On the alleged intrinsic immorality of mixed martial arts

Abstract

In two recent articles, Nicholas Dixon has argued that the intent to hurt and injure opponents which is essential to mixed martial arts (MMA) makes the sport intrinsically immoral. Although bondage, domination, sadism, and masochism (BDSM) also involves the intentional infliction of pain and injury, Dixon argues that it is morally permissible in many cases. In this paper, I examine the principle underlying Dixon's differentiation of MMA and BDSM. I argue that, when properly elaborated, that principle does not in fact condemn MMA as intrinsically immoral, but rather implies that the attitudes and actions of most autonomously consenting amateur MMA fighters and some autonomously consenting professionals are prima facie morally permissible.

Keywords:

• Mixed Martial Arts
• violence

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Nicholas Dixon, Derek Jones, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Notes

1. It was estimated that MMA had more than 300 million fans around the world in 2013 (Reinsmith 2013). In 2015, more than a million Americans participated in ‘MMA for competition’ and nearly 2.5 million participated in the sport ‘for fitness’ (Lefton 2016).

2. The morality of boxing has been more thoroughly discussed. See, for instance, Davis (1993) and Dixon (2001). Given the violent nature of both sports, conclusions reached regarding the morality of one may apply to the other. This is not necessarily the case, however, as the two sports do differ in arguably relevant ways. For example, MMA ‘participants receive far fewer blows to the head than do boxers’ and thus ‘seem less likely than boxers to suffer from brain damage’ (Dixon 2015, 366, 367). On the other hand, whereas MMA is characterized by ‘unrelenting assaults’, ‘in boxing, the action is stopped for ten seconds when a fighter is downed or issues a “standing count”’ (Dixon 2015, 369). In this paper, I limit my attention to moral evaluation of MMA and will not attempt to answer the question of how that evaluation might apply to boxing or any other combat sport.

3. In addition to arguing that ‘the actions of MMA fighters are wrong’, Dixon also critiques those who profit from and support the sport (2015, 374, 375). This latter group includes spectators, who Dixon (2016, 110, 111) argues watch MMA either because they enjoy seeing fighters hurt, in which case they ‘display the vice of schadenfreude’, or because they appreciate the power and skill that fighters display and are merely indifferent with respect to fighters’ suffering, in which case ‘they are … open to the charge of moral callousness’. I share Dixon’s worries regarding the attitudes of spectators, but will not explore that issue here. My focus will lie instead with the actions of MMA fighters, which Dixon correctly acknowledges to be a distinct issue. That it raises moral concerns for people to enjoy viewing an activity does not imply that the activity is intrinsically immoral. We would have concerns about the moral character of a person who derived pleasure from watching surgeons cut into people’s bodies, but that of course does not mean that surgery is inherently immoral.

4. As Dixon (2015, 371) explains, there is reason to think that ‘Kant himself did not believe that consent, however free and voluntary, always rebut the charge of treating someone merely as a means’. However, the alternative interpretation of the categorical imperative Dixon goes on to offer is meant to stand on its own merits; it is proposed as a piece of moral philosophy rather than of Kantian scholarship and I will evaluate it accordingly.

5. Although not intrinsically immoral, those actions could in some circumstances be impermissible for consequentialist reasons. I will follow Dixon in setting consequentialist considerations aside so as to examine the inherent morality of MMA.

6. I have specified that the individual who inflicts the pain, etc. need only be at least partially motivated by a desire to meet the recipient’s desires/needs because it clearly is not morally necessary that satisfaction of those desires/needs be the inflictor’s sole motivation. To the contrary, mutually satisfying BDSM, in which all participants are motivated partly by a desire to meet their partner’s (or partners’) desires/needs and partly by a desire to meet their own, can clearly be morally permissible.

7. Note this participant’s direct goal might be to immobilize her partner such that it is impossible for the partner to inflict any pain upon her. Yet she might be disappointed to actually achieve that goal, for if her partner did not effectively ‘fight back’ such that the dominating participant herself experienced some pain, that would mean the encounter did not pose much of a challenge. Her ultimate goal would thus not be achieved. So, too, might an MMA fighter have the direct goal of avoiding pain and injury by blocking or dodging her opponent’s blows and generally remaining ‘in control’ of the fight, yet be disappointed to actually accomplish that goal if her ultimate aim is to test her limits or overcome challenges.

8. As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, a surgeon’s goal is (at least in part) to promote the patient’s long-term health and in pursuit of that goal she will endeavor to minimize pain and injury. As I shall argue presently, though, an MMA fighter’s goal might also (at least in part) be to promote her opponent’s long-term health via exercise. And such a fighter might attempt to cause the minimum amount of pain and injury compatible with providing her opponent with the workout that he/she seeks.

9. Professional fighter Josh Burkman, for instance, explained his participation in the sport by stating, among other things (including references to its promotion of health and self-control, and the fact that ‘women love it’), ‘I love to compete! MMA is the ultimate form of competition. It’s one thing you can’t perfect, you have to constantly challenge yourself, and always push yourself’ (Hill 2006).

10. This would seem to be the position of Luke Cummo, who expressed less enthusiasm for the sport than Burkman: ‘One way or another I am where I am now in my life and this is my job. The UFC writes my paycheck and I fight for them … also, I love the martial arts’ (Hill 2006).

11. An example might be gastric bypass surgery, which promotes health by reducing food intake and eventually weight.

12. A match in which one fighter is motivated by a desire of the former, amateurish sort and the latter by a desire for income would also be permissible, provided both are aware of the other’s goals and at least partly motivated by a desire to help him/her achieve those goals.

13. Also permissible on that interpretation would be the actions of a fighter whose opponent does desire suffering in the relevant ways, but the fighter either is not aware of the opponent’s motivation or does not care about it and is thus not even partially motivated by a desire to help satisfy the relevant desire/need(s).

14. Likewise for autonomously requested amputation of healthy limbs, assuming the procedure is merely desired and not (pathologically) needed.