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Abstract
This study aims at analyzing the impact of the European integration process on Kurdish nationalism in Turkey by focusing on the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) as the major pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey between 2005 and 2009. It argues that the Europeanization process in Turkey, which accelerated in the post-Helsinki period, has brought about some important consequences concerning the recognition and expression of Kurdish identity. The study examines Europe's impact on the DTP through analysis of party documents and interviews with party representatives, in order to investigate the meaning and use of the European integration process in the DTP's sub-state nationalist ideology. This analysis shows that, although the Europeanization process in Turkey has somewhat broadened opportunity structures for Kurdish sub-state nationalist politics, overall the EU's impact on the DTP's nationalist politics has remained indirect and limited.
Notes
The type of electoral system is a major factor in determining the type of political party system. While proportional representation would benefit sub-state nationalist political parties by raising their parliamentary representation, in majoritarian systems voters may refrain from voting for parties that are unlikely to win any seat (Catt and Murphy). In addition to the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the state's capacity and propensity for repression affects opportunity structures. McAdam et al. (10) also note the importance of the presence and stability of elite allies.
The Franco dictatorship in Spain and the discovery of oil in Scotland can be given as examples of fomenting factors from different contexts (see Saylan).
As an ethno-political question, it has various dimensions including cultural rights, socio-economic underdevelopment of largely Kurdish areas (southeastern Turkey), high levels of unemployment, and terrorism (see Keyman).
Upon his capture in Kenya, Öcalan was brought to Turkey 16 February 1999. He was sentenced to death; his sentence was later commuted to life-long imprisonment without parole when the death penalty was abolished in Turkey in August 2002.
Tocci (“Europeanization in Turkey”) convincingly argues that there is no linear relationship between domestic change in Turkey and EU conditionality. She claims that domestic change has been spearheaded by domestic actors that have used and been strengthened by the external EU anchor (see also Ulusoy).
The realignment in domestic politics, the increasing effect of a flourishing civil society, and some signs of an alteration in the military's perspective of the Kurdish question (for the signals from the military see Bila).
Nevertheless, Turkey has kept its sensitivity about the recognition of any minorities other than those recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne. For example, it only ratified OSCE conventions with certain reservations grounded in this attitude (for details see Sarıgil 186–87).
The Institute of Living Languages at Mardin Artuklu University, hosting a department of Kurdish as the first institution of Kurdish language at the university level, was opened in 2009.
The European Commission's Turkey 2005 Progress Report, Criteria for Membership: Human Rights and Protection of Minorities, states that “The minorities usually associated by the authorities with the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians and Greeks. However, there are other communities in Turkey, which, in the light of the relevant international and European standards, could qualify as minorities” (35).
For instance, France, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have not ratified the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities prepared by the Council of Europe since 1995 (see Phillips).
For a detailed analysis of political activism in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, see Eccarius-Kelly.
Neither the Turkish Constitution of 1982 nor the Political Party Law allows the establishment of political parties on ethnic or regional grounds.
Kurdish nationalist activism is reflected in the workings of human rights organizations, cultural associations, political parties, self-help organizations, local administrations, and movements of different political stripes, ranging from the traditional Left to Islamic movements. Therefore, the Kurdish national movement is wider than the DTP and the PKK. Other than the DTP, the other pro-Kurdish political parties are HAK-PAR (Hak ve Özgürlük Partisi, or Rights and Freedom Party) and KADEP (Kadep Katilimci Demokrasi Partisi, or Participatory Democracy Party). Unlike the DTP, both of these parties openly reject the use of violent methods, yet they both back an ethnic-based federation of Turks and Kurds.
The population of an ethnic group seeking self-government is often a matter of speculation for competing parties. The numbers, “40 million Kurds, 25 million of whom live in the territorial boundaries of the Turkish state,” were uttered in the author's interview with Ahmet Türk, 21 January 2009. Nevertheless, many public opinion polls show that almost 15% of the population in Turkey identify themselves as Kurds. According to the results of two different research projects conducted by KONDA, there are nearly 11–12 million Kurds living in Turkey (2 million in Istanbul); see “Kürt Meselesini Yeniden Düşünmek” [“Rethinking the Kurdish Issue”] Konda Reports 2010. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2010_12-KONDA_Kurt_Meselesini_Yeniden_Dusunmek.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2012; “Kürtler ve Kürt Sorunu” [“The Kurds and the Kurdish Issue”] Konda Reports Nov. 2008. http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2008_11_KONDA_Kurtler_ve_Kurt_Sorunu.pdf. Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
For a detailed analysis of Kurdish intellectuals' efforts to create a Kurdish ethno-history, see Hirschler.
For the construction and the use of Newroz as an ideological means for mobilization by Kurdish nationalists, see Aydın.
Although the DTP has never expressed irredentist claims, Kurdistan maps used in the party's congresses, meetings or conventions have often displayed a “Greater Kurdistan” that included Kurdish sections of Iraq, Iran, and Syria. For an exemplary incident about the “map dispute” see “Parka Kürdistan Havuzu Yaptırdı.” DTP Kayapinar Mayor faced charges DTP Kayapinar Mayor faced charges for for building a Kurdistan-shaped pool. The pool was demolished and its construction also became one of the charges leveled against the party in the subsequent closure case. See also “DTP'nin nevruzunda Kürdistan haritası skandalı” and “Diyarbakır'da tartışmalı harita!”
See for instance, DTP Vice President Ayna as quoted in “Ayna: Atatürk'ün Verdiği Sözler Tutulmalı” [the promises given by Atatürk should be kept].
The DTP's vision of European integration is consistent with this view. As a left-wing mass party, it supports the idea of a “People's Europe” against the “Europe of businessmen.” This emphasis implies not only an egalitarian social understanding, but also a view that European integration is seen as the proper political framework for the peaceful co-existence of peoples in a democratic Europe (DTP, Party Program 49–50).
The BDP, current successor to the DTP, continues this policy. Osman Baydemir has recently summarized democratic autonomy as meaning that “the Kurds would have a parliament in southeastern Anatolia and fly their flag next to the Turkish flag”. “Baydemir sparks debate with Kurdish ‘Kurdish flag' remarks.” Today's Zaman 2 August 2010. Web. Gülten Kışanak, co-chair of the BDP, has stated that the party has been already implementing the model of democratic autonomy in municipalities held by the BDP mayors. She argues that the BDP strengthens civil society in the name of a participatory democracy by establishing women's, youth, and neighborhood assemblies. “A Road Map to Democratic Autonomy.” Bianet 5 September 2011. http://bianet.org/english/minorities/132501-a-road-map-to-democratic-autonomy. Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
Based on the criterion of “language spoken with mother at home,” Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu identified Kurdish electors as making up 12.8% of total 42 million electors in Turkey in 2007. In other words, there were about five million Kurdish electors in Turkey in 2007. The Independents whose major force behind it was the DTP obtained 1,822,253 votes (5.19% of total votes) in 2007 elections (“Türkiye Geneli Seçim Sonuçları.” http://secim2007.hurriyet.com.tr/partidetay.aspx?pid=1. Web. 18 Jan. 2012) while the party had 5.68% of total votes with 2,271,566 votes in 2009 local elections (“Seçim 2009.” http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/election2009/election.html. Web. 18 Jan. 2012). Even if it is hard to estimate the exact number of Kurdish voters in Turkey, one can still suggest in the light of these figures that votes for the DTP roughly ranged between 35% and 45% of all Kurdish votes.
The DTP won 99 municipalities in the recent 2009 local government elections. Nine of the 99 are provincial capitals: Diyarbakır, Batman, Hakkari, Iğdır, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Bingöl and Van (“Election results by provincial assemblies.” http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/election2009/election.html. Web. 18 Jan. 2012).
In order to overcome the 10% national threshold, the DTP formed a platform of independent candidates in the 2007 general elections, winning 21 seats in the Turkish Parliament. As a result, since 2007, the DTP, now the BDP, has had a parliamentary group in the national assembly (see ‘Kurumsal Yapı’ at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arsiv.htm. Web. 18 Jan. 2012). This is the first time in the history of Turkey that a pro-Kurdish political party has formed a parliamentary group.
For detailed information about movement parties, see Kitschelt.
The statement by Ahmet Türk, the DTP's leader, read: “Tabanımız dağda” [“Our grassroots is in the mountain].” Sabah, 22 April 2006. Web.
“Emine Ayna says that the PKK, Öcalan key to peace.” Hürriyet Daily News 12 August 2009. Web.
To illustrate, the DTP organized a mass meeting in Diyarbakır in 2007 under the name of a “Mr.Öcalan meeting” (Hürriyet, 25 Nov. 2007). DTP MPs often referred to Öcalan as “Mr.” in their interviews and speeches to emphasize that they saw him as respectable and key to solving the Kurdish question. To illustrate, Sabahat Tuncel, Istanbul MP of the DTP, said “Sayın Öcalan'ın fikri alınmalı” [“Mr.Öcalan's opinion should be sought”] Yeni Şafak 1 March 2008; Aysel Tuğluk, Diyarbakir MP of the DTP, said “Çözümün muhatabı Sayın Öcalan'dır” [“The addressee for the solution is Mr. Öcalan”] Radikal 28 August 2009. Web.
A report prepared by the European Union Institute for Security Studies states that “it is an obvious secret that DTP is connected to PKK in a way, and the PKK is a terrorist organization” (“EU Report: DTP is connected to PKK ‘in a way’.” http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=8226. Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
The DTP had a representation bureau in Brussels that basically lobbied EU institutions about Kurdish rights in Turkey (author's interview with the DTP Brussels representative, Fayık Yağızay, 2 April 2008, Brussels). The DTP's representation's effectiveness has been highly limited because of unfavorable institutional design in Turkey. Unlike its many counterparts in Brussels, this office was officially unable to represent Kurdish sub-national identity and interests.
Author's interviews with Ahmet Türk (DTP's leader) and Bengi Yıldız (DTP's MP for Batman), 21 January 2009, Turkish Grand National Assembly.
For the full text of the declaration, see Institut kurde de Paris.
“Yilmaz: the road to EU passes through Diyarbakir,” Turkish Daily News 17 December 1999. Print. Diyarbakir is a mostly Kurdish-populated province in southeastern Turkey.
Although Recommendation 229 does not have any compelling power on Turkey, it is still a valuable document since it shows that Turkey needs to undergo a comprehensive process of decentralization or devolution. “The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities - Recommendation 229 (2007) Local Democracy in Turkey.” https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1691602&SecMode=1&DocId=1167298&Usage=2. Web. 18 Jan. 2012.
Interview with the ambassador of Germany to Turkey (see “‘PKK ile bağınızı koparmalısınız’”).
DTP MPs occasionally criticized the EU's stance on the Kurdish question. However, the harshest criticisms have come from Öcalan, the PKK's leader, who has been in prison since 1999. His statements since 2005 coincide with the official view of a foreign conspiracy dimension to the Kurdish question. For instance, Öcalan claims that the Kurdish question is a trump card in the hands of Europe. European countries do not really want to see the Kurdish question solved; they carry on policies that contribute to the protraction of the conflictual situation. Europe is an old enemy of Turkey. Turkey mistakenly believes it can solve the Kurdish question with European assistance. The Europeans wanted to use the PKK, but they were rejected by the PKK; so the Europeans put the PKK on the list of terrorist organizations. “Avrupa Kürt kartını oynuyor” [“Europe plays the Kurdish card”]. Online Gündem 10 February 2007. Web.
For instance, the declarations of Kurdish authorities in Northern Iraq regarding the right of Kurds living in neighboring countries to self-determination fueled the debate. Barzani, the president of the Kurdish regional government in Iraq, stated that when the time comes, Kurds in Turkey and Syria would naturally use their right to self-determination. “Saldırı olursa kendimizi koruruz” [“We shall defend ourselves if we are attacked by”]. Hürriyet 3 February 2007. Web. This pan-Kurdish perspective of the Kurdish authorities in Iraq was also accompanied by declarations by DTP representatives emphasizing a pan-Kurdish solidarity. For instance, against the possibility of Turkish military intervention in Kirkuk, the DTP's Diyarbakir branch leader declared that any attack on Kirkuk would be tantamount to an attack on Diyarbakir. “Kurdish leader charged with controversial remarks.” Turkish Daily News 24 February 2007. Web.
In the volatile circumstances of the region, Turkey has gradually changed its policy with respect to the Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq, which has brought about an apparent improvement in relations. Consequently, the Kurdish authorities emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with Turkey by gradually playing down the pan-Kurdish dimension of their policies.
Turkish governments have occasionally made declarations about a “Kurdish reality” and the importance of finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish question in terms of Turkey's EU bid. However, until the recent reforms, none of these declarations had resulted in material actions.
One should here mention two recent articles, both of which focus on the failure of the AKP's “Kurdish opening” in interaction with the process of Europeanization in Turkey. Kirişci rightfully argues that as the EU's engagement with Turkish full membership has been weakened, the EU has gradually lost its transforming capacity on Turkish politics, including on the Kurdish question. Thus, reform-minded political and social actors, most importantly the governing party, have become deprived of a critical support in facing the rising nationalist backlash in Turkey against the EU-anchored political efforts to find a democratic solution to the Kurdish question. In the same way, Somer and Liaras emphasize EU-related causes as a significant factor for fierce reaction from both the opposition and the government's own constituencies to the “Kurdish opening.” Differently, they observe a limited amount of normative change on the Kurdish question among religious conservatives, largely represented by the AKP, despite the party's reformist image.
On its closure, the ex-DTP MPs, except for the two having lost their MP status (Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk), joined the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), which is the current successor to the DTP.