On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox

Abstract

There are circumstances in which we want to predict a series of interrelated events. Faced with such a prediction task, it is natural to consider logically inconsistent predictions to be irrational. However, it is possible to find cases where an inconsistent prediction has higher expected accuracy than any consistent prediction. Predicting tournaments in sports provides a striking example of such a case and I argue that logical consistency should not be a norm of rational predictions in these situations.

Keywords:

• rationality
• prediction
• decision theory
• logical consistency
• expected utility
• tournaments

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank John Basl, Patrick Forber, Ron Sandler, and Kevin Zollman for comments and discussion on previous drafts of this article. I am also grateful to John Russell for helpful remarks in revising the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rory Smead

Rory Smead, Department of Philosophy & Religion, Northeastern University, Boston MA, USA. E-mail: [email protected]