What use was the election to us? Clientelism and political trust amongst ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

Abstract

This paper posits that a great deal of cross-national variation in clientelistic investment strategies can be explained through an examination of the different forms of risk faced by the political elite of different types of regimes. It also maintains that demand from clients/potential clients is, by itself, insufficient to explain the level or scope of clientelistic investments. The argument is advanced through an examination of the linkages (and non-linkages) between patrons/potential patrons and clients/potential clients amongst the ethnic Uzbek populations of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, a semi-authoritarian state, electoral risk predominates; however, the character of electoral risk in Kyrgyzstan provides Uzbek members of the political elite with an incentive to diversify their clientelistic investments. Consequently, many engage in direct exchanges with their constituents while simultaneously investing in private, cultural organizations that serve party-like functions. Alternatively, in contemporary Tajikistan, best described as an authoritarian state, electoral risk has been replaced with the risk of expulsion from the presidential clientelistic network. As a result, members of the Tajikistani political elite have a disincentive to publicly invest in constituent clients as this investment may increase the risk of expulsion.

Keywords:

• ethnicity
• clientelism
• political trust
• Central Asia

Acknowledgements

The research for this article was supported by a Fulbright-Hays DDRA Fellowship. The author is grateful to Vera Heuer, Timothy Rich and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. All the standard caveats apply. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 14th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), New York, 23–25 April 2009.

Notes

In Uzbek, aka means big brother and is used as a sign of respect.

From a women's focus group conducted in Jalalabad City, Kyrgyzstan: 25 February 2008. To protect the anonymity of my respondents, the names have been changed in all of the focus group excerpts.

Both of these numbers should be viewed skeptically as the census is frequently utilized as a political tool in Central Asia (Ferrando 489–520).

Although it should be noted that Radnitz's important dissertation explores the link between networks, patrons and mobilization across Kyrgyzstan, and is not interested exclusively in ethnic clientelism.

This definition differs from recent definitions offered by Kitschelt/Wilkinson and Stokes by not limiting the constituency to an electoral constituency (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2; “Political Clientelism” 604–05). In this way, it is more in line with the classic literature on clientelism (Lemarchand 69; Scott 92). Also in this paper, I do not distinguish between different forms of clientelism, such as tribute, patronage and prebendalism.

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

Radnitz's examination of patronage in Uzbekistan reaches a similar conclusion in that state.

Each community met the following three criteria: (1) between 250 and 550 households; (2) described as having a population that is at least 90% ethnically Uzbek; and (3) relatively accessible by car under normal road conditions. The specific names of the communities have been withheld to ensure the anonymity of my sources.

Two focus groups (a men's group and a women's group) were conducted in each community. In compiling and analyzing these data, I am indebted to the assistance of countless individuals including: Bahrom Mananov; Bakyt Tatibecov; Nargiza Kiger; Babur Bolshoev; Shuhrat Pulatov; Akmal Salomov; Akmaljan Ergashev; Umeed Gufranov; Umidjon Alimatov; Inomjon Mamadaliev; and Otchil Zakhidov. In both countries the survey was conducted by SIAR-Bishkek.

These two politicians are unrelated.

Focus group conducted on 25 February 2008.

Fumagalli (“Informal Ethnopolitics”) reports some similar opinions of Sobirov expressed by local journalists.

Focus group conducted on 30 January 2008.

Focus group conducted on 6 February 2008.

Although in Aravan the extent of this assistance seems limited.

At the time, 20 som was roughly equal to 60 cents.

Osh, also known as Plov, is a rice and meat dish and is a staple of the Central Asian diet.

This quotation is drawn from the women's focus group conducted in Jalalabad on 25 February 2008.

While not necessarily representative, several Uzbeks I talked to in Osh after the December 2007 election admitted that they looked for both the number of Uzbeks on the party lists as well as the placement of Uzbeks on the lists (how high up on the list an Uzbek was) in order to select a party to support. The question of why, if they are likely to be supported by a large number of co-ethnics regardless of their behavior, would these candidates invest any resources, however minimal, into the communities remains open. The most likely answer is that doing so increases turnout.

For example, the current director of the Osh Regional Uzbek National Cultural Center is the mayor of Kara-Suu, Akhmadjan Rakhimov; Davron Sobirov founded and still directs the Uzbek Society; Mamsaidov had been the president of the Kyrgyzstan Republic Uzbek National Cultural Center and, in Jalalabad, Kadyrjan Batyrov founded and heads the Jalalabad Regional Uzbek National Cultural Center named after Alisher Navoi.

Interview with A. Alimjanova, director of the Osh City Uzbek National Center, 29 March 2008; interview with Akhmadjan Rahimov, 8 April 2008; interview with Ulughbek Abdusalomov, vice-director of the Jalalabad Regional Uzbek National Cultural Center named after Alisher Navoi, 22 April 2008.

Based on my observations of the April 2008 Qurultoy (assembly) to select the new leadership of the National center, it appears that this center often exacerbates tensions between the leaders. On this occasion, several prominent leaders and their delegates, including Mamasaidov, staged a walk-out before any vote was taken on the new leadership. These events are described in Boboev.

The men's group in the Osh neighborhood had the most negative things to say about the role of the centers, despite the fact that the survey revealed a high opinion of the centers in this neighborhood. This demonstrates that, despite their usefulness, focus group interviews should not be considered representative.

Focus group conducted on 6 February 2008.

Focus group conducted on 6 February 2008.

Interview conducted in Osh, 16 April 2008.

Interview conducted with Osh-based journalist, 29 April 2008

It is worth underscoring that the majority of focus group and survey respondents viewed these centers in a favorable light. Batyrov's university (International Friendship University named after Alim Batyrov) seems to serve a similar purpose as the centers in that some respondents suggested that they saw this university as primarily an option for Uzbek students.

A few of my interview subjects stressed the importance of these centers in mobilizing voters. Interview with Isatillo Rakhmatillaev, 4 April 2008; interview with Osh-based journalist, 29 April 2008.

This is not to imply that Batyrov did not have private interests in organizing the rally.

Until his assassination in September 2005, Erkinbaev was a member of parliament and one of the richest men in Kyrgyzstan.

200–500 som is roughly $5–14. Interview conducted on 4 April 2008.

Interview with NGO worker living in Osh, 29 March 2008.

University students are often used to increase turnout in elections in Central Asia. Deans will demand that students vote multiple times for a specific person or party. Students who refuse face daunting sanctions, such as expulsion or failing grades.

Even this percentage of votes may not have been enough to get the party into parliament in December 2007 since an additional electoral rule stipulated that in order to receive seats in the Jogurku Kenesh every party needed to receive a certain percentage of votes in every region. The main opposition party, Ata Meken, was kept out of parliament because it did not receive the necessary percentage in Osh. It is likewise doubtful whether Rodina would have received enough votes in the heavily Kyrgyz oblasts of Naryn or Talas to qualify.

The principles of the Adolat movement, Tohir Yuldashev and Jumaboi Khodjaev (later known as Juma Namangani) would eventually form the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the late 1990s.

By most accounts, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have had more success in limiting the emergence of rivals to their monopolization of violence. For a thoughtful examination of the factors that led to Tajikistan's state collapse see Markowitz.

This was a brutal process: according to UN estimates, the war left 20,000–40,000 individuals dead, 600,000 people internally displaced and 100,000 refugees (Lynch 832).

At the micro-level, ethnicity was often utilized as a heuristic by combatants to determine the affiliations of families and villages, however; for example, in Tursunzade, Uzbek villagers described to me how they, and not their Tajik neighbors, were targeted when an opposition force gained control of their village.

Tajikistan's parliament, Majlisi Oli, is divided into two houses. Representatives in the lower house, Majlisi Namoyandagon, are elected through a mixed single member and proportional system; representatives in the upper house, Majlisi Milli, are appointed.

This was expressed by many of the journalists that I interviewed: journalist based in Dushanbe, 12 July 2008; journalist based in Dushanbe, 18 July 2008; journalist based in Dushanbe, 22 July 2008; journalist based in Khojent, 22 October 2008.

This statement is taken from a focus group conducted on 24 August 2008. Given the closed nature of the Tajikistani political system, it is possible that this response indicates a reluctance to speak truthfully about the political environment; however, similar statements regarding the general political ignorance of the population were offered by journalists (n. 41) who were otherwise quite open in discussing politics in the country.

Of course, the severity of this risk may vary between cases. Following expulsion, some elites may be able to fare quite well in a neighboring country or even in a remote part of Tajikistan provided they maintain access to some of the resources that they accumulated while in the presidential network. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

The OSCE's 2005 report on Tajikistan's parliamentary elections makes note of the underrepresentation of Uzbeks in the political system. It is important to note that a common complaint amongst Uzbeks in Tajikistan is that positions in the government are blocked unless they officially change the nationality listed in their passport: a process that is easy to arrange with the proper bribe.

Additionally, it has branches in several of the heavily Uzbek-populated districts of the region.

Interview in Khojent, 7 October 2008.

It is unlikely that the large number of “no opinion” responses is due to respondent reluctance to answer truthfully to this question. When asked about the cultural centers, focus group respondents did not indicate that this question was overtly political or controversial. More overtly political questions on the survey (e.g. “Have Uzbek–Tajik relations improved, worsened or stayed the same over the past year”) garnered significantly fewer “no opinion” responses.

Responses during my focus group interviews add credence to these findings: the following exchange from a focus group in Taboshar conducted on 15 October 2008 in which two men disagree about whether the Uzbek Society is still operational is illustrative:

• Timur: During the Soviet times there was an Uzbek Society. It would collect money but now there isn't such a thing.Sardor: The Uzbek Society publishes the “Qadriyat” and “Tong” newspapers. People from this Society bring these papers and sell them in local schools. We were unable to subscribe to these papers because they were not certified. The Society needs money so we buy their papers and support them this way.

TadAz changed its name to TALCO in 2007.

This perspective was offered in interviews conducted with several village officials in the region of Tursunzade; interviews conducted on 24 June 2008, 29 June 2008, 30 June 2008 and 15 July 2008. However, as the following quotation from the men's focus group in the Tursunzade village indicates, Nazarov did not assist the villages of the region in an equal manner: “He [Nazarov] didn't help here. He helped his own village, helped his friends and those he knew. But the roads in this village and the roads in the villages that Avaz Aka helped are very different. He brought gas to his village but he did nothing to help this village.” This focus group was conducted on 29 August 2008.

The corruption charges, however, followed him to Britain.

Two separate journalists interviewed in Dushanbe on 22 July 2008 suggested that Rahmon's hold on power may be slipping. If true, the clientelistic networks would undoubtedly be drastically rearranged. See also International Crisis Group, Tajikistan 19–20.