Modes of transition and the timing of separatist war onset: a comparative analysis of South Ossetia and Kosovo

Abstract

This paper compares the escalation of civil war in South Ossetia and Kosovo and shows how different modes of transition deeply influenced the timing and type of conflict in these two cases. It argues that regimes resulting from a transition from above – when the elite in power leads the process of regime change and imposes its political agenda on other social actors – are more likely to ensure political stability in the short term, since governments are more cohesive internally, enjoy the support of the military, and can rely on a loyal bureaucracy. In contrast, regimes that emerge from transitions from below are more likely to experience civil war with an ethnic minority in the short term because of an intrinsic weakness of the elite in power. Under these circumstances, the newcomers need to win the loyalty of the military and of the bureaucracy, and separatist groups can take advantage of the incumbents’ weaknesses and try to build resources to militarily challenge the state.

Keywords:

• regime change
• modes of transition
• separatist war
• South Ossetia
• Kosovo

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions and comments.

ORCID

Loretta Dell'Aguzzo http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9185-9245

Notes

1. See also Hegre et al. (2001), Muller and Weede (1990) and Gurr and Moore (1997).

2. The concept of “short term” is used to indicate the period between the collapse of the old regime and the instauration of a new regime, that is when new institutions and rules of the game are established. Data on eight cases of regime change in post-socialist countries (1990–2008) provided by Jansson et al. reveal that the average duration of these transitions is 397 days (2013). Therefore, I use the concepts of “short term” to indicate a period comprising between 0 and 3 years after the collapse of the previous regime and “long term” to refer to a period longer than three years.

3. The term “imposition” has been previously adopted by Karl and Schmitter (1991, 275) to define violent transitions. In this paper, this concept does not imply the resort to coercion and violence: imposed transitions denote those transitions in which a pact between the old and the new elite was made impossible due to high polarization and power disparity.

4. Interestingly, whereas regime change in Czechoslovakia was undoubtedly a bottom-up process, secession was a top-down process. Though from 1990 to 1992 polls showed a plurality of citizens in each republic favoring the continuance of the state (Leff 1996, 137), Czech and Slovak leaders opted for the dissolution of the state in blatant disregard for popular will. Cox and Frankland maintain that this course is due to weak mass-elite linkages “as appeared to be the case in post-Communist Czechoslovakia, [where] the relative autonomy of elites is increased, and the importance of the issues which divide them is amplified” (1995, 87).

5. In the vast literature on democratization, the use of different terms to identify the same concept contributed to a terminological Babel. Actually, the term “transformation” used by Huntington (1991) coincides with the concepts of “reforma-pactada” and “transaction” developed, respectively, by Linz and Stepan (1996) and Mainwaring (1992). Similarly, the words “replacement” and “rupture,” on one side, and “breakdown” and “collapse,” on the other, are conceptually equivalent.

6. A notable exception is represented by the overthrow of Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev during the Tulip Revolution in 2005. However, popular protests in this case did not result in a regime change, but in a mere transfer of power. Radnitz highlights that limited political change in Kyrgyzstan was made possible by policies that allowed “a business or political elite network to form outside the state” (2006, 144). More recently, Radnitz compares the mobilization processes in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and finds that – in order to challenge the incumbents – independent elites should be able to build both vertical and horizontal networks. Whereas the first allow them to mobilize the population, the latter ensure cooperation among the challengers when the state threatens their position (Radnitz 2010).

7. In states such as Czechoslovakia, Georgia, and the Baltic countries, national movements against Communist (and Soviet) rule emerged in the late 1980s. These new societal actors were able to organize mass protests against the old regimes, delegitimized by accusations of corruption, poor economic performance, and a repressive attitude against any form of dissent. Moreover, the popular fronts in these states achieved overwhelming victories in the first competitive elections held in the early 1990s.

8. The law stated that only parties and alliances whose activities extended on the entire territory of the republic of Georgia were allowed to participate in the elections. If votes for a list did not reach a national threshold of 4%, no candidates from that list would be elected.