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Notes
∗I am thankful to anonymous reviewers, Francis Fukuyama, Seymour Martin Lipset, Philip Roeder, and Olga Shvetsova for their comments and suggestions on various stages of this project. I would like to acknowledge Hans Klingemann for providing the dataset of the 1996 World Values Survey in Ukraine. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association in 2001 in San Francisco and in 2005 in Washington, DC. Responsibility for any mistakes remains my own. For a detailed comparative analysis of regional cleavages and conflicts in Ukraine and Moldova, see Ivan Katchanovski, Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova, Soviet & Post-Soviet Politics & Society 33 (Stuttgart: ibdem-Verlag, 2006).
1. Although the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc included some former leaders of nationalist parties, these parties were not members of this bloc.
2. Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.gov.ua>, 2004, 2006.
3. Bohdan Harasymiw, “Elections in Post-Communist Ukraine, 1994–2004: An Overview,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 47, Nos 3–4, 2005, p 224.
4. Ibid., pp. 191–239.
5. See Lowell Barrington, “The Geographic Component of Mass Attitudes in Ukraine,” Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. 38, No. 10, 1997, pp. 601–614; Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine (New York: St. Martin Press, 2000); Sarah Birch, “Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2000, pp. 1017–1042; Ralph Clem and Peter Craumer, “Shades of Orange: The Electoral Geography of Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 46, No. 5, 2005, pp. 364–385; Peter Craumer and James Clem, “Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1999, pp. 1–26; Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, “Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine,” in Taras Kuzio, ed., Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 60–80; Paul Kubicek, “Regional Polarization in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2000, pp. 273–294; Vicki Hesli, “Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine: Regional Patterns,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1995, pp. 91–121; Oksana Malanchuk, “Social Identification Versus Regionalism in Contemporary Ukraine,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, pp. 345–368; William Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood, Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Arthur Miller, Thomas Klobucar and William Reisinger, “Establishing Representation: Mass and Elite Political Attitudes in Ukraine,” in Sharon Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich, eds, Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 213–235; Stephen Shulman, “Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity,” Political Geography, Vol. 18, No. 8, 1999, pp. 913–939.
6. Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 157–188.
7. Craumer and Clem, “Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography”; Hesli, “Public Support for the Devolution of Power in Ukraine.”
8. See Birch, Elections; Birch, “Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics,” in Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996), pp. 138, 165; Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Steven Roper and Florin Fesnic, “Historical Legacies and Their Impact on Post-Communist Voting Behaviour,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, 2003, pp. 119–131.
9. See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; Katchanovski, Cleft Countries.
10. Ukrainian- and Russian-language studies of regional cleavages in post-Soviet Ukraine are mostly descriptive in nature. See, for example, Politychna kul'tura: Teoria, problemy, perspektyvy (Kyiv: Parapan, 2004); Anatolii Romaniuk and Natalia Chernysh, “Shid-Zahid: Kompromis chy konfrontatsia,” Filosofs'ka i sotsiolohichna dumka, Vols 3–4, 1995, pp. 104–116. Ukrainian- and Russian-language studies often reflect political value judgments concerning the regional divisions. For example, publications by pro-nationalist scholars refer to Eastern Ukraine as an “ugly” and heavily criminalized region. See, for example, Mykola Riabchuk, Dvi Ukrainy: Realni mezhi, virtual'ni viiny (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2003). Similarly, publications by pro-Russian and pro-Communist scholars in Ukraine and Russia often brand Western Ukrainians as banderivtsi, or followers of the radical and militant nationalist organization active during World War II.
11. See Lowell Barrington and Erick Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?: Regionalism in Ukraine and its Political Consequences,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2004, pp. 53–86.
12. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965); Larry Diamond, “Causes and Effects,” in Larry Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1993), pp. 229–249; Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966); Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990); Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
13. Findings of such culturally-based stable patterns of regional political behavior provide evidence against rational choice theories, which maintain that it is self-interest and not values that motivates people to vote for political parties and candidates. See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). Similarly, such culturally-based stable voting patterns challenge theories of irrational voters, which, for example, attribute the narrow victory of George Bush, the Republican Party candidate in the 2000 US presidential elections, to several million voters who voted against Al Gore, the incumbent Democratic Party candidate, because they blamed the United States vice president for drought in their states. See Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, “Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 29 August–1 September 2002.
14. Diamond, Political Culture; Elazar, American Federalism; Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Lipset, Continental Divide; Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work.
15. Max Weber, “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences,” in Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, eds, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 181–183.
16. See Ivan Katchanovski, “Divergence in Growth in Post-Communist Countries,” Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2000, pp. 55–81; Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments,” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1–64; Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work.
17. Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997); Robert Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).
18. See Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Subtelny, Ukraine.
19. See Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Subtelny, Ukraine; Orest Subtelny, “Russocentrism, Regionalism, and the Political Culture of Ukraine,” in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 189–207.
20. See Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Subtelny, Ukraine.
21. Ivan Katchanovski, “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 6, 2005, pp. 877–894.
22. Similarly, historical experience in many regions in the geographic Center, South, and East of Ukraine differed before their incorporation by the Russian Empire. There were also differences in settlement patterns in these regions during Russian and Soviet rule.
23. See Katchanovski, Cleft Countries.
24. Rondald Inglehart et al., World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981–1984, 1990–1993, and 1995–1997 [computer file] (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 2000).
25. The inclusion of short periods of Russian and Soviet rule and non-Russian or non-Soviet rule does not significantly change regression results.
26. Regression results are not sensitive to choice of different base year for historical experience in regions of Ukraine.
27. See Barrington and Herron, “One Ukraine or Many?”
28. Because its population is much smaller than that of other regions of Ukraine, this study includes data for Sevastopol city, which has a special regional status, in data for Crimea.
29. See Inglehart et al., World Values Surveys and European Values Survey. A similar World Values Survey was conducted in Ukraine in December 1999, but this survey is not as suitable as the 1995 survey for regression analysis, because the 1999 survey did not include questions on ethnicity and language of the respondents.
30. In 2006, in contrast to the 2002 elections, the Ukrainian People's Party was not part of the “Our Ukraine” Bloc, but led the Ukrainian People's Bloc.
31. See Craumer and Clem, “Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography”; Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, <http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net>, 2000, 2002; Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, 2004; Katchanovski, Cleft Countries; Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
32. Ibid. and Andrew Wilson, “Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 7, 1997, pp. 1293–1316. In contrast to the 1994 presidential elections, Leonid Kravchuk, who was the Soviet Communist Party ideology chief in Soviet Ukraine, during the 1991 elections advocated a relatively more pro-Russian political program compared to his nationalist opponents.
33. The regional vote for the Civic Congress candidates in the 1994 parliamentary elections is not available. However, candidates from this party received only 0.4% of the national vote in the first round of the 1994 elections, and they won only two out of the 450 electoral districts in the second round.
34. The weakest correlation (0.33) between the vote for the independence of Ukraine and the vote for Leonid Kuchma in the 1999 presidential elections is statistically significant at the 0.1 level.