Problem areas for the new Turkish foreign policy

Abstract

Given its economic success and the political transformations of the last decade, it is not surprising that Turkey is now charting an ambitious course in foreign policy. This article provides a sober assessment of some of the shortcomings becoming evident in Turkish foreign policy, and argues that if these problems are not addressed, Turkey is due to fall short of its regional leadership ambitions.

Keywords:

• Turkey
• Foreign Policy
• Middle East
• Eurasia
• Balkans

Notes

Some of the ideas in this article have been presented previously as PONARS Eurasia policy memos or blog posts. I am grateful to the PONARS community for their invaluable feedback. I would also like to thank Şener Aktürk and Harris Mylonas for their comments.

The “zero problems” policy was the cornerstone of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's “strategic depth” doctrine which also held the main principles of Turkish foreign policy to be a balance of security and democracy in domestic politics; closer relations with the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus; complimentary policies with the West and a diplomatic approach which is active in international organizations and peace-building efforts.

Ayoob, p. 68.

Independent Task Force Report, p. 3.

For instance, the IMF issued a stern warning last January.

Of course, it may be countered that some countries such as Saudi Arabia may be more eager to do business with an interventionist Turkey. However, the point is that it is not clear what the economic outcome of this shift will be once all is said and done.

Turkey is currently the seventeenth largest economy in the world; South Korea is fifteenth, Mexico is fourteenth and Canada is tenth. See World Bank figures.

See After Defeat for a detailed discussion of various status seeking strategies.

Compare e.g. with Italy, which has 142 embassies.

The report is silent on other languages, but it may be speculated that even fewer would speak other non-European languages such as Chinese. In another example, in the diplomatic row between Turkey and Israel in 2009 over Israel's treatment of Turkish ambassador, it was clear that the Turkish diplomatic personnel involved did not speak Hebrew.

Unfortunately, in order to justify the 1928 switch from Arabic letters to the Latin script, the Turkish education curriculum (which is entirely centralized) spends some time denigrating the Arabic alphabet, while lauding the Turkish language and its suitability to the phonetic Latin script Turkey now uses. All Turkish children are exposed to this notion; unless this is mediated by some other goal to learn Arabic (e.g. the desire the read the Koran in the original, academic interest etc.), most Turks emerge out of the education system with the idea that Arabic is a difficult and nonsensical language.

See After Defeat for a more detailed exploration of this issue.

Most recently, Erdoğan declared that abortions (legal in Turkey up to ten weeks) are a bigger problem than the Uludere massacre.