Towards a new past: Some reflections on nationalism in post-socialist Slovakia

Abstract

By analysing two commemorative events organized shortly before and after the 2010 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, this article demonstrates how the Prime Minister Robert Fico and his collaborators exploited these ceremonies to promote a more inclusive definition of political community than their right-wing counterparts. Although commentators have interpreted the continuous political success of the political party Smer-SD in terms of negatively connotated nationalism and national populism, Fico's discursive framework allows him to address those who have been stigmatized by post-1989 neoliberalism, especially former communists and people unable or unwilling to adapt to the rapid changes brought about by post-socialist social, economic, political as well as cultural transition(s). Instead of backwardness, Fico's anti-elitist and anti-capitalist rhetoric opened a new symbolic universe to these groups. The history narratives that formed an important part of this universe were not used to exclude the Other, but rather to create a meaningful future for those who have been ignored by (neo-)liberal ideals. This paper argues for an interpretation of post-socialist populist parties that would take into account culturally relevant symbolic structures advanced by these parties.

Keywords:

• dead-body politics
• nationalism
• post-socialism
• Slovak Republic
• Robert Fico

Notes

This paper is a part of research project Representations of “Nation” and “State” in the Discourse of Slovak State Institutions no. SGS-2010-062 funded by the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen as part of their student grant competition. The aim of the project is to examine how representations of the Slovak nation and the Slovak state are used and (re)constructed in order to infuse specific contents into the notion of the state that serve as a framework for institutional practices within the Slovak state. Parts of this paper also appeared in my unpublished PhD thesis.

Fisher (209) views the post-communist political history as shaped by “two major forces” or “two fundamental choices” or even “a contest” between “‘the Nationalists,’ who stressed the importance of national sovereignty even at the risk of international isolation, and the ‘Europeanists,’ who believed that their country's brightest future lay in Western integration”.

For example, one of the working papers published by the Institute for Public Affairs (Gyárfášová “Národný populizmus na Slovensku” 53) concludes with this statement: “National populism mobilizes collective identities, identification against ‘the Other’ on the basis of ethnic cultural differences, which negates the civic principle and does not constitute a good starting point for an intercultural dialogue.” For a critique of such distinctions between civil society and ethnic nationalism with populist and authoritarian nature see Přibáň.

For accounts on Slovak nationalism, see for example Auer (130–169); editions by Drál' and Findor and Kiliánová, Kowalská and Krekovičová.

As Přibáň (418) put it, “ethnically oriented politics have the communitarian promise of being a safe haven in the unsettled modern world of permanent change”.

This is a local term referring to those political parties in Slovakia which place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum. It has been used as a collective term especially with regards to populist or national populist post-socialist governments of Vladimír Mečiar (1994–1998) and Róbert Fico (2006–2010 and after March 2012).

Can be translated as “Direction-SD”, SD stands for Social Democracy.

The winner of the 2010 election, the coalition government led by Iveta Radičová, a professor in Sociology, fell after the eurozone bailout vote in October 2011. The new election was scheduled for March 2012. Radičová's coalition consisted of four conservative and neoliberal parties having a narrow majority with 79 of the 150 seats in the Slovak parliament.

Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party).

Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (The People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)

Haughton (“HZDS”) provided an analysis of the ideology, organisation and support base of the party. The study is based on interviews with leading HZDS members, parliamentary archives and official party documents. The “starring role on Slovakia's political stage” as well as other similarities with Smer-SD, such as the focus on those who had been considered victims of post-socialist “marketization”, deserve scholarly attention.

See also footnote 3. As in the case of Mečiar and HZDS (Haughton “HZDS” 745), much of the attention Smer-SD and Fico has received from analysts and observers has been “heavily opinionated”.

Can be translated as Institute for Public Affairs.

IVO defines the attributes of Slovak national populism as: “anti-americanism, anti-atlanticism, anti-western sentiment, resistance to international integration. . .” (Mesežnikov “Národný populizmus na Slovensku”). However, it has been indicated that Smer-SD cannot avoid reproducing neoliberalism in practical politics after the 2002 turn (Fisher et al.).

In addition to national populism, his symbolic mixing of socialism and nationalism and the coalition of his social democratic party with the Slovak National Party won him the label of “national-socialist” (Kasarda).

At the beginning of these observational visits across Slovakia I was surprised that many people did not actually come to commemorate but to see Robert Fico and other SMER officials in person. A frequent answer to my question “Why are you here?” was “I came to see Fico”. His arrivals were accompanied by attentive silence, consequent long applause and even standing ovations. During Fico's speeches, talking would be met with a stern gaze (based on author's field notes).

The team consisted of students of the Department of Politics and IR and the Department of Anthropology.

Paška is the vice-president of SMER. The president, although he declares political neutrality, is very close to the party as well as to the party elites.

The official programme and a video are available at the official website of the Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic (“Slávnostné odhalenie sochy Svätopluka na nádvorí Bratislavského hradu”).

See the official website of the association (OZ Svätopluk).

For the nationalist dramaturgy of the ceremony I recommend the following video produced by SMER TV, an internet television channel of Fico's party SMER-SD “SMER TV: Odhalenie sochy Svätopluka na Bratislavskom hrade”.

See the official statement made by historian Zavacká reviewing the ideational roots of the use of Svatopluk as a political symbol of Slovak nationalism. Caught in an illustrative post-socialist symbolic struggle, the new Head of Parliament Richard Sulík appointed an expert commission led by Marína Zavacká to investigate and provide recommendations concerning the possible tearing down of the statue after the 2010 election. Sulík eventually decided to keep the statue to avoid “polarization of society”.

See the official statement delivered by historians based in the Slovak Academy of Science and Matica slovenská, a state-funded Slovak “cultural” institution (“Svätoplukovská štátotvorná tradícia je národnou tradíciou Slovákov a je nedelitel'nou súčasťou nášho národného a historického vedomia”). Matica slovenská is an organization that has been credited with the introduction of significant nationalist issues into the post-1989 public discourse in Czechoslovakia.

References were made to those considered legitimate historians as well, especially to the historians in Matica slovenská. The latter published an official statement about the public questioning of the statue, stressing the role of Svatopluk as a national symbol. To mark the allegiance to the same discourse of national identification, the historians used the idiom of “national nihilism” as well (“Vyhlásenie prezídia Matice slovenskej k verejným útokom na jazdeckú sochu král'a Svätopluka”).

The speech is available online at Pavol Paška's website (“Príhovor pri príležitosti slávnostného odhalenia sochy Svätopluka na Bratislavskom hrade”).

The author of the statue Ján Kulich is considered controversial as he enjoyed prominence within the communist Czechoslovakia, a fact that is supposed to exclude him automatically from major contracts from the state in the post-1989 political order.

An expert on state symbols said: “It was used in 1938 and was modelled on a swastika in a circle – the emblem of Adolf Hitler's [Nazi] party. All fascist organizations modelled their images on the German swastika.” (Vrtel in “Activists launch campaign against Bratislava Castle Svätopluk statue”).

On an English and recent account on the wartime Slovak Republic, see Nedelsky.

5 July, a national holiday in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Saints Cyril and Methodius are commemorated in other countries as well, especially in Bulgaria.

The statue St. Stephen in Komárno spurred a significant controversy as well. One year before the 2010 unveiling of Saints Cyril and Methodius, the Slovak government officially blocked the visit of Hungarian president who was supposed to unveil the statue (“Slovakia blocks Hungarian visit”).

A Hungarian revisionist organization seeking to unify all Hungarians in one political community.

“. . . to rebury ancestors is to create a community of mourners” (Verdery “The Political Lives of Dead Bodies” 90).

The uprising represents another controversial and not yet established symbol for Slovak identification. While it would serve the imagery of a nation acting in unity against an external evil and thus establish an important event in the nation's heroic and primarily antifascist past, it is contested by those who promote the legacy of the wartime Slovak Republic, as “the uprising” actually represented a rebellion against the official regime and was illegitimate (Kamenec 218). On the other hand, the uprising “became a respected part of European anti-fascist resistance” (76).

The commemoration was not concentrated on a statue although it played a significant role as well. The omnipresent references to anonymous victims of the war and heroes of the resistance were embodied in the statue located inside the building of the Museum of Slovak National Uprising. The statue is called “Victims warn” and it serves as a sort of Anderson's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the “ghostly national imaginings” (9) when wreaths are placed on the statue by state officials and foreign diplomatic representatives.

These people have won various labels, from simple enemies to those who are deliberate apostates, renegades, national nihilists or “national homeless”.

For an anthropological account on Slovak nationalism and Czechoslovakia, see Holý (13; 101–102).

Not only of the living, but also the dead. As one of my friends told me: “You want to justify membership in the Communist Party? It is impossible, remember the victims of Stalin!” (illustration from personal conversation).

Interestingly enough, Roosens observed that: “[t]here seems to be a far-reaching consensus among human beings, whatever their cultural tradition, that a number of material goods and social values, whose production originated in Western society, are highly desirable” (11).

For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Naxera who presents an interesting and subtle analysis of corruption behaviours in post-socialism.

Many observers criticized him for using his state position to promote his party. The unveiling of Svatopluk was criticized for being abused for the electoral campaign of Smer-SD.

Fico kept shocking the post-1989 pro-Western elites by his statements on communism. Once he declared that he didn't even notice the 1989 Revolution – which was seen as an unimaginable arrogance by many people as the Velvet Revolution has been a sacred symbol of freedom and struggle against totalitarian tyranny.