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Abstract
Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.
Notes
On 6 September 2010, during the 7th meeting of Valdai Club in Sochi, Putin made some very straightforward statements regarding the matter: “Foreign experts keep telling us about the threat from China. We are not worried at all. … There is the huge Far East, Eastern Siberia, an under-populated territory. And there is powerful China, over a billion people. We should be afraid. We are not afraid. … There is no threat on the side of China. … We have co-existed with China for a thousand years. We had difficult moments, and at times better relations, but we know each other very well and we have got used to respecting each other. … China does not have to populate the Far East and Eastern Siberia to get what it needs: natural resources. … We have just finished the construction of an oil pipeline. We are ready to build two gas pipelines. We will be supplying coal to them. … China does not want to worsen relations with us to solve its current goals” (“Highlights”; “Pryedsyedatyel' Pravityel'stva”).
See E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, 2006; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 2006; E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1990; H. Donnan, T.M. Wilson, Borders. Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State, Oxford, 1999.
The interregnum in Russia 1598–1613, after the death of tsar Feodor Ivanovich.
On the basis of the Chinese strategic doctrine, “Strategic plans to subdue Russians, XVII century,” qtd. in Popov 37–38.
Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did Russia become concerned with Japan's modernization and militarization.
The pogrom in Blagoveshchensk was a reaction to gunfire directed at the city from the Chinese side (Popov 281–87).
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the attention of the Russian Orthodox Church is drawn above all to the West. From the perspective of the ROC, China is a matter of concern merely in the context of uncontrolled immigration. In 2004, bishops from the RFE even complained to the president, Vladimir Putin, about difficulties with the assimilation of Asian immigrants. Referring to historical patterns, Putin advised assimilation through evangelization, i.e. converting Asian immigrants to Russian Orthodoxy. In 2004 the Moscow Patriarchate announced a renewal of evangelization among Chinese immigrants living in Russia (“Pravoslavnaya assimilyatsiya”).
The function of religion as hallmark of identity is also evident in the ROC's activity in the border regions with China in the twenty-first century. Russian Orthodox places of worship play the role of symbolic border posts. A notable example is the chapel of St. Victor the Warrior situated on Bolshoi Ussuriski Island, which, according to the intergovernmental agreement, was to be divided between Russia and China. The chapel, however, is on the Chinese part of the island, which has caused disputes. Beijing and Moscow have managed to reach a compromise, deciding to leave the chapel there. The place has become a destination of ritual Via Dolorosa for residents of Khabarovsk (“Krestnyi khod”).
A concept created by Mikhail Gorbachev.
Bobo Lo argues that the traditional fear that weapons that Russia has exported could one day be pointed at Russia must have been at least partly discredited; otherwise it is hard to explain why Russian weapons constitute up to 95% of the all arms sold to China over the past decade (79–80).
According to polls from 2011, the most reliable friends of Russia are Byelorussia (35%), Kazakhstan (33%), Ukraine (21%), Germany (20%), and China (18%) (“Otnoshyeniye k droogim stranam”).
V. Kolosov presented surveys in which Russians ranked Indians highest on the scale of “friendliness and closeness” in Asia (Kolosov 117). However, in polls published by Levada-Center for 2011, China (18%) was ahead of India (16%) (“Otnoshyeniye k droogim stranam”).
Forty-eight percent in Moscow, 41% in the Far East (Larin 299).
Eighty percent considered Russia's global influence positive; 6%, negative (“Rossiya, SShA i Kitay”).
One should not overlook the fact that there is a favorable social ground for this kind of narrative. Seventy-four percent of respondents agreed that “Russia is a Eurasian state with a specific way of development”; only 11% considered Russia a part of the West, and 7%, an Asian state (“Rossiya i Zapad”). Twenty-two percent believed that Russia needs “a special way of development” which would acknowledge differences in values and tradition between Russia and the West. Importantly, 59% of Russian respondents did not consider themselves Europeans, while 32% did (“Boodooshshyeye Rossii”).
Igor Panarin presented this opinion in the debate “Russia after Elections” (with Ivan Krastev; held in Warsaw, Poland, on 25 January 2008), organized by the Polish journal Europa and daily newspaper Dziennik. Anastasia Mitrofanova expressed this view in the discussion during the international conference “Religion in International Relations: Spiritual and Secular Dimension”, organized by the Faculty of International Relations of the State University of St. Petersburg, that took place on 29 October 2010 in St. Petersburg, Russia.
In 2006, those preferences looked different: the CIS countries 39%, Western Europe 24%, China 13%, and the US 8%. (“Strana i mir”).
The perception is, naturally, just one factor which relieves possible Russian anxiety in relation to China. There are of course other reasons, such as profit from cooperation with the Chinese being important for many particular groups of interest in Russia: military industry, oligarchs, lobbying groups in the State Duma, etc. (Morozova 667–86).