The Ethos of Excellence

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the normative role of conventions in sports. However, the approach I have in mind does not dispatch the theory of interpretivism. What I offer is a synthesis that aims to show how interpretivism works in concert with – and relies heavily on – conventions. To make this point, I will argue that historical, cultural, and even simple preferential needs and desires help to determine what counts as athletic ‘excellence’ in sports.

Keywords:

• sport ethics
• interpretivism
• conventionalism

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Corrigendum

Acknowledgements

Scott Kretchmar provided advice, encouragement, and critique throughout many discussions that enabled me to develop this paper. Colleen English read at least three versions of this paper and her feedback is always helpful. John Russell posed a number of concerns that forced me rethink and rearticulate large portions of this paper. Russell and William Morgan both made their 2013 Fullerton presentations available to me. Blind reviewers offered numerous questions and challenges that pushed me to defend and clarify my stance. Many thanks to all.

Notes

1. Russell (2004) also discusses an ‘external’ principle of ‘consent’ which ‘regulates and sets certain conditions for entry into, and exit from, a game’ (147). Namely, persons should not be coerced into participation. I will return to this principle later.

2. Interestingly, nonetheless, interpretivists have debated and taken rather clear stances on ‘strategic’ fouling, Simon (2007b) included.

3. Russell (2011) has delved into this very issue and, in fact, concluded that integrity in sports functions differently from integrity in legal-systems. However, the differences he identified differ from the ones I will point out.

4. Of course some changes could ruin a sport. If a change diminishes physicality enough, an activity may no longer be a sport. But this is semantic issue, not a moral one.

5. It is worth noting that this principle probably extends beyond sports to other forms of recreation and leisure (assuming here that recreation and leisure, like sports, are by definition freely chosen).

6. Appiah’s notion of project-dependent goods sounds strikingly similar to Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1981) description of the telos of a ‘practice’, a notion that sports philosophers have employed (Butcher and Schneider 2007). In comparison see MacIntyre’s (1981) explanation of a ‘practice’ (175). MacIntyre’s communitarian scheme holds that normative recommendations are grounded in practices, imbedded in specific traditions. Sports philosophers could reposition this idea within Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism. That is, MacIntyre’s conception of a practice should apply, but only to non-transferable particularist goods born of identitarian projects, like sports. Meanwhile general liberal guidelines still apply.

7. What constitutes human dignity or human rights is too large a topic to delve into in this essay. Nonetheless, by giving these concepts credence broadly, it is possible to see how they can remain intact even as partiality is given some normative weight in sports. There will be times when general obligations and special obligations conflict, when our duties to others as persons test our duties to our identiterian projects and practices. I have not tried to strike the balance between the two in this essay. But if my analysis is correct, this is an important topic for future consideration.

8. This also begs the question of how, conversely, recommendations based on a sports internal values might affect a society at large. This is an important issue but will not be delved into in the present paper.

9. One methodological issue left on the table is based on Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism. See note 7. One epistemological issue left unanswered pertains to the merits of Morgan’s anti-foundationalism, which I have bypassed for pragmatic reasons. Another point that calls for further inquiry is role of integrity in sports. While it is not the fundamental virtue with regard to fostering ‘excellence’, it is still possible there may be times when it will be very important. I have not tried to delineate when these times might be. However, my guess is these instances will themselves be contingent to a specific cultural moments and contexts. It will be socially constructed conventions that make integrity a prevailing value.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Adam Berg

Penn State University, Kinesiology, 274 Recreation Building, University Park, 16802 United States. Email: [email protected].