The August 2008 war: main consequences for Georgia and its conflicts

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to take stock of the major political consequences that the August 2008 war had (or did not have) for Georgia: how the war affected Georgia's internal political dynamics and its policies toward its separatist conflicts, its neighbors, and the world. I start by briefly summarizing my views on the nature of and reasons for the war, and on its impact (or the lack thereof) on the global security architecture. These constitute the backdrop against which changes in Georgia can be understood.

Notes

Nodia, “The War for Georgia,” “The Russia-Georgia War.”

The report (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission) of an international fact-finding mission created by the European Commission is considered the most authoritative source on assessing different aspects of the war. This document is based on extremely thorough research into the origin and course of the August war; its most important conclusion is that it rejects both Georgian and Russian justifications for their military actions in August 2008. However, it also deliberately avoids analysis of the broader political issues and motives that lay at the heart of the conflict but exceeded the mandate of “fact finding.”

See Vladimir Putin's speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, which is considered the most vivid expression of this approach of the Russian government.

On the Russian claim for a zone of privileged interests in its neighborhood, see “Interview Given by Dmitry Medvedev.”

For overall analysis of the Russian motives in the August war, see Fedorov. In November 2011, President Medvedev publicly referred to preventing the accession of Georgia and some other countries to NATO as the chief justification for taking action in August 2008 – see “Medvedev: yesli.”

Even if we believe in an alternative version of the core reasons of the war – that neither side had a premeditated plan to start it, things just went out of control in a series of asymmetrical responses to military provocations – then the existence of these Georgia-controlled enclaves within the separatist-controlled territories constituted the most fertile ground for such “uncontrolled” resumption of hostilities (see Charap and Welt 54). While the Tagliavini report deliberately avoids overall political judgments on the nature of the war, its spirit is also most consistent with this version of mounting mutual provocations leading to a larger conflict.

For the best analysis of Russian justification of the war, see Allison.

See for instance Blank; Thom.

See for instance Müllerson.

In 2007, the volume of FDI to Georgia exceeded US$2 billion – a respectable figure – and continued to be strong in the first half of 2008. However, in the two subsequent years it dropped to US$658.4 and US$814.5 million, respectively (National Statistics Office of Georgia).

In February 2009, 64% of those polled considered Russia to have been the aggressor in August 2008; 14% believed that Georgia had started the war. In September 2008, the numbers were 80% and 7%, respectively (International Republican Institute, Georgian National Survey).

Most analysts describe Georgia's political regime as “hybrid,” that is combining elements of democratic and autocratic rule, while Freedom House usually describes Georgia as a “partly free regime” (Freedom House).

In the period after the 2008 war there had been some changes in Georgia that can give grounds for hope that its political system is becoming more pluralistic and mature: the government displays greater readiness to engage in dialogue with its opponents; radical revolutionist strategies are less popular with the opposition, and groups that insist on them are marginalized; the November 2010 amendments to the constitution strengthened the role of Parliament; etc. But it is difficult to directly trace these trends to the results of the 2008 war.

On 6 December 2006 the Russian Duma issued two statements in support of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively – see State Duma of the Russian Federation (“Appeal,” “Statement”).

These conflicting views of the current state of the conflict are reflected in the constant debate over the setup of the Geneva negotiations: Russia promotes a greater role for the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Georgia agrees to negotiate only with Russia and seeks a place at the table for the pro-Georgian authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in exile.

Arguably, the latter had been a long-time trend that the war brought to its logical solution.

For an excellent overview of growing Georgian–Russian tensions in the pre-Saakashvili period, see Gordadze 28–48.

The fourth such extension is in Azerbaijan, in the areas populated by kin of people residing in Dagestan.

Polls show some decline in public support for NATO membership in Georgia, but it is still strong enough. In research by the International Republican Institute (Georgian National Study), support for NATO membership in Georgia dropped from 80% of those polled in September 2007 to 68% in June 2009 and then went up to 72% in March 2010. According to polls conducted by the National Democratic Institute (Public Attitudes in Georgia), in March 2011 the support increased to 71%, from 61% in April 2010.

Unfortunately, almost no results of credible public opinion polls on ratings of major political parties and politicians are published in Georgia. There are occasional leaks from polls conducted by the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute of the US; however, Burjanadze's and Noghaideli's (and their respective parties') ratings are usually not even mentioned due to their insignificance.

I tried to argue that point in my previous articles, “The Georgian Perception of the West” (12–43) and “Georgia: ‘Dimensions of Insecurity’.”

Arguably, one may reverse the causal connection here: it was the ambiguity of the Bucharest decision, giving Georgia a general but vague commitment of eventual membership while denying a specific Membership Action Plan, that actually prompted Russia to attack Georgia. This interpretation is discussed in Asmus (137–40).

Discussions around this issue are not the most successful part of EU–Georgia relations – though not everybody in Europe puts blame for this on the Georgian side (see Messerlin et al.).

In 2011, the International Financial Corporation of the World Bank ranked Georgia 12th out of 183 economies with regard to ease of doing business (Doing Business 2011).

“I admire American ideas. I used to idealize America under Bush, when ideas were above pragmatic politics. Now it is a new time, when pragmatic politics are in charge of ideas. That might spoil the America I know” (qtd. in Nemtsova).