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Abstract
This paper discusses the nature of competitiveness and argues (contra Jones 2015) that being competitive does not essentially involve a strong desire to win or to outperform others. The appeal of the ‘desire-to-win’ analysis of competitiveness can be explained away provided we distinguish between virtuous and vicious competitiveness. It is conceivable (even if it is not typical) that a virtuously competitive athlete lack a strong desire to win or to outperform others. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that virtuous competitiveness and vicious competitiveness are distinct character traits. If being virtuously competitive does not require a strong desire to win, then being competitive simpliciter does not require this. Other recent accounts, e.g. Kretchmar 2012 and Russell 2014, may appear to support the desire-to-win analysis, but careful reflection reveals that this is not the case.
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Notes
1. There are strong and weak versions of this view. According to a strong version, to be competitive is just to have a strong desire to win. A weaker version is that being competitive consists at least in part in having a strong desire to win. I reject even the weak version. My arguments are sometimes directed explicitly against the strong version, but they apply to the weak version as well. In addition, I should note that while my concern is with competitiveness as a trait that is exhibited not only in sport but in other areas of life, the view I will defend is motivated primarily by reflection on competitiveness as it occurs in sport. Indeed all of the examples I consider are from competitive sport. While I think that what I say about competitiveness is true of the trait understood in a general sense, it could turn out that there is no such general trait of competitiveness, or no substantive truths about such a trait. In that case, I would suggest that my arguments be understood as concerning a more specific trait of ‘sport competitiveness’, or competitiveness as it is realized in athletes.
2. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the importance of distinguishing these issues.
3. I offer no analysis of what it means to say that someone has a strong desire to win or be better than others, and I presume an intuitive grasp of the notion in what follows. Jones distinguishes three senses of desire: phenomenal, dispositional, and judgmental (see Jones Citation2015, 369–371). While I think these different ‘senses’ are best understood as different aspects of desire in general, I will not assume this in what follows; my view is that there is no plausible sense of ‘desire’ in which the desire-to-win analysis of competitiveness is correct.
4. An athlete may desire both meaningful (if not close) competition and decisive victory (if not victory by a large margin). So, if the desire for meaningful competition is necessary for being competitive, this does not imply the desire for victory is not also necessary (Thanks to J. S. Russell for this point). But, if the desire for meaningful competition (with or without victory) is a plausible necessary condition, this at least raises the question whether it may be sufficient.
5. Jones clearly identifies some important ambiguities and vagueness in these terms (see Jones Citation2015, 369–373).
6. Jones (Citation2015, 5) that a virtuous attitude is not required for being competitive. For instance, an athlete does not automatically become noncompetitive by being happy to have unworthy opponents. I agree. Neither is being vicious required; since it is not required, we can consider whether the virtuously competitive must have a strong desire to win, in order to determine whether this desire is essential to being competitive simpliciter.
7. Ultrarunning is the sport of running distances longer than the marathon (26.2 miles). However, typically, the shortest distance that is considered an ‘ultra’ is 50 km (31.07 miles).
8. Thanks to Bob Fischer for help in clarifying some of the points made here.
9. I should be clear that Russell does not condemn the institution of competitive sport and indeed thinks that it is on balance a good thing; however, he thinks its potential to promote moral virtue tends to be overstated and seeks to bring out its moral flaws.
10. Machiavellianism is characterized elsewhere (Mudrack et al. 353–354) in terms of ‘calculating rationality’ and ‘overriding self-interest’.
11. Mudrack, Bloodgood, and Turnley (Citation2012). In their study, hypercompetitiveness was linked with ‘poor ethics’ and PD competitiveness was linked with ‘high ethics’. Ryckman et al. (Citation1997) also discuss differences in the value systems of hypercompetitive and personal development competitive individuals.
12. As I believe Fine (Citation1994) has taught us, claims about essence must be separated from claims about modality: the essence of a thing is not something which is to be understood in terms of what is necessarily true of that thing (much less, then, in terms of what is generally, or probably, true of it). This view is, I contend, just as plausible in the case of psychological traits as in the case of material objects.