Whose land is it? Land reform, minorities, and the titular “nation” in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan

Abstract

Each of the post-Soviet Central Asian states inherited both inefficient collectivized agricultural systems and an understanding of the nation rooted in categories defined by Soviet nationality policy. Despite the importance placed on territorial homelands in many contemporary understandings of nationalism, the divergent formal responses to these dual Soviet legacies have generally been studied in isolation from one another. However, there are conceptual reasons to expect more overlap in these responses than generally assumed; in this paper, we engage in a focused comparison of three post-Soviet Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in order to investigate how nationalizing policies and discourse, land distribution, and ethnic tensions interact with each other over time. We reveal that the nationalizing discourses of the three states – despite promoting the titular groups vis-à-vis other groups – have had limited influence on the actual processes of land distribution. Furthermore, the Kyrgyzstani case challenges the assumption that the effect flows unidirectionally from nationalizing policies and discourse to land reform implementation; in this case, there is evidence that the disruption caused by farm reorganization generated grievances which were then articulated by some nationalistic political elites.

Keywords:

• land reform
• nation-building
• Central Asia

Notes

1 It should be noted that informal institutions, as well as unofficial strategies and procedures, often attempt to preserve the inherited systems.

2 According to local observers, the unrest was a reaction by a segment of the Kazakhstani elite to what they perceived as a violation of a longstanding informal agreement between Moscow and the republic which ensured that the top leadership position in the country will be held by a Kazakh.

3 This right was further clarified in the Land Code passed by Parliament in 1999.

4 Beknazorv would be arrested in 2002, an event that would set off the important Aksy events which can be viewed as a precursor of the Tulip Revolution.

5 Based on fieldwork in southern Kyrgyzstan, Wouter Ronsijn reports that farm size dwindles near urban areas; for instance, he found that many plots near Jalalabad were less than 1 hectare (2006, 7–8).

6 The fact that the local administration was slow in removing the squatters was widely seen by many Uzbeks as retaliation for Botirov's political demands.

7 According to a 22 February 2010 article on Ferghana.ru, Russians and Tajiks alike were among those indiscriminately shot by the Soviet troops. Furthermore, an investigative committee found that rumors that the demonstration was staged by nascent nationalist and religious political movements to intimidate the Russian population were false.

8 Despite a multitude of differences between these organizations, they all demanded economic reforms.

9 He also promised to work to restore the Soviet Union.

10 Nationalizing efforts have also involved the vilification of Uzbekistan and the construction of grandiose monuments such as the Ismoili Somoni statue in the center of Dushanbe to celebrate the “first Tajik state,” a similar monument in the northern city of Khujand, and the world's tallest flagpole.

11 These initiatives also conveyed a message to the state's citizens generally, and the IRP particularly, that Tajikistan's culture and history predates the arrival of Islam.

12 The law does permit a variety of land use rights (life-long inheritable tenure, short-term lease, and long-term lease).

13 As Radio Ozodi on 1 December 2012 reports, this prompted Rahmon to threaten local elites with dismissal and arrest if this practice were to continue. However, despite the passage of the law and Rahmon's threat, the illegal sale of land has not stopped.

14 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to consider this.

15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.