Conflict resolution after the 2008 Georgia–Russia War: the Taiwan and Kosovo models as tools for mobilization and comparison

Abstract

The Taiwan model of conflict transformation and the Kosovo model of conflict settlement have specific features, and are useful for analyzing the Georgian and Russian policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is a similarity between the Georgian strategy of engagement and the Taiwan model, with its declared readiness to interact with the other party regardless of any setbacks arising over the issue of status. Unlike the Taiwan model, however, the Georgian strategy includes no concrete view on how to involve the authorities controlling the breakaway territories or, in particular, how to have a positive impact on their relations with the outside world. A comparison between the Kosovo model and Russian policies toward these two entities demonstrates that, in deciding to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow largely drew on the moral and legal arguments put forward for the recognition of Kosovo. Russia has established political oversight over these entities, to a certain extent mirroring the Western policy of supervised independence for Kosovo. But Russia is still unable to adopt a conflict resolution policy toward Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia that is based on regional integration prospects, in contrast to Western policies toward the Balkans.

Keywords:

• conflict resolution
• secession
• South Ossetia
• Abkhazia
• Taiwan

Notes

A first draft of this paper was discussed at the conference on New Geopolitics and the Role of Diplomacy in the Caucasus, Geneva, 8–9 May 2010, organized by CIMERA, the Graduate Institute (Geneva), and the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). Additional interviews were conducted in Georgia in June 2011 and in Georgia and Abkhazia in May and June 2012. Financial support for research for this paper from the Research Foundation (Flanders) and the Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, is gratefully acknowledged. I am thankful to Vicken Cheterian, Viacheslav Chirikba, Sabine Fischer, Céline Francis, Uwe Halbach, Liana Kvarchelia, Natalia Mirimanova, Lincoln A. Mitchell, Aleksandar Pavkovic, Giulia Prelz Oltramonti, Oliver Reisner, Anna Rudakowska, Mira Sowakar, Hongyu Wang, Marion Chyun-Yang Wang, Sigrid Winkler, Catherine Woollard, and the two anonymous reviewers of Nationalities Papers for their comments on a previous draft of this paper. I also wish to thank Veronica Kelly for her language corrections. An earlier draft has been published in Georgian (Coppieters, konfliqtis gadawyveta) and in Russian (Coppieters, “Razreshenie konflikta”).

The distinction made in this paper between a model that can be used for mobilizatonial purposes and a scientific model that can be used for comparative analysis draws heavily on the distinction made by Max Weber between an ideal and an ideal-type.

In relation to the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict, see Zverev.

In his analysis of the Georgian military build-up after the Rose Revolution of 2003, Dov Lynch underlines the fact that Tbilisi did not reject the principle of military operations against secessionist forces. In some discussions that took place in Georgia just before the August 2008 war Operation Storm against the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina was presented as a model for how to resolve ethnic conflict in Georgia. Ronald D. Asmus writes the following about the Bucharest meeting of April 2008: “Saakashvili even recalled how in Bucharest a triumphant Croatian president Stjepan Mesić had told him – half-jokingly, half-seriously – that Georgia might look at the Croatian example of Operation Storm. During the war in Bosnia in the mid 1990s, Zagreb had successfully made its own land grab that created new military facts on the ground and had helped set up the negotiations that eventually led to Dayton. NATO had protested at the time but quickly moved on as it realized that Croatia's gains had actually made the resolution of the conflict more rather than less likely. A decade later, criticism of that move had been forgotten and Croatia had just been invited to join NATO” (Asmus 143).

On these definitions see Coppieters (“The EU and Georgia”). See also Diez. For a comprehensive overview of various definitions and theories in conflict resolution, see Ramsbotham.

This is the reason why only a limited number of negotiations to resolve sovereignty conflicts have led to their popularization as a model. Many negotiations are not based on willingness by the sides to agree on a compromise and have not led to any original idea or practice that is relevant for other conflicts – and this is unfortunately the case with all the negotiations on the conflicts over sovereignty in the South Caucasus.

On the cross-Strait relationship see Chi. On EU policies toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations see Su.

The concept of a model should be distinguished from the concept of a precedent. The concept of a political or legal precedent refers to the political or legal authority a particular decision may have for cases considered to be similar. Here we are thus dealing with the need for consistency in decision-making. In contrast, the concept of a model refers to a process rather than to a particular decision. In the case of cross-Strait relations, one may use the concept of a model to refer to the conflict transformation process as a whole and may at the same time use the concept of a political or legal precedent in order to focus on particular decisions in this context – such as for instance the political or legal consequences of Taiwan's membership of the World Trade Organization for its acceptance by other international organizations or for the acceptance of other non-recognized entities by such organizations. In the case of Kosovo, one may use the concept of a precedent in the context of a discussion on the legal or political authority that the recognition of Kosovo – a political decision based on legal principles – may have in other cases of unilateral declarations of independence.

On the relevance of the Belgian federal model for foreign-policy-making mechanisms in a Georgian–Abkhaz federation see Coppieters, Kovziridze, and Leonardy.

The conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh is an exception among the secessionist conflicts in Europe insofar as the threat or use of force is concerned. In June 2010, the parliament of Azerbaijan approved a military doctrine that affirmed the right to liberate its occupied territories using all necessary means, including the use of force. The Azerbajani doctrine does not rule out this military option – despite its tremendous cost – in the event that the negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh do not move forward (Goble).

Interviews by the author, Tbilisi, July 2008.

In a speech to officials from the Ministry of Education, President Mikhail Saakhashvili expressed his admiration for the development of science and technology in Singapore (Civil Georgia, “Saakashvili: Education System”). In a speech to top army officials, Saakashvili lauded Singapore for its capacity to build a military industry of its own. In his view, Georgia should follow that path too (Civil Georgia, “Saakashvili Talks on ‘Total Defense’”). On the use of models by the present Georgian leadership see also de Waal (27–30).

Taiwan is a founding member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), which was created in The Hague in 1991. Abkhazia joined this organization the same year. This common membership of UNPO has enabled a regular exchange of views to take place between Taiwan and representatives of non-recognized entities such as Abkhazia. Taiwan, however, has never widely publicized its activities in this organization and does not appear to attach much importance to it. UNPO is seldom mentioned in the literature on Taiwan's foreign relations.

Abkhazia has a population of 214,000, according to figures from an Abkhazian census of 2003 (International Crisis Group, “Abkhazia”), while South Ossetia is estimated to have around 30,000 people. At the time of the August war of 2008 there were between 50,000 and 60,000 inhabitants in the region (International Crisis Group, “South Ossetia”).

Continuous and close interaction does not mean an unlimited form of interaction. Taipei for instance has long argued for the need to have severe restrictions on visitors from the mainland, and on Taiwanese investment on and from the mainland, as well as import bans.

Not all the references to the Taiwan model to be found in political declarations or in literature are in line with this theoretical model. The term Taiwanization may refer to characteristics very different from those mentioned above, such as the reference to Taiwan in Russia's legitimization of its support for Abkhazia before the war in August 2008. In this case the term Taiwanization referred to the normalization of bilateral relations with a non-recognized entity, which included military support.

These have been the motives of the Taiwanese government since the start of Ma Ying-jeou's presidency in May 2008, while the previous government under Chen Chui-bian's presidency took a more confrontational stand, without, however, denying (1) that economic links with China were a question of survival for the island; (2) that open, violent conflict should be avoided; and (3) that an agreement with China on status would require political equality between the sides.

Or in full: “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei).”

My own criticism of the recognition of Kosovo's UDI is to be found in Coppieters (“Kosovo and the Question of a Just Secession”).

On Russia's policies toward Abkhazia see Antonenko.

For an assessment of the Geneva process see Gurgulia; Gegechidze.

Short-term perspectives were implied in all the models and proposals put forward by the Georgian authorities. The only exceptions were the policies toward South Ossetia before 2004, where a conflict settlement was expected to follow the resolution of the conflict with Abkhazia.

These fears were expressed even more strongly in Georgia's “Law on Occupied Territories of Georgia.”

In their criticism of these policies, Russia and Abkhazia pointed out that the travel documents could not be considered neutral, as they are issued by Georgia and consequently indicate the code of the issuing country (GEO).

With regard to the travel documents, residents of Abkhazia who have acquired Russian citizenship have great difficulty in obtaining visas for EU countries, as their authorities challenge the legal basis of the massive distribution of Russian citizenship to the inhabitants of these breakaway territories before the August 2008 war. It is particularly difficult to obtain a visa with Russian passports indicating residence in Abkhazia rather than in Russia itself (interviews in Abkhazia, May 2012).

During her visit to Georgia in June 2012, Hillary Clinton declared that US embassies would accept the new travel documents.

The EU has stated that the “status-neutral” travel documents should be regarded as “a welcome step towards the de-isolation of inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, [but they] should not be the only means of travel for these populations until they are more widely accepted by them” (The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy). 

“The provision of health care and other social services to inhabitants of the breakaway regions is also an important step towards reconciliation: it should be extended without preconditions, such as acceptance of Georgian ID documents” (The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

This and the following information are largely based on interviews in Tblisi, June 2011.

By June 2012, some 140 residents from Abkhazia had accepted identity documents and 20 residents international travel documents (interview in Tbilisi, June 2012).

These policies have established some control on the engagement of other actors within the breakaway territories. International organizations and NGOs do ask the Georgian Ministry for Reintegration for permission to work in Abkhazia, in line with Georgian legislation.

The strategy paper has been opposed by the Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities (Kvarchelia).

This policy of including members of the Abkhaz or South Ossetian communities in such delegations failed in the past, before the August war, when only a few South Ossetian politicians loyal to Tbilisi participated in such events.

On the various Georgian peace proposals for South Ossetia and Abkhazia see Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.

On the question of historical wrongs in conflict resolution processes see Brilmayer.

In English, Georgians would write Sukhumi (or Sokhumi) and Tskinvali; Abkhaz and Ossetes, Sukhum and Tskinval.

Estimates from Russian sources range from 1700 to 3700, while Russian troop figures from Western analysts lie between 4000 and 5000 (International Crisis Group, “Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence” 3; see also Charap and Welt).

On the economic and military integration of Abkhazia into Russia see Mitchell and Cooley (27–29, 56). See also Cooley and Mitchell; International Crisis Group (“Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence”). On South Ossetia see International Crisis Group (“South Ossetia: the Burden of Recognition” 4–14).

On South Ossetia see Gordadzé.

See the summaries of two panel discussions, the first by Malashenko and Olcott, the second by Malashenko, de Waal, Yaffa, and Lanskoy. See also Alexeï Malashenko.

A compromise between Tbilisi and Moscow on this issue was reached in autumn 2011, enabling Russia to join the WTO.

The lack of a Russian vision of how to resolve the conflict with Georgia mirrors a similar lack of vision on the Georgian side. The Georgian strategy on engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia includes demands on Russia – primarily that it should de-occupy the breakaway territories, de-recognizing them and withdrawing its troops – but it does not include any description of how such goals may be achieved. This is striking, given that the Georgian strategy defines the present state of the secessionist conflicts in Georgia as being primarily the result of Russian meddling.

On Abkhaz fears concerning future Russian policies toward Russia, see Mitchell and Cooley (56).