Language, nation and citizenship: contrast, conflict and convergence in Estonia's debate with the international community

Abstract

This paper investigates the clash of (language) ideologies in Estonia in the post-Communist period. In an analysis of changing Western recommendations and Estonian responses during the transition of Estonia from Soviet Socialist Republic to independent state, we trace the development of the discourses on language and citizenship rights. Different conceptions of the nation-state and of how citizenship is acquired, together with different approaches to human rights, led to disagreement between Estonian political elites and the political actors attached to international institutions. In particular, the Soviet demographic legacy posed problems.

We use a context-sensitive approach that takes account of human agency, political intervention, power, and authority in the formation of (national) language ideologies and policies. We find that the complexities of cultural and contextual differences were often ignored and misunderstood by both parties and that in their exchanges the two sides appeared to subscribe to ideal philosophical positions. In the following two decades both sides repositioned themselves and appeared to accommodate to the opposing view. In deconstructing the role of political intervention pressing for social and political inclusion and in documenting the profound feeling of victimhood that remained as a legacy from the Soviet period and the bargain that was struck, we hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of the language ideological debates surrounding the post-Communist nation-(re)building process.

Keywords:

• citizenship
• collective memory
• language rights
• nationalism
• nation (re)building

Notes

Estonia, like Latvia, had been the destination of considerable internal USSR migration; Lithuania, on the other hand, had experienced far less immigration. In 1945, the population in Estonia had been over 95% of Estonian descent, and in Latvia 80% were Latvian. By 1989, these figures had dropped to 65% and 52% respectively, the remainder of the population now consisting mainly of ethnic Russians and, to a lesser extent, Russophones (i.e. Russified Slavs). In Lithuania, the percentage of Russians in 1989 was 9.4% (slightly more than Poles; for more information see Hogan-Brun et al. 2007, 505; Pettai 2001, 265). Such people-transfer policies had served to dilute the local populations and culture and had been deployed elsewhere too, albeit under different circumstances (e.g. in Ireland and South Tyrol).

Cujus regio, ejus lingua, or “the ruler determines the language,” may have been more de facto than de jure, in contrast to cujus regio, ejus religio, or “the ruler determines the religion.'” It was, nonetheless, just as powerful, and may have had even greater long-term effects (Gellner 2006).

Children born in France to foreign parents were asked to make an express choice to become French in the law of 22 July 1993. This was amended in the law of 16 March 1998 to give the automatic right to citizenship to such children on their attaining majority: “si, à cette date, il a en France sa résidence et s'il a eu sa résidence habituelle en France pendant une période continue ou discontinue d'au moins cinq ans, depuis l'âge de onze ans” (Nationalitè française http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/les-francais-etranger_1296/vos-droits-demarches_1395/nationalite-francaise_5301/index.html).

In addition to the traditional fulfillment of residency criteria, would-be citizens are expected to display cultural knowledge about the host country and competence in the host country's official language. Policies have been developed in many states for citizenship applicants to undergo language and knowledge of society (KoS) tests as part of this procedure. Some of these tests have an element of attitude and value testing (cf. Wright 2008; Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero, and Stevenson 2009; Extra, Spotti, and Van Avermaet 2009).

As Brubaker (1992) rightly points out, the strict assignment of nation-states to one philosophical paradigm or the other is ever more difficult. The German state, long held as the archetype for jus sanguinis, enacted amended Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz legislation in 2000, which gave some jus soli rights.

To see Eastern Europe as purely ethno-nationalist is of course simplistic, and there is no example of the ideal form of ethnic nation-state in Eastern Europe. The interpenetration of groups in the center and east of the continent always made this an impossibility (Kamusella 2008). Thus, after World War I, familiar strategies of nation-building had to be employed. A state language and culture were imposed on a largely heterogeneous reality, just as in Western Europe. However, it is fair to say that Central and Eastern Europeans have traditionally subscribed to ethnic nationalism.

In the Soviet period, a new discourse of internationalism spread, eclipsing “bourgeois nationalisms.” In language policy terms, this meant that a process of language substitution slowly evolved that favored the language of the ruling power (i.e. Russian). With the (overt or covert) imposition of a previously external language in an increasing range of domains in public life and social interaction, this led to the prevalence of asymmetrical bilingualism (on the part of the titular nationals in the various Soviet republics, since Russians remained largely monolingual) and limitations on the function of the local languages, and their ideological stigmatization.

For example, the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia into smaller states may have had at its core economic and political reasons, but a great deal of the argument was expressed in terms of blood and belonging. This discourse is also to be found in the debate on the decoupling of Czechs and Slovaks.

By the end of February 2012, 25 member states had signed and ratified the charter (Council of Europe – Treaty office 1992; http://conventions.coe.int).

“Il n'y a plus ni noblesse, ni pairie, ni distinctions héréditaires, ni distinctions d'ordres, ni régime féodal, ni justices patrimoniales, ni aucun des titres, dénominations et prérogatives qui en dérivaient, ni aucun ordre de chevalerie, ni aucune des corporations ou décorations, pour lesquelles on exigeait des preuves de noblesse, ou qui supposaient des distinctions de naissance, ni aucune autre supériorité, que celle des fonctionnaires publics dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions.– Il n'y a plus ni vénalité, ni hérédité d'aucun office public.– Il n'y a plus, pour aucune partie de la Nation, ni pour aucun individu, aucun privilège, ni exception au droit commun de tous les Français.” (Conseil constitutionnel 1791; http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr)

Apart from having been governed by Russians Conseil constitutionnel; [then webaddress] (1710–1918), Estonians have also endured German landownership and lived under the Danish and Swedish crowns, although the latter spell is remembered by Estonians as a “golden period.”

The situation was similar in Latvia. By contrast, since Lithuania's demographic landscape had remained more homogeneous, automatic citizenship was offered to all normally resident on the country's soil on the restitution of its independence.

In Latvia there was a similar problem, with even more (700,000-plus) settlers from the Soviet period.

Lithuania's legislation diverges from that in the neighboring republics in that the country was in a position to opt for inclusive citizenship policies. This is because it hosts a relatively small percentage of immigrant communities, who already tend to have an adequate command of Lithuanian. The majority of Lithuania's non-native population was therefore able to acquire citizenship through a naturalization process offering the so-called “zero option” for all individuals normally resident in the republic by 1990.

Ernest Renan delivered his lecture “Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?” at the Sorbonne in March 1882. He argued that a nation exists because those who are part of it have decided to constitute a group. In this sense, “L'existence d'une nation est (pardonnez-moi cette métaphore) un plébiscite de tous les jours.”

Estonia joined the Council of Europe in 1993 and the European Union and NATO in 2004.

Of the 45,000 people living in this oil-shale mining region, some 95% are Russian-speakers. There is another, integrated (Old Believer) Russian community in Eastern Estonia around the Lake Peipsi area.

According to the 2000 census, some 80% of Estonians, 79% of Latvians, and 94% of Lithuanians reported an ability to communicate in the titular language of their country. The current figures, to be reported in the 2011 Estonian census, have increased (personal communication; full statistics not available at time of writing). In 1989, the corresponding figure was 67% in Estonia, 62% in Latvia, and 85% in Lithuania.

See Gross (2002) for an Estonian view of the similarities between nineteenth- and twentieth-century discourses.