Abstract
The article explores the current stalemate in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, and perspectives for conflict transformation. As the conflict has remained dormant for more than 20 years, the political systems of the countries engaged in the conflict have adjusted to the conflict situation. The conflict is often used by the political elites in order to legitimize their power, consolidate support, marginalize opponents, and neutralize democratizing pressures. Since the status quo serves the interests of the authorities, the ruling regimes do not have strong incentives to seek conflict resolution. In these conditions, conflict transformation approaches are considered a necessary means to deal with the conflict. Given that political elites have little incentive to implement such transformation, civil society actors come increasingly to the fore. Only through multitrack initiatives supported by civil society actors, we argue, can conflict transformation practices advance and subsequently bring peace to the region.
Notes
1. Focus group interviews were conducted during the period of March–June 2014 among youth (including separate groups of students), women, NGO representatives, and civic activists in Yerevan, Gyumri, and Vanadzor, as well as with people living in the region bordering Azerbaijan in the northeast of Armenia in the town of Chambarak. These particular groups were identified because of their involvement in the past in peacebuilding initiatives. Participants were selected randomly using purposive sampling. Overall, eight focus group interviews were conducted with a total of 86 participants. Expert interviews were conducted among NGO leaders, academics, journalists, businessmen, and civic activists in Yerevan, Gyumri, and Vanadzor, as well as with local administration in Chambarak during the period of March–June 2014. Experts were selected using snowball sampling and their professional background in terms of peacebuilding initiatives. Overall, 10 expert interviews were conducted.
2. Galtung (Citation2002) discusses the Nagorny Karabakh conflict and South Caucasus among 45 other conflicts.
3. While volumes of literature on the conflict have been published both in Armenian, Azerbaijani, and in Russian (mostly by Armenian and Azerbaijani authors), we shall confine ourselves to the literature available in English.
4. As a de facto state, Nagorny Karabakh is not included in Levitsky and Way's analysis.
5. According to Caucasus Barometer 2013 survey, 43% of Armenians and 33% of Azerbaijanis either “don't care” about democracy or “in some circumstance would prefer to have non-democratic government” (CRRC Citation2013).
6. Of course, the change of government in post-Soviet countries does not always happen through elections, but sometimes it does, and sometimes through a coup d'etat, and sometimes through popular revolution (on the mechanisms of change of governments in post-Soviet political systems, see Levitsky and Way Citation2010, 183–235; O'Beachain and Polese Citation2010; Bunce and Wolchik Citation2011). Certainly, any of these scenarios can be enhanced by resentment which society at large and parts of the elite itself may feel in cases when the leaders make concessions that are viewed as unacceptable.
7. On this discourse in the Armenian mass media centered around the Karabakh issue, see Baghdasaryan (Citation2013).
8. This is supported by the results of the Caucasus Barometer survey in which more than 50% of the respondents in Armenia and Azerbaijan still think that the conflict can be resolved by peaceful means (CRRC Citation2013).
9. For an assessment of dialogue initiatives, see International Alert (Citation2013).
10. For a study of the most common clichés and stereotypes on both sides, see YPC (Citation2013).
11. The success of this project was helped by the fact that it was multilateral, with a regional dimension.