Social networks and brokerage behavior in Indonesian elections: Evidence from Central Java

Abstract

This manuscript examines the role of intermediaries known as “brokers” in mobilizing voters, often by distributing cash and material goods, for campaigns in Indonesia. We build upon previous studies by examining the role of social networks in recruiting brokers into campaigns, the structure of brokerage networks, and the motivations of brokers to join a campaign. Whereas past studies tend to view the candidate-broker relationship in transactional terms, our study finds that the social network of candidates is also an important factor that helps explain how brokerage networks are structured and also the considerations that motivate brokers to work for a campaign. While material benefits and transactional considerations do motivate some brokers, we also find a wide variety of solidary benefits such as personal friendships and shared membership in social organizations as motivating factors for many other brokers. Our findings are based on in-depth interviews with approximately 150 individuals (candidates, brokers, citizens, etc.) during the 2017–2019 series of Indonesian elections which includes local village head elections, legislative elections, and the gubernatorial election.

Keywords:

• Social networks
• brokers
• vote buying
• elections
• Indonesia

Notes

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18 Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi, “Hitting Them With Carrots,” 857–81.

19 Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi, “Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout,” 710–46.

20 Finan, and Schechter, “Vote-Buying and Reciprocity,” 863–81.

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23 Aspinall, “When Brokers Betray,” 548.

24 Triantini, “Blora, Jawa Tengah,” 353–79.

25 Aspinall, “When Brokers Betray,” 545–70.

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27 Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi, “Hitting Them with Carrots,” 857–81; Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi, “Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout,” 710–46.

28 Hellmann, “Electoral Reform in Asia,” 275–98.

29 Ocantos et al., “Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias,” 202–17.

30 Blaydes, “Who Votes in Authoritarian Elections and Why?,” 1–21.

31 Aspinall, “When Brokers Betray,” 545–70.