Reconsidering “Piłsudskiite nationalism”

Abstract

This paper examines the intellectual underpinnings of the nationalism articulated by the followers of Marshal Józef Piłsudski (Piłsudskiites), who ruled Poland between 1926 and 1939. Scholarly consensus holds that modern Polish nationalism was solely the domain of the National Democratic movement. Conversely, the Piłsudskiites' conception of the nation is generally seen as anachronistic, poorly articulated, self-contradictory, and lacking a deeper intellectual foundation. Focusing on the formative years of the Second Polish Republic (1918–1922), this paper draws a link between Piłsudskiite political thought and the philosophy of the heterodox Marxist theorist Stanisław Brzozowski. Re-examining the early writings of Piłsudski's followers in light of Brzozowski's philosophy, the paper presents the argument that “Piłsudskiite nationalism” was in fact deeply constructivist, surprisingly sophisticated, and no less “modern” than the nationalist discourse articulated by the National Democrats. In the process, the article interrogates and problematizes the classic “ethnic” vs. “civic” typology of nationalist movements.

Keywords:

• nationalism
• Poland
• Pilsudski
• Brzozowski
• civic

Notes

1 For more on this question see Walicki (1982, 1989b).

2 In civic nationalism, usually identified with the French tradition of statehood, the nation constitutes a common political space, defined around a set of institutions, values, and political projects. Conversely, ethnic nationalism, which has its roots in German political thought, imagines a primordial nation based on (some combination of) shared ancestry, language, culture, and religion. For more on this question see Brubaker (1992).

3 Similarly, Dziewanowski (1969, 350) writes that

[Piłsudski's] essentially practical approach to politics, his distaste for ideology, prevented him from formulating a federal program, let alone a federal theory. His federalism was not theoretical: it was more instinctive and pragmatic, derived, as it was, from a traditional respect for the diversity that surrounded him from his earliest days.

4 While there are a number of works dealing with the policies of the “Piłsudski camp” in specific areas, there is not a single study which can be said to seriously engage its political thought and examine its vision of the Polish national community. For attempts to implement Piłsudski's “federalist” plans see Wandycz (1970, 25–39); Okulewicz (2001); Dziewanowski (1969). However, these works do not address the theory behind Piłsudski's praxis. Yet, as Osiński (2004, 2) points out, even though Piłsudski purposefully distanced himself from theoretical concerns, he “placed the burden of formulating the latter on the shoulders of his followers.” The few works which focus on Piłsudskiite political thought, in practice limit themselves to the study of political programs and largely ignore its deeper philosophical underpinnings. For example see Paruch (2005).

5 For example, many early followers of Piłsudski, such the radical Andrzej Strug, found themselves in opposition as the mainstream of the Piłsudski movement drifted further to the right. Conversely, cynical observers noted the phenomenon of the “Fourth Brigade,” that is newly minted Piłsudskiites who joined the Marshal's cause only after his successful coup d’état in 1926. In reality, of course, Piłudski's Legions, where his most dedicated followers earned their stripes, only had three brigades.

6 For an interpretation of the 1922 elections as a critical rupture in Polish history see Brykczynski (2013).

7 In Polish historical writing the term “Piłsudskiite” is sometimes reserved for the period after 1926, while prior to that date the Marshal's followers are designated with the term the “Camp of the Belweder” (Obóz Belwederski), after Piłsudski's residence at the Belweder Palace. However, since the latter term is cumbersome in English and the word Piłsudczyk was readily used and discussed in early independent Poland, it will be employed for analytical purposes in this article.

8 By the word “modern” in this context I mean drawing on and being in conversation with the contemporary political philosophy of thinkers like Marx and Nietzsche rather than, as most scholars implicitly argue, being beholden to nostalgic memories of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

9 So far only one publication dedicated to Skwarczyński has appeared in print, and it is little more than a collection of his articles (Nałęcz 1998).

10 To this day, the most insightful treatment of Skwarczyński remains Micewski's chapter on the subject in W cieniu marszałka Piłsudskiego (Micewski 1968).

11 In the long run it was the “old ones” who emerged with the larger following and were more successful in appropriating the unhyphenated acronym PPS. The PPS-FR program, composed by Feliks Perl, demanded “in the political realm, the creation of an independent Polish Republic … and in the national realm, the elimination of all national oppression.” Quoted in Syzdek (1986, 69).

12 Despite being an important forerunner of “Marxist humanism,” Brzozowski is almost entirely unknown in the West (Kennedy 1992, 735).

13 On Brzozowski see: Mencwel (1976); Miłosz (1982); Walicki (1989a, 2011).

14 According to Brzozowski ([1912] 2007, 242), he understood that “relinquishing responsibility” for life could only lead to “disaster.”

15 He has been cited as an influence by Miłosz, Adam Michnik and, most recently, the Krytyka Polityczna group.

16 Histories of the Piłsudskiite movement do not mention Brzozowski at all. Conversely, the only monograph dealing with the legacy and influence of Brzozowski's thought in the interwar period contains only a brief, tendentious, and wholly unsatisfying treatment of his influence on the Piłsudski camp (Stępień 1976, 36–39).

17 For more on this see (Syzdek 1986).

18 Skwarczyński cites Mickiewicz, who, in Wykłady literatury słowiańskiej, defines the fatherland not as “a bounded piece of land beyond which the existence and national action of Poles should end” but an idea “which has as yet no power on this earth, and is still actualizing itself (Lux 1910, 4–5).

19 There, he formed deep friendships with many men who would later play key roles in the Polish state and contribute significantly to the elaboration of Piłsudskiite ideology. Key among them were Tadeusz Hołówko, Janusz Jędrzejewicz, Kazimierz Świtalski, Aleksander Prystor, and Stanisław Thugutt.

20 It is noteworthy to point out the audacity of its title, since at the time Poland had not had anything close to either a government or an army since 1830!

21 In a candid letter written to his friend Feliks Perl before leading a daring and dangerous attack on a Russian bank train in the village of Bezdany, Piłsudski wrote:

I ask you [if you write my obituary] not render me ‘a good officer, a whiner, or a sentimentalist,’ that is a good man stretching himself out on the cross of humanity, or whatever. I used to be like that to some extent, but that was during my lofty and grim youth. Now, it has passed, it has passed forever—the whining and self-crucifying has bothered me so much when I witnessed it among our intelligentsia—it is so weak and hopeless. I fight and I will die because I can no longer live in the outhouse that is our life, because it is offensive—you hear!—offensive to me as a man with a non-slavish dignity. Let others play at tending the flowers of socialism or Polishness in this outhouse … atmosphere—I can't! This is not [about] sentimentalism, whining, the little machine of social progress, or whatever else, it is [about] plain old human dignity. … I hope you understand me. I am not driven by despair or sacrifice but by the desire to win and to prepare the foundations for victory.

Clearly Piłsudski shared to some extent Brzozwski's and Skwarczyński's Nietzschean emphasis on the key role of the individual creative act in history and saw himself, first and foremost, as an individual making his mark on history rather than as a cog in the struggle of the nation against its enemies (Piłsudski 1937, 299–300).

22 “Piłsudczycy,” Rząd i Wojsko, 26 January 1919, no. 4, pp. 1–2. While Piłsudski himself kept an arms-length distance from any attempts by his followers to formulate a concrete ideology or political philosophy, this does mean that he took no interest in such matters and that attempts by his followers to articulate a more concrete intellectual foundation for his movement did not have his tacit support or even input. It is doubtful that an article under such a provocative title could have appeared without Piłsudski's approval (Nałęcz 1975, 590).

23 “Piłsudczycy,” 1.

24 “Piłsudczycy,” 1.

25 “Piłsudczycy,” 1.

26 “Piłsudczycy,” 2.

27 “Piłsudczycy,” 2.

28 “Misja Polski,” Rząd i Wojsko, 19 January 1919, no. 3, pp. 1–2. Piłsudski's own vision of history was much less theoretical. For an excellent discussion see Dabrowski (2011, 73–110).

29 “Misja Polski,” 2.

30 “Sprawa Litwy,” Rząd i Wojsko, 12 January 1919, no. 2, pp. 3–4.

31 “Sprawa Litwy,” 2.

32 “Misja Polski,” 2.

33 The two parties singled out for criticism were the Polish Socialist Party and the radical Polish Peasant Party – “Liberation” (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – “Wyzwolenie”). Both of these enthusiastically supported Piłsudski and had many Piłsudskiites in their ranks. “W sprawie programu polskiego,” Rząd i Wojsko, 9 February 1919, no. 6, pp. 1–2.

34 I would like to thank Porter-Szűcs for suggesting this formulation.

35 Adam Skwarczyński, “Polska a Ukraina.” Rząd i Wojsko, 25 May 1919, no. 21, pp. 2–3.

36 “Mniejszości narodowe,” Rząd i Wojsko, 15 June 1919, no. 24, pp. 1–2.

37 “Mniejszości narodowe,” 1.

38 Skwarczyński, “Polska a Ukraina,” 2.

39 Dabrowski identifies a very interesting tension between romantic and pragmatic modes of thought in her insightful analysis of Piłsudski's own writings. While more analysis would be necessary to bear this out, I would be tempted to suggest the hypothesis that Piłsudski also saw what he called “moral force” (siła moralna) as ultimately being a necessary component of any realistic power calculus. At any rate, the lack of faith in teleological historical progress, or the metaphysical support for morality in the universe, is what differentiates the romanticism of Piłsudski and his followers from that of Mickiewicz (Dabrowski 2011, 82–83).

40 “Sprawa Litwy,” Rząd i Wojsko, 12 January 1919, 3.