Abstract
Eugen Fink’s interpretation of play is virtually absent in the current philosophy of sport, despite the fact that it is rich in original descriptions of the structure of play. This might be due to Fink’s decision not to merely describe play, but to employ its analysis in the course of an elucidation of the ontological problem of the world as totality. On the other hand, this approach can enable us to properly evaluate the true existential and/or ontological value of play. According to Fink, by integrating beings into the imaginary play-world, we become able to transcend mere circumscribed individual entities and encounter reality as such in a new, more profound way. This positive ontological value of play is, however, forgotten because the imaginary dimension of play is traditionally interpreted as a virtual imitation of a model reality which already actually exists somewhere else. For this reason, Fink returns to the Platonic interpretation of play, which laid the foundations for this understanding, and offers a thorough critique thereof. Fink demonstrates how Plato’s interpretation of play as a mirror reflection does not get to the essence of the act of play and how it stresses only its inessential traits. In reality, play is not a less real copy of an actual, serious action: the essence of the imaginary dimension of play is not to represent a circumscribed action, event, or being. As the analysis of its structure reveals, the proper essence of a playful action is rather to symbolize a certain whole, which is irreducible to its actual parts. Players thus necessarily understand individual realities with regard to the whole of the play-world in which they integrate them, i.e. they understand them differently than as objects.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. The author would like to thank prof Ivo Jirásek from Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic, who brought his attention to the possibility of developing Fink’s analysis of play in the context of sport and provided several useful references (cf. Jirásek Citation2003).
2. A translation was, however, envisioned in the 1970s, see Krell (Citation1972, 63), note 1. Since the author is not a native English or German speaker, it has to be stressed that the goal here is not to establish a definitive vocabulary. The reader is invited to confront his/her understanding with the original German text.
3. Fink’s analyses of the way in which play appears to us are, in our opinion, an exemplary case of a phenomenological description. The existence of such a positive model should be highly valued, since the ‘phenomenology of sport’ still does not seem to have cleared up its fundamental principles (cf. e.g. Halák, Jirásek and Nesti Citation2014).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Jan Halák
Faculty of Physical Culture, Department of Recreology, Palacký University in Olomouc, tř. Míru 115, 771 11 Olomouc, Czech Republic. E-mail: [email protected]