Nationalism in the Russian media: content analysis of newspaper coverage surrounding conflict in Stavropol, 24 May–7 June 2007

Abstract

This paper considers the role of Russian print media and government in forming and publicizing nationalist sentiment through a content analysis of newspaper coverage of ethnic conflict in Stavropol in 2007. It shows that though the government officially pursues an inclusive multicultural approach (which I call associative nationalism), newspapers owned by Kremlin-loyal business holdings printed quite nationalist and sensationalist versions of the events in question. I argue that this is a passive promotion of a dissociative type of nationalism on the part of the Kremlin, which works against its stated purposes of bringing together all those in the Russian territory into a united national identity.

Keywords:

• Russia
• nationalism
• media
• newspapers

Notes

The modernist school of nationalism views print media as essential in the spread of nationalism (Anderson). For Gellner, literacy, communication, and education mobilize societies toward a shared identity. The institution of the mass media allows the transmission of high culture that is necessary for nationalism to exist (Gellner). For Hobsbawm, the media has both allowed nationalist messages to be standardized and introduced the possibility that those messages could be used for propaganda to benefit states and private interests. In particular, the media is essential in the process of nationalism because it conveys national symbols and traditions from the public/national to the private/local sphere. More recently, scholars have identified the mass media as a key factor in the mobilization of nationalist and ethnic conflict (Snyder and Ballentine; Gagnon).

The associative/dissociative view of nationalism is roughly related to Hale's re-categorization of the associative/instrumental and primordial thrusts of the nationalism literature into instrumentalist (ethnicity is flexible) and perdurabilist (ethnicity is resilient and emotive) varieties.

This includes Tolz's classifications of unionists (preservation of the boundaries of the USSR), eastern Slavicists (Russians united in national identity with all eastern Slavs), linguistic Russians (language being the primary distinguishing feature of national identity), and civic Russians (united in their commitment to the new institutions of the post-Soviet period). It also includes nation-shaping nationalism (where national identity is built within the confines of an existing state) (Brubaker, “Nationalizing States”) and official nationalism (the stated ideological and policy platform of the state) (Brudny).

Here I am collapsing the categories of civic nationalism and multiculturalism, which is admittedly unorthodox (Brubaker, “Manichean Myth”) but will serve as an entry point into the current discussion. The civic associative approach is slightly different from Hechter's state-building nationalism, which seeks to impose cultural homogeneity on a disparate group of people for the purpose of creating a cohesive state. Rather, civic associativism is multicultural in nature. State-building nationalism is also different from an ethnic associative approach. Though both are assimilationist, ethnic associativism has a specific content (the dominant nation) that is the goal of assimilation. Civic associativism in this formulation is similar to Kymlicka's conceptualization of civic nations.

This differs from Kymlicka's view of the ethnic nation, which he argues does not allow for non-ethnics to join. Rather, I separate out two versions of the ethnic nation, one that allows for non-ethnics to join through assimilation (ethnic associativism) and one that does not (ethnic dissociativism, which is the same as Kymlicka's ethnic nation). The Soviet Union has attempted both of these approaches at various times. The federal system was created by Lenin as an attempt to allow ethnic representation at the same time that it would call all Soviet citizens to a higher attachment to shared values (Carrere-d'Encausse). During the Stalin period, nationality policy shifted toward a Russian-dominated system, mobilized for and solidified through World War II, that used the Russian language, mass media, and population movements as its assimilating force (Vujac?ic?; Kohn; Carrere-d'Encausse; Fair).

An example of dissociative nationalism with a civic focus would be Lenin's initial policy of self-determination (e.g. granting independence to Finland), based on the belief that the values of the socialist revolution would unify people across (temporary, he believed) state and national borders (Carrere-d'Encausse).

A similar impulse during the Soviet period, though represented by a minority, held that the Russian state should be reformulated based on historically Russian territories as well as those occupied nearly exclusively by Russians, while non-Russian areas would be allowed to “go their own ways” (Wimbush). Secession-oriented nationalism is along the lines of what Brubaker (“Nationalizing States”) referred to as “polity-seeking nationalism.”

The Stalinist ethnic redistribution campaigns were dissociative in a different way. Though they could certainly be classified as ethnic cleansing, they were aimed at preserving the power of the state by separating potentially problematic groups from their traditional homelands and consequently dissociated the target group with the aim of constructing a stronger Soviet state. An ethnic associative project that aims at assimilation by nature dissociates those not in the dominant nation.

This view includes biological or racial justifications for the nation, as seen in the writings of Lev Gumilev (Tolz).

Alexander Belov (leader of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration) and Eduard Limonov (leader of the National Bolshevik Party) are listed as enemies of Putin in a book published by United Russia–affiliated Evropa Publishing House (Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation; Danilin, Kryshtal', and Polyakov).

A number of government officials blamed the 2010 Manezh riots on liberal groups. In particular, Vladislav Surkov said liberal critics paved the way for Manezh by holding unauthorized rallies and demonstrating an attitude of protest (Leskov and Sadchikov).

In this way it is not unlike the 2010 French ban on “face-covering veils” in public, which is neutral in its language but in reality specifically targets Muslim populations.

For example, xenophobic statements of this nature might focus on how migrants pose a public health risk (“Gennadii Onishchenko”), take Russian jobs (Butuzova), or are highly criminalized (Babic; Polevoi; Zubchenko). An ethnic associative view, on the other hand, would frame these issues differently: focusing on solutions, such as medical examinations for migrants (Ignatova), and explanations, such as that migrants fill jobs that Russians deem undesirable (Yudina).

Most nationalist sentiment in Russian society is not this overt, but instead quite passive. This passivity can be seen in public opinion polls that show that 68% of the people would like the government to limit migrants, 58% support the idea of “Russia for Russians,” and 56% believe that violent nationalist confrontations are possible in Russia today; yet only 30% think that violent altercations could occur in their area, indicating that people perceive xenophobia to be a significant social problem, yet one that is unrelated to their personal experience (Levada Center, “Natsionalizm”).

For example, prosecutions of hate crimes have increased (Alperovich, Kozhevnikova, and Verkhovsky) and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DNPI) was shut down for its extremist activity (“Prosecutors Shut Down Nationalist Movement”).

In August 2007, Izvestiia was accused of extremism for printing a headline about nationalism in Yakutia that the Federal Service for Control of the Mass Media argued incited ethnic conflict (International Press Institute).

Though an effort to create a vertical of power and increasing centralization of most functions mark the Putin era, the Kremlin has not brought regional governments under uniform control. The Southern Federal Region has been particularly problematic. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that there will be some degree of variation among regional newspapers based on geography, and in particular that proximity to Stavropol and the Caucasus region will impact coverage.

The relationship between oligarchs and the Kremlin evolved during the Putin administration. The Yeltsin period marked the freest press Russia had ever seen, despite the fact that the oligarch “media barons” owned many media outlets (Becker; Lipman and McFaul, “Putin and the Media”). During Putin's tenure, however, media ownership was slowly and methodically taken away from oligarchs like Gusinsky and Berezovsky, who had freely criticized the Kremlin, and turned over to oligarchs with proven track records of loyalty to the regime (Lipman and McFaul, “Putin and the Media”).

The term “liberal” used here denotes western orientation, a pro-democracy stance that is focused on liberal rights, and often western funding.

In only three cases were regional (non-Moscow) papers placed in a category other than regional government–affiliated: Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, which is owned by Yury Kovalchuk, who is Putin's banker, making it a case of oligarch ownership (“Putin Insider”); Groznenskii Rabochii, which is funded by the National Endowment for Democracy and Open Society, making it a clear example of a liberal (western-oriented) newspaper (Fitzpatrick); and Cheliabinskii Rabochii, which is linked to an independent media group (Yablokova). In most cases, there were clear links between the newspapers in question and regional governments, as in the case of Kubanskie Novosti (Mereu). However, in several cases, there was either disputed or inadequate information to justify placing papers in a category other than regional government–owned/affiliated, and thus the regional/affiliated distinction is, in these few cases, used as a residual category.

This categorization uses a combination of ownership, affiliation, and ideological perspectives as category titles, which some may take issue with. However, the categories allow for the most salient aspect of each paper to be assessed. Most papers were categorized based on ownership. Where ownership information was not available, the head editor or general reputation was used as an indicator of the paper's orientation.

On average, newspapers in the Southern Federal District included 6.25 articles about the events, while the Central Federal District ran 3.46 articles per paper, the Far East Federal District 1, Northwest 2, Ural 1, and Volga 1.

It is interesting, however, that there is no mention of orange forces in the articles from the Communist Party newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia.

Some scholars also cite a lack of professionalism, particularly a focus on profits rather than ethical journalism, as a root cause of sensationalism, relying on the adage that sex and violence sells (Berkowitz). Because print was the most lucrative sector of the Russian media in 2007, it is worth considering profit motives (Datamonitor). Yet the literature on the Russian media cites lack of professionalism in Russian journalism most often in connection with taking bribes and failing to report sensitive news that could bring censure (or worse) from political elites (Daniloff; Becker). Therefore, profit motives would enter the picture only when the subject matter did not involve politically charged issues, such as ethnic relations, which the Kremlin has an interest in keeping a tight lid on. In this study, sensationalism is used as a further measure of the degree to which media coverage nationalizes events.

Not only is self-censorship part of the Soviet legacy, but threats and attacks on journalists make Russia an increasingly dangerous place to cover controversial issues. The general expectations stated were that the government is most likely to clamp down on reporting in situations of national security and that the Stavropol events could be construed as such. It is logical that all of the papers analyzed are familiar with the types of reports the Kremlin will find unacceptable and thus know when to exercise self-censorship.

A likely contributing factor to this result is that the most radical nationalist voices have moved toward newer media formats, such as LiveJournal.

The uses and misuses of anti-extremist legislation are well documented by the Sova Center (www.sova-center.ru).

Take for example Vladislav Surkov, the president's chief of staff, who is an ethnic Chechen.

In particular, Putin commented on a question coming from a gentleman named Miroslav, praising the idea that “beautiful names” such as these are marking a return to a “genuine Russian [Russkii] tradition.” (“Razgovor s Vladimirom Putinym”)

They are not dissociative in the sense that they are seeking further deconstruction of the state or removal of an existing group from the territory; rather, they are supporting the idea that the former Soviet Union remains deconstructed along ethnic lines.

For comparison, see the original 1999 law, “On the Public Policy of the Russian Federation towards Compatriots Abroad.”