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Abstract
Until 1999, Kosovo was a little-known province of Serbia. NATO's intervention, however, changed this. Suddenly, everyone was talking about Kosovo and the plight of the Kosovo Albanians. Today, Kosovo is no longer a major talking point; few authors are now writing about post-independence Kosovo and the many challenges that confront the young state. Particularly striking is the relative absence of scholarly writings that discuss the Gordian knot of northern Kosovo. Seeking to rectify this neglect, this article has three core aims: to provide new empirical insights into the situation on the ground in northern Kosovo, to explore Serb and Albanian viewpoints regarding the status of the north (and in particular to examine Serb fears and concerns) and to discuss possible solutions. It argues that granting the north a special, autonomous status within Kosovo is the ultimate way to resolve the “northern problem,” and indeed this now seems the most likely solution following the recent conclusion of the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. This research is based on five weeks of fieldwork in Kosovo in July and August 2012. During this time, the author conducted 56 semi-structured interviews, 29 of which took place in northern Kosovo.
Notes
1. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, “The unemployment rate in Kosovo is approximately 45% … Unemployment continues to be the country's biggest problem” (2012, 15).
2. In September 2012, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there are 17,900 IDPs in Kosovo, of which 54% are Serbs, 40% are Albanians and 5% are Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians (RAE) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Citation2012, 4).
3. It should be noted that in Kosovo, place names are written in Albanian and in Serbian. In this article, both spellings will be simultaneously used. As Kosovo Albanians form the majority in Kosovo, the Albanian spelling will always be given first, except in those cases where the place name in question is a Serb majority area.
4. Without acquiring a Kosovo ID card, for example, it is impossible to receive a pension, to obtain a Kosovo driving license or the new RKS car number plates or indeed to live a “normal” everyday life.
5. These internationals represented, inter alia, the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE.
6. Due to the sensitive political situation in Kosovo, however, it was more prudent to ask Albanians if they spoke “bosanski” (Bosnian) rather than “srpski” (Serbian). Although officially Bosnian and Serbian are now two separate languages, to all intents and purposes they are one and the same language and are mutually comprehensible.
9. This is because two of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia, do not recognize Kosovo's independence and remain committed to UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
11. There is, however, no evidence that Serbs were in fact responsible for the tragic deaths of the three children (see, for example, ICG 2004).
14. That Serbia does not recognize Kosovo's international borders means that it is impossible to travel directly from Kosovo to Serbia, unless Serbia was your initial point of entry. As far as Serbian authorities are concerned, Kosovo is still Serbian territory. If, therefore, you endeavor to cross into Serbia straight from Kosovo without a Serbian entry stamp in your passport, you will be turned back and could potentially be charged with illegally entering Serbia. If, therefore, any visitor to Kosovo would like to travel to Serbia but does not have a Serbian stamp in his/her passport, a long detour must be made. Namely, it is necessary to leave Kosovo and to travel into neighboring Macedonia, from which point Serbia can be legally entered and a Serbian passport stamp obtained from the Serbian border police.
15. The north is also home to small communities, inter alia, of Roma and Bosniaks.
16. According to the UNDP, “The population of Mitrovicë/a north is around 20,000 people, 17,000 of whom are K-Serbs” (2011, 13).
17. Woehrel notes that, “In January 2013, KFOR had 5,134 troops in Kosovo, of which 773 were U.S. soldiers” (2013).
18. The two sides have since agreed upon a border agreement, which took effect on 10 December 2012 at two border crossings.
19. According to a 2012 report by the UN Secretary-General, for example,
… the security situation in northern Kosovo has remained fragile. Tensions flared on 1 June when KFOR attempted to clear a roadblock in Zveçan/Zvečan Municipality. Local protestors violently confronted KFOR, which responded with force. As a result, two KFOR soldiers and five Kosovo Serbs sustained gunshot wounds. (UN Security Council 2012, §9)
20. Among Serb interviewees, the jury was still out regarding Serbia's newest president, Tomislav Nikolić. They simply hoped that he would do more to protect and defend their interests than his predecessor, Boris Tadić. Street graffiti reflected the widespread consensus among interviewees that Tadić had failed them. Scrawled onto a wall in the center of Mitrovica/ë were the words: “Tadiću, ako si Srbin dođi u Mitrovicu” [Tadić, if you are a Serb then come to Mitrovica].
21. According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, “Establishment of the rule of law in North Kosovo is crucial for regional stabilization” (2012, 15).
22. On 2 July 2011, Kosovo and Belgrade reached an agreement on freedom of movement, the implementation of which began five months later. According to Deda and Qosaj-Mustafa,
“Overall, the implementation of the agreement is going well. Through this Agreement, free movement of people from Kosovo to Serbia was established and citizens of Kosovo can now enter Serbia using ID cards and passports issued by the Kosovo authorities, excluding northern Kosovo” (2013, 18).
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, moreover, maintains that, “Kosovo Serbs’ freedom of movement has improved considerably”. In the Serb enclave of Štrpce/Shtrpcë, for example, “All Serb residents … possess Kosovo ID cards and passports. They have all taken Kosovo car plates. There are no problems whatsoever when it comes to freedom of movement or interethnic relations” (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Citation2012, 48). While underscoring that important progress has been made, however, the Helsinki Committee also acknowledges that, “ … little has been accomplished at [the] social and cultural level – in daily communication between citizens from [the] two ethnic communities. No doubt that enhanced mutual communication would greatly contribute to feelings of security among citizens” (2012, 10). The author's own fieldwork supports this latter point. Interviewees living in Serb enclaves, for example, frequently explained that even with a Kosovo ID card, they do not have complete freedom of movement because they do not feel completely safe traveling in or through Albanian areas. Echoing this, the OSCE reports that, “Throughout the southern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region, Kosovo Serbs exercise limited freedom of movement outside of their settlements and rely on humanitarian bus transportation or private means of transportation to access services in northern Mitrovicë/Mitrovica” (2010b, 12).
23. Those Albanians who live in the north regularly use the bridge but once they reach the Serb part of Mitrovica/ë, they always turn left toward the aforementioned Albanian-inhabited apartment blocks or right toward Bošnjačka Mahala/Lagja e Boshnjakëve. They never carry straight on, up the café-lined street into the very heart of north Mitrovica/ë, where a large Serbian flag declares “Ovo je Srbija” [This is Serbia]. This part of Mitrovica/ë is apparently “off bounds” to Albanians.
24. There is a mixed police patrol on the main bridge in Mitrovicë/a 24 hours a day.
25. As Judah underlines, “For as long as anyone can remember, the history of Kosovo has been a battlefield pitting Serbs against Albanians. Each believes different things because each has been taught different things … ” (2008, 30).
26. In his 2010 report entitled “Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo,” for example, which the Council of Europe subsequently adopted, the Swiss senator Dick Marty claims that, “The appalling crimes committed by Serbian forces” gave rise to a very one-sided view of the conflict, whereby one side was invariably perceived as the perpetrators while the other side was seen as victims. Yet, “The reality is less clear-cut and more complex” (Marty Citation2010, §13). Hume, for his part, asserts that, “The accusation that President Milošević's Serbia was carrying out ‘another Holocaust’ in Kosovo was the culmination of a long campaign to Nazify the Serbs, which had escalated throughout the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia” (2000, 71).
27. It is important to underline, however, that it is not only Serbs who are the victims of security incidents. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, RAE [Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian] communities also suffer. Compared with 2010, there was an increase in reported crimes affecting both communities [Serb and RAE] in 2011 and the first half of 2012, with incidents of intimidation, assault and theft most common at returnee sites. (2012, 7)
28. The OSCE, for example, reports that, “In the Prishtinë/Priština region security incidents targeting Kosovo Serbs – who constitute the second largest community – continued to occur, undermining the community's safety and security. Kosovo Serbs, their private property and their sites of cultural and religious significance were targeted throughout 2010” (2011, 13).
29. Similarly, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia maintains that, “Today, twelve years after the end of the conflict, the Serb community is guaranteed more rights than any other minority community in the region … Kosovo Serbs hold power in the municipalities of Ranillug/Ranilug, Kllokot/Klokot, Partesh/Parteš, Graçanicë/Gračanica, Shtrpcë/Štrpce – which totals 20 percent of local self-governments in Kosovo” (2012, 21).
30. Not all interviewees who joined the KLA, however, were fighting for a “Greater Albania”. While for some, it was important to unify all Albanians in one state, for others the priority was simply to liberate Kosovo from Serb rule.
31. It is important to note, however, that Kosovo – as a province of Serbia – had definitive and official borders. The north of Kosovo, in contrast, has never been more than several municipalities. Hence, to invoke the secession of Kosovo from Serbia as an argument in favor of the north's secession from Kosovo is problematic as there is an important distinction between the two cases in terms of prior borders.
32. Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština reached seven agreements between March 2011 and March 2012 on, inter alia, freedom of movement, integrated border crossing control and cadastral records. A further six agreements were concluded between October 2012 and June 2013 on issues including a special fund for northern Kosovo and the creation of a special multi-ethnic police unit within the KPS to protect Serb religious and cultural heritage.
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