![Sample our Sports and Leisure journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5949/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Sports-Leisure.jpg"})
Abstract
J.S. Russell, Stephen Mumford, and Randolph Feezell have criticized my view that zealous partisans of a particular team are superior to purists, who derive an esthetic pleasure from good play by any team. All three philosophers extol the virtues of purism and Russell defends a pluralistic view that rejects the very idea of an ideal type of fan. In response, I renounce the claim that partisans are superior to purists and instead propose a more modest defense of partisanship. Moderate partisan fans, who constrain their support by moral and esthetic criteria, exhibit admirable concern for their team’s wellbeing, have unique opportunities to display moral virtue, and are necessary for the welfare of competitive sport. Partisans’ choice of team is influenced by arbitrary factors but arbitrariness is built into the very nature of sport and applies equally to purists’ admiration of athletic excellence. It diminishes neither the value of athletic excellence nor the value of partisans’ devotion to their team.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. As Feezell (Citation2013, 78) points out, the purist is ‘a game lover rather than a team lover’.
2. Russell recognizes diversity in fans’ motivations that goes beyond the partisan vs. purist dichotomy. Some spectators may watch games for pure entertainment or to learn ways to improve their own performance in sport, neither of which are either partisan or purist motivations. While acknowledging this pluralism in fans, my concern in this paper is with the merits of the two approaches that fans most commonly display: partisanship and purism.
3. ‘Though some will be lifelong partisans and others will have different motivations, they all have meaningful connections and attachments with each other and form a meaningful community through their common attachment to a sport. Thus, it is fun to watch or attend games together or talk about them, even with – perhaps especially with – those who may support different teams or have no strong partisan team attachments’ (Russell Citation2012, 11–12).
4. For a similar critique, see also (Feezell Citation2013, 79–80).
5. This article is reprinted in (Mumford Citation2011) as ch. 13.
6. For example, Mumford (Citation2004, 189) claims, plausibly enough, that the Bootle soccer club that ceased to exist in 1893 is not the same entity as the club of the same name that began in the same area in 1954.
7. ‘[Athletes’] displays of physical excellence – skill, conditioning, etc. – can be comparable to those of performers, such as ballet dancers, whom we are far less tempted to dismiss as unworthy of devotion. Athletes can also display mental qualities, such as astute strategy and coolness under pressure, that are fit objects for fans’ admiration’ (Dixon Citation2001, 156).
8. For a good account of competition as ‘a mutual quest for excellence’, see (Simon, Torres, and Hager Citation2015, 43–53).
9. For a similar objection that partisan fans’ desire for victory is based on self-regard rather than on any altruistic motives, see (Feezell Citation2013, 75).
10. For a more extended discussion of and response to this argument, see (Dixon Citation2001, 155–157).
11. Mumford (Citation2011, 15) too raises the concern that our athletic allegiances are too random to have value, but he is satisfied with the response that I give in my original paper when I compare it with the random factors that also influence our choice of romantic partners, which do not lead us to regard romantic love as worthless.
12. I am grateful to audience members for helpful comments at the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport and the Canadian Philosophical Association meetings where I presented this paper. I am deeply indebted to editor John Russell and two anonymous referees for JPS for their generous but challenging feedback.