Strength in diversity: multiple memories of the Soviet past in the Russian Communist Party (CPRF), 1993–2004

Abstract

This paper investigates collective memory of the Soviet experiment in the narratives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), in the period of 1993–2004. My research finds that ideological differences within the CPRF led to the creation of multiple and contrasting depictions of the Soviet past in the discourse of its leaders. Challenging dominant assumptions, I argue that these differences did not conflict and undermine one another, but were structured to strengthen the public appeal of the CPRF. The paper adds empirical findings to the study of the CPRF and of collective memory at the (so far underdeveloped) level of public organizations. The paper also challenges the prevailing assumption that diverging historical narratives necessarily imply conflict and contestation.

Keywords:

• Communist Party of the Russian Federation
• CPRF
• memory
• memory wars
• Soviet history
• factionalism

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the help of my supervisors, Professor Paul Chaisty and Professor Dan Healey, for their valuable and constructive feedback during my research and on several earlier drafts.

Notes

1. Scholarship is schematized according to this binary in Buldakov (2003, 11), Kalinin (2013, 259), and Kelly (2014).

2. The fixation on the Russian state is, to an extent, understandable. The leadership’s toughening stance in domestic and international politics has been accompanied by an offensive in the politics of memory. The state has progressively tightened access to the archives (Adler 2001, 299–300; Etkind 2004, 56; Khazanov 2008, 305) and placed pressure on alternative historical viewpoints. Scholars have worriedly referred to the “Presidential Commission to Oppose Attempts at the Falsification of History” (active 2009–2012) (Benn 2011, 710; Kalinin 2013, 262; Linan 2010, 169; Morozov 2009, 2; Torbakov 2011, 210). These dynamics have been coupled with the state’s larger financial capacity for the building of museums, monuments, and so on and legal prerogative for creating education curriculum in schools (Adler 2005, 1001; Etkind 2004, 56).

3. Notable exceptions to the state-centrism implicit in the literature are a handful of studies that examine the “Memorial” society and the Orthodox Church. A few works mention in passing the CPRF’s stance on and role in Russian collective memory (Forest and Johnson 2002; Smith 2002; Shlapentokh and Bondartsova 2009; Slater 2004). However, even in these studies, the party is treated as monolithic, and there is an undue emphasis on the specific views of its First Secretary Gennadii Ziuganov (which are not shared by the majority of party members).

4. In presidential and parliamentary elections since 1994, the CPRF consistently placed second. By the end of the 1990s, the party was in the process of (partially) diversifying its electorate and membership, and it appeared that the CPRF would remain a part of the Russian political landscape (as it has, however limitedly).

5. Since the XXVIII CPSU Congress, these had even been formalized as “platforms” (Urban and Solovei 1997b, 11–29).

6. Among several explicitly subscribing to this typology (under identical or similar labels), see Devlin (1999, 161–170), Kholmskaia (1998, 565–569), Levintova (2012), and Sakwa (1998, 38–42, 2002, 244–247). A slightly different approach has been advanced by March (2001, 2002, 2003). While assenting to Urban and Solovei’s arguments, March contended that the more important cleavage in the party was the difference between party “radicals” and “moderates.” However, the distance between the two positions is not great. Firstly, March himself noted that “radicals” tended to support “orthodox Marxist–Leninist” ideology and “moderates” to embody the “nationalist” and “social democratic” tendencies (March 2002, 55–56). Thus, a three-way cleavage is merely simplified to a binary in March’s work. Secondly, the different schema are largely an outcome of the analytical emphasis accorded either to concrete stances on political issues (March) or to abstract ideological worldviews (Urban and Solovei). Because this paper focuses on ideology, it is justified in using the more nuanced typology advanced by Urban and Solovei.

7. In doing so, I subscribe to the prevailing functionalist paradigm: in the final analysis, I assume that collective memory functions in support of a given ideological worldview.

8. Representatives of the “orthodox Marxist–Leninist” trend were Anatolii Luk’ianov (Devlin 1999, 161; Ishiyama 1997, 317; Levintova 2012, 742; March 2002, 57; Sakwa 1998, 139, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997a, 24; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169), Richard Kosolapov (Hashim 1999, 85; March 2002, 37, 57; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997b, 59; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169), Nikolai Bindiukov (March 2002, 57; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997b, 154, 187), Al’bert Makashov (Devlin 1999, 161; March 2002, 37, 58; Sakwa 1998, 142; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169), Viktor Iliukhin (Ishiyama 1997, 317; March 2002, 58, 238; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169; Volokhov 2003, 90), and Teimuraz Avaliani (Hashim 1999, 85; Kholmskaia 1998, 565; March 2002, 58; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169).

“Social democratic” representatives included Valentin Kuptsov (Devlin 1999, 161; Kholmskaia 1998, 565; March 2002, 35, 56; Sakwa 1998, 139; Urban and Solovei 1997b, 55, 59; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169), Gennadii Seleznev (Devlin 1999, 161; Kholmskaia 1998, 565; March 2002, 56, 238; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997a, 24; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169; Volokhov 2003, 89), Ivan Mel’nikov (March 2002, 56; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997a, 24), and Iurii Masliukov (Devlin 1999, 161; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban 2000, 15; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169).

“Nationalists” included Gennadii Ziuganov (Devlin 1999, 161; Flikke 1999, 277–278; Ishiyama 1996, 151; Kholmskaia 1998, 565; March 2002, 35, 56; Sakwa 2002, 245; Urban and Solovei 1997b, 55), Iurii Belov (Kholmskaia 1998, 565; March 2002, 56; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997b, 55), Aleksandr Shabanov (March 2002, 56; Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997a, 24), and Viktor Peshkov (Sakwa 1998, 142; Urban and Solovei 1997a, 24; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 169).

9. One can assume that CPRF leaders were also “heard” by the Russian public. As a perusal of my bibliography demonstrates, many sources came from the pages of central newspapers (especially Pravda and Sovetskaiia Rossiia, whose circulation in the 1990s numbered up to half-million each [Petrova 2010, 71–73]) and major radio stations (such as Ekho Moskvy). As previously stated, the CPRF also had a developed network of regional press, which republished important statements.

10. The Soviet political culture of passivity and subordination to leadership also rendered open challenges to authority (and especially splits) very unlikely (Sakwa 2002, 260; Tarasov, Cherkasov, and Shavshukova 1997, 170).

11. In their reverence for Stalin, nationalists bore some resemblance to orthodox Marxist–Leninists. Unlike the latter, however, they saw the Stalin regime as embodying national traits, not the strictures of Marxism–Leninism.

12. “Zionists” were blamed for the purges, the Gulag, the anti-religious campaigns, corruption, and even the Nazi invasion of the USSR (Belov 1997, 1999b; Shabanov and Terekhov 1994; Shabanov, Sokolov, and Sivkov 1997).

13. Even the social democratic faction, with its rhetorical emphasis on reform, pragmatism, and re-updating, was careful to keep one foot in the past. They emphasized that their revisions were of a technical nature, as they were not abandoning Soviet values. Illustratively, the reform effort itself was justified by appealing to “creative Marxism,” itself a well-worn Soviet concept.

Additional information

Funding

Fieldwork for this research was supported by the School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, University of Oxford, and an academic travel grant from Santander Bank.