Building the Nation, Instrumentalizing Nationalism: Revisiting Romanian National-Communism, 1956–1989

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Notes

During the period 1948–1965, the official name of the communist party in Romania was Partidul Muncitoresc Român—PMR (Romanian Workers' Party—RWP); from 1965 to 1989 the official name was Partidul Comunist Român—PCR (Romanian Communist Party—RCP). The two terms are used in accordance with the period discussed and are not interchangeable.

Quoted in Skilling, Communism National and International, 3.

Particularly useful for the present analysis is Breuilly's emphasis on nationalism as a political argument. See Breuilly, Nationalism and the State.

Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, 99.

This author follows the distinction between “patrimonial,” “national-accommodative” and “bureaucratic-authoritarian” communist regimes put forward by Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Tóka. According to the said authors, “patrimonial communism” can be characterized as follows:

• It relies on vertical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive patronage and clientelist networks … Political power is concentrated around a small clique or an individual ruler worshiped by a personality cult. The level of rational-bureaucratic institutionalization in state and party remains low because the ruling clique penetrates the apparatus through nepotistic appointments … Rulers firmly repress any stirring of opposition demanding rights to participation or they co-opt potentially resourceful challengers through selective incentives … Patrimonial communism was likely to emerge in historical settings where a traditional authoritarian regime, assisted by compliant religious leaders, ruled over societies of poor peasants … weak cities, a thin layer of ethnic pariah immigrant entrepreneurs and merchants, a small and geographically concentrated industrial working class, and a corrupt coterie of administrators dependent on the personal whims of the ruler. (See Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist Party Systems, 23–24, emphasis added)

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6–7, original emphasis.

For the idea of “organized solidarities” see Duţu, “‘Europa noastră’ gîndită şi trăită,” 8–12, original emphasis.

Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism, 223.

Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 1.

Connor and Płoszajski, “Introduction” to idem, Escape from Socialism, 16.

Concerning RWP/RCP membership over the period 1945–1955 and its subsequent steady growth until 1989 see Ionescu-Guraˇ, “Introductory Study” to Dobre et al., Membrii C.C. al P.C.R., 1945–1989, 20–22.

The “first” revolution was the Revolution of October 1917, while the “second” Soviet revolution was the “revolution from above” of 1928–41. As Tucker puts it: “The revolution from above was a state-initiated, state-directed, and state-enforced process … State power was the driving force of economic, political, social, and cultural change that was revolutionary in rapidity of accomplishment, forcible methods, and transformative effect.” Tucker, “Preface” to Stalin in Power, xiv.

This author follows Tismăneanu's conceptualization of the three “centres” of power from within the RCP during the Second World War period: (1) the underground Central Committee; (2) the centre from prisons; and (3) the centre in Moscow. See Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 119–25; page numbers are to the Romanian edition (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2005). In the aftermath of the Second World War, the inner circle of communist power in Romania was composed of militants who, beginning in 1933, stayed in prison together with Gheorghiu-Dej and were part of his “group from prisons,” such as Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnăraş, Iosif Chişinevschi, Miron Constantinescu, Chivu Stoica and Nicolae Ceauşescu.

Avoiding factionalism and thus preserving the unity of the party was a most salient feature of the political culture of Romanian communism. Gheorghiu-Dej, for instance, stated that the “most precious asset” of the party was its unity:

• The unity of the Party's ranks is its most precious asset. Without this unity, characteristic to a new type of Marxist-Leninist Party, we could not obtain successes in fulfilling the historical tasks that stayed ahead of us. The preoccupation for the unyielding unity of the Party, for the purity of its ranks, for the education of the Party members in the spirit of vigilance against the class enemy from inside and outside the Party and of intransigence towards deviations from the Party line, is a permanent duty for every Party organization. (Gheorghiu-Dej, 30 de ani de luptă a Partidului sub steagul lui Lenin şi Stalin, 59)

The emancipation of the party was another essential feature of the RCP political culture, originating in the inter-war period when the party was not only small and marginal but was also compelled to follow unabatedly the orders coming from the Kremlin. This explains the emergence of what sociologist Pavel Câmpeanu has termed the “anti-Soviet Stalinism” of the Romanian communist elite. Câmpeanu, Ceauşescu, 178–79.

The Gheorghiu-Dej regime provided immediate and unconditional support for the re-establishment of Soviet-type rule in Hungary. Members of the so-called Imre Nagy group were transported to Romania against their will and kept under close surveillance by the Romanian Securitate in villas belonging to the RCP in the Snagov resort, on the shore of Lake Snagov, outside Bucharest (23 November 1956–14 April 1957). For more details, see Nagy, Însemnări de la Snagov. For the influence of the Hungarian Revolution on the mindset of the Romanian communists elite see Petrescu, “Fifty-Six as an Identity-Shaping Experience,” 48–68. For a chronology of the events in Hungary over the period 1953–1963 see Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, xxxiii–l.

Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy, 122–140.

For a collection of documents related to the position of communist Romania with regard to the Tito–Stalin split see Constantiniu and Pop, Schisma roşie.

See Declaraţie cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român.

This author follows Jowitt's conceptualization of the selective community-building process. See Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs, 74.

The most recent estimate places the number of political prisoners at around 600,000. If one adds the people deported, placed under house arrest, interned in labour camps in the Soviet Union, etc., the total number of direct victims of the communist repression rises to approximately 2,000,000 individuals. See Rusan, Cronologia şi geografia represiunii comuniste din România, 61–62.

Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs, 224.

For the wave of repression launched in 1958 see Rusan, Cronologia şi geografia represiunii comuniste din România, 31–34. For more on the forced collectivization process, see Iancu et al., Colectivizarea agriculturii în România; Roske et al., Colectivizarea agriculturii în România.

Neagoe-Pleşa and Pleşa, Dosarul Ana Pauker, 251.

Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, 150.

Petrescu, “Vizitele de lucru, un ritual al Epocii de aur,” 229–38.

Goma, Amnezia la români, 54.

Constantin Munteanu, Ultimii şapte ani de-acasă, 120.

Such a three-level model of analysis is put forward in Petrescu, “Communist Legacies in the ‘New Europe,’” 37–54.

Trebici, Demografie, 28; Alexandrescu, Recensămintele României, 93–94.

See table 2.6 in Mureşan, Evoluţii economice, 1945–1990, 92.

Montias, Economic Development in Communist Rumania, 1.

During the period 1965–1975, the regime paid special attention to the housing sector. The data provided below have been compiled from official sources and should be considered with caution. Nonetheless, they provide an idea about the general trend of augmenting the housing stock and improving the quality of housing. Thus, in 1965 new urban housing represented 45.3% of the total, while in 1975 it represented 81.7% of the total. The number of newly built dwellings with three or more rooms increased, therefore allowing more living space per person. In 1965, out of a total of 191,988 dwellings put into occupancy, 57,116 dwellings had one room (29.8%); 85,080 (44.3%) had two rooms; and 49,792 (25.9%) had three rooms or more. In 1970, out of 159,152 dwellings put into occupancy, 26,548 (16.7%) had one room; 83,935 (52.7%) had two rooms; and 48,669 (30.6%) had three rooms or more. In 1975, out of a total of 165,431 dwellings put into occupancy, 14,952 (9.0%) had one room; 83,148 (50.3%) had two rooms; and 67,331 (40.7%) had three rooms or more. Although the housing stock grew, demand remained high: in 1975, for instance, in urban areas the housing deficit amounted to 150,000 dwellings. Data compiled by the author from: table 12.12, “Housing Put into Occupancy, by Number of Rooms and Sources of Funds, 1965–1975”; and table SA8.7, “Housing Turned over to Occupancy, 1965–1976,” in Tsantis and Pepper, Romania, 298–99 and 666–71, respectively.

The integration of rural regions was closely linked to the development of the road and railway networks, as well as to the modernization of the means of transport. During the period 1950–1989 the railway network increased by 10.4%, and by the end of the communist period the railway density amounted to 47.8 kilometres per 1,000 square kilometres. By the end of the period, the share of electrified railway lines grew from 0.6% to 32.2%, while the share of two-way railway lines grew from 3.6% to 26%, which increased the speed of transportation both for passengers and goods. See Mureşan, Evoluţii economice, 1945–1990, 127. With regard to the road network, in 1956 paved roads made up only 4.8% of the total network of 76,000 kilometres, while in 1980 paved roads made up 20% of the total road network. As for rural electrification, in 1945 only 535 villages out of a total number of 15,000 were connected to the national grid, while in 1965 there were 3,034 electrified villages; by 1970 the number had risen to 10,591. See Ronnås, Urbanization in Romania, 246. See also Chapter 7—“The Development of Communications and Social Services,” in Gilberg, Modernization in Romania since World War II, 190–206.

Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, 64.

This was not characteristic solely of Romania. As Schöpflin notes, during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, “the street fighters were overwhelmingly made up of workers motivated by anti-Russian sentiments, as well as a vaguer commitment to freedom and democracy.” Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, 156.

The following sample is telling: “The incursion in Czechoslovakia of the troops belonging to the five socialist countries represents a big mistake and a serious threat to peace in Europe and for the destiny of socialism in the world.” Ceauşescu's speech of 21 August 1968 was first published by the party daily Scînteia, no. 7802, Thursday 22 August 1968, 1.

The same day, the GNA adopted a document whose importance was equalled only by that of the “Declaration of April 1964”: Declaraţia Marii Adunări Naţionale a R.S.R. [Declaration of the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania]. See Principiile de bază ale politicii externe a României.

Schöpflin, Nations, Identity, Power, 89.

Ceauşescu, “Cuvîntare la marea adunare populară din municipiul Cluj—30 august 1968” [Speech Delivered at the Mass Rally in the City of Cluj—30 August 1968], in România pe drumul desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste, 478.

Ceauşescu, “Expunere la şedinţa jubiliară a Marii Adunări Naţionale consacrată sărbătoririi semicentenarului unirii Transilvaniei cu România—29 noiembrie 1968” [Speech Delivered at the Special Session of the Grand National Assembly Dedicated to the Celebration of 50 Years since the Unification of Transylvania with Romania—29 November 1968], in România pe drumul desăvîrşirii construcţiei socialiste, 745–46.

See Trebici, Demografie, 30; Alexandrescu, Recensămintele României, 100.

As Weber puts it: “there were no better instruments of indoctrination and patriotic conditioning than French history and geography, especially history.” See Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, 333–34.

See “Partea I—Lupta poporului român, a forţelor progresiste şi revoluţionare, a clasei muncitoare, a partidului comunist pentru libertate socială şi naţională, împotriva fascismului şi războiului, pentru înfăptuirea insurecţiei naţionale armate antifasciste şi antiimperialiste” [Part I—The Struggle of the Romanian People, the Progressive and Revolutionary Forces, the Working Class, the Communist Party for Social and National Liberty, against Fascism and the War, for Accomplishing the Anti-fascist and Anti-imperialist National Armed Insurrection], in Programul Partidului Comunist Român, 27–51.

See “Partea a II-a—Lupta partidului comunist pentru instaurarea puterii revoluţionar-democratice, răsturnarea claselor exploatatoare, înfăptuirea revoluţiei socialiste şi edificarea noii orînduiri sociale” [The Struggle of the Communist Party for Establishing the Democratic-Revolutionary Power, Overthrowing of the Exploiting Classes, Accomplishment of the Socialist Revolution and Constructing the New Social Order], in Programul Partidului Comunist Român, 52–64.

Michael the Brave was born in 1558 and obtained the throne of Wallachia in September 1593. After the battle of Şelimbăr (18/28 October 1599), he occupied Transylvania and became Habsburg governor of the province (while also ruling over Wallachia). On 6/16 May 1600 his troops entered and occupied Moldavia. During the months of June, July and August 1600 he was at the height of his power, ruling over the three principalities inhabited by a Romanian-speaking population: Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia. After the battle of Mirăslău (8/18 September 1600), Michael was forced to renounce the throne. He returned to Transylvania with the military support of Emperor Rudolph II in July 1601, but was assassinated on 9/19 August 1601 on the orders of the Habsburg General Giorgio Basta. For a classic interpretation of the reign of Michael the Brave see Giurescu and Giurescu, Istoria Românilor, 324–80.

For details regarding the movies Dacii and Mihai Viteazul see Modorcea, Dicţionarul filmului românesc de ficţiune, 164–65 and, respectively, 198–99. On the rankings devised by the National Centre of Cinematography regarding the most watched Romanian movies of all times see “Cele mai vizionate filme româneşti din toate timpurile” [The Most Watched Romanian Movies of All Time], in Cotidianul (Bucharest), 23 August 2005, <http://cotidianul.ro/cele_mai_vizionate_filme_romanesti_din_toate_timpurile-2116.html> (accessed 29 July 2008). Mihai Viteazul was watched by 13,330,000 people while Dacii was watched by 13,112,000.

Amza Pellea also played the Dacian king Decebal in Dacii. As for his comedic talents, he impersonated Nea Mărin, a charming and witty peasant from the village of Băileşti, Oltenia, whose common sense and popular wisdom enchanted generations of TV viewers and cinemagoers in Romania. Actually, the most viewed Romanian movie of all time is Sergiu Nicolaescu's comedy Nea Mărin miliardar [Nea Mărin, a Billionaire] in which Amza Pellea plays the central character. The movie was released in 1979 and was watched by 14,650,000 people. Ibid.

In the post-1989 period, the movie was first re-released in a VHS/PAL version. In 2008, the daily newspaper Adevărul initiated a commercial campaign of each week selling a Romanian movie together with the newspaper. Mihai Viteazul was sold in 90,000 copies, Dacii in 100,000, and Nea Mărin miliardar in 90,000. See Ioana Bogdan, “Vânzări-record la colecţia de filme” [Record Sales of the Film Collection], in Adevărul (Bucharest), 16 August 2008, <http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/vanzari-record-la-colectia-de-filme.html> (accessed 3 October 2008).

The official name of the festival was: “Festivalul naţional al educaţiei şi culturii socialiste ‘Cîntarea României’” (National Festival of Socialist Education and Culture “Song of Praise to Romania”). For more on the organization of the first edition (1976/1977) of the festival see Almanahul Scînteia 1977, 69–72.