Russia and the Baltic states: problematizing the Soviet legacy discourse

Abstract

Most studies of the post-Soviet space often explicitly or implicitly analyze Russia not as a new independent state but as the political successor of the USSR, thereby almost automatically leading to conclusions about Russian neo-imperialism. This paper explains how distorted discourses on the Soviet legacy originated and how they obstruct equal relations between Russia and other former Soviet republics using the example of the Baltic states.

Keywords:

• Russia
• post-Soviet space
• Soviet legacy
• Baltic states
• regional cooperation in the post-Soviet space

I am grateful to the PONARS community for their invaluable feedback.

Notes

† Some of the ideas in this article have been presented previously as a PONARS Eurasia policy memo.

1 The term “post-Soviet space” usually refers to the 12 former Soviet republics except the Baltic states, which are now members of the EU and NATO. However, in this article I use this term to designate all 15 former Soviet republics. I also use the established term “new independent states” as a synonym, although, of course, the former Soviet republics have been independent for over 20 years.

2 In this paper I analyze only the USSR as a colonizer of the Baltic states and disregard the Russian Empire because the colonial discourse in the Baltic states is limited to the conflicting interpretations of the Soviet history and almost does not make references to the Russian imperial past. If the Baltic states wanted to use arguments related to their colonization by the Russian Empire, they would have to admit that some of their EU partners also had imperial ambitions toward the Baltic states and, thus, they can be regarded as former colonizers as well. Another explanation of the choice of the Soviet Union for the main colonizer is that the Baltic states received a chance to build sovereign nation-states for the first time in their history only after the collapse of the Russian Empire when they gained independence. Thus loss of independence in 1940 is perceived now in the Baltic region as a greater damage to the process of the nation-building of the Baltic states than Russian imperial rule, because the Soviet occupation interrupted unaccomplished state- and nation-building processes.

3 “Politics of memory,” a widespread political phenomenon, is commonly used in reference to the relations of Russia with the post-Soviet states. For more World War II examples, see Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (ed. by Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu 2006).

4 The Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights established a working group on historic memory. This working group organized a series of seminars on Stalinism and launched a website “Historic memory: XX century” (http://istpamyat.ru/), presenting the history of political repressions from 1918 to 1991.

5 “Titular nation” is a Soviet term denoting a dominant ethnic group that gives its name to an administrative unit within the Soviet Union (e.g. “Ukrainians” for Ukraine or “Armenians” for Armenia).

6 For political clashes over World War II monuments in Estonia, see Brüggemann and Kasekamp (2008).

7 The First Chechen War, or the First Campaign, took place in 1994–1996; the Second Chechen War, officially called the “Counterterrorist Operation,” had its active phase in 1999–2000 and formally ended in 2009.

8 Governors of the many official regions constitute the Russian Federation.

9 A term used in Russia for describing Russian president Vladimir Putin's measures to centralize power in Russia by making local authorities more accountable to the federal authorities.

10 The Russian name for the period of World War II from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945.

11 A similar methodological complication is discussed in: Wallander (2007).