British UNPROFOR Captain Ken Lindsay.

Mark Danner, “Bosnia: the Turning Point,” New York Review of Books, 5 February 1998, p. 34–41.

Binder, “Anatomy of a Massacre,” pp. 77–78.

In addition, the ongoing Slobodan Milosevic Hague trial is re‐examining this incident.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” note 1560.

Principal local investigators: Mirza Sabljica, and Berko Zečević had investigated prior mortar incidents in Sarajevo. At the time Hamdija Čavčić, was “a police investigator in the Department for Criminal and Technical Investigations in Sarajevo” (ICTY, paragraph 391). ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 441.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 443.

Ibid., paragraph 444.

Reported by multiple sources to be between 200 and 250 mm

The fact that the tailfin was present in the crater proves that the shell was moving at a velocity greater than 150 meters per second. See Figure 3.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 481.

Ibid., paragraph 459.

Ibid., paragraph 454–460.

Ibid., paragraph 453.

Ibid., paragraph 449.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia,” paragraph 73.

Case No. IT‐98‐29‐T. “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia.” In Trial Chamber I, Before: Judge Alphons Orie, Judge Amin El Mahdi, Judge Rafael Nieto‐Navia. Released 5 December 2003. Paragraphs 92, 94, 98–101, 488, 493, 495–496.

The U.S. Army field manual for artillery states, “It is possible to do the following: verify as confined locations, suspected locations that have been obtained by other means. Confirm the presence of enemy artillery and obtain an approximate direction to it. Detect the presence of new types of enemy weapons, new calibers, or new ammunition manufacturing methods.” This manual ignores the possibility of determining range estimates through post‐impact analysis. Although it does state, “often, tail fins are found in the fuze tunnel of the crater,” it does not elaborate on a method for extrapolating range from the tailfin. U.S. Military Field Manual FM 6‐50, Appendix J “Crater Analysis and Reporting,” Section J‐4.

Interview with Bill Stuebner, former advisor to the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and a senior staff member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation, working in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, 12 December 2003. See Figure 3.

Chuck Sudetic, “Bosnia Army Said to Shell Its Own Area,” New York Times, 11 November 1994, p. 10.

Mike O'Connor, “Investigation Concludes Bosnian Government Snipers Shot at Civilians,” New York Times, 1 August 1995, p. 6.

Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Vol. 1 (Washington: Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), pp. 377–378.

The forensic report has never been released, even at the Galić trial. According to Burg and Shoup, who interviewed a source close to the investigation, the shell was one of five salvoes, the other four had definitely originated from VRS positions, but the origin of the all‐important fifth shell that inflicted the casualties could not be ascertained, probably because it had been deflected just before impact. War in Bosnia‐Herzegivina, p. 168.

Andrei Naryshkin, “Russian Commander Question UN Probe into Sarajevo Attack,” Tass, 3 September 1995.

Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Vol. 1 (Washington: Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), p. 417.

Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992–1995 (Munich, Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna and London: Lit Verlag, 2003), p. 68; 5 October 2004 interview with the author.

ICTY, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Judgment and Opinion,” paragraph 342.

Interview with UNPROFOR Captain Ken Lindsay, who employed parallel logic in giving responsibility for the 5 February 1994 Markale salvo, which he recounted as one of an estimated 600 that fell on Sarajevo that day.

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Notes on contributors

Benjamin Rusek