Why Germany won’t build its own nuclear weapons and remains skeptical of a Eurodeterrent

ABSTRACT

Aggressive Russian policies and the Trump administration’s transactional approach to alliances have put nuclear issues back on the agenda for European governments. Arguments for German acquisition of nuclear weapons have gained no traction among German decision makers, as this would require multiple costly and radical shifts of Berlin’s foreign and security policies. German-French convergence on the role of nuclear weapons in European security is a necessary – though not necessarily sufficient – precondition for a strengthened nuclear dimension to the EU’s security and defense policies. However, the different nuclear cultures in France and Germany, French aversion to nuclear consultations, and inter-European divisions on the role of nuclear weapons make it unlikely that Germany will support a Eurodeterrent anytime soon. In the short term, the German debate on NATO’s response to the end of the INF treaty and Berlin’s decision on new dual-capable aircraft to support NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements will be indicators of changing nuclear attitudes and policies.

KEYWORDS:

• Germany
• Non-Proliferation Treaty
• NPT
• nuclear weapons
• proliferation
• NATO
• nuclear sharing

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. Conservative member of the Bundestag Roderich Kiesewetter in 2017 asked the Parliamentary research service to evaluate the legality of a joint financing by EU members of a European nuclear deterrent. The report found that such an option would be legal under the NPT and the 2 + 4 Treaty on Unification as long as the funds do not come from an EU budget line, but questioned the political added value of such an arrangement (Wissenschaftliche Dienste 2017; see also Fisher 2017).

2. See Schmidt (2004), 59. Strategic nuclear issues have been on the agenda of a series of Franco-German track 1.5 meetings that took place since 2016. On this specific set of meetings see Maitre (2017). The author of this article has participated in some of these meetings, which took place under the Chatham House rule.

3. Article 42(7) of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon states that “[i]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.” It is unclear whether this mutual defense clause might also entail nuclear deterrence commitments, with some analysts arguing that French nuclear forces de facto are already contributing (Tertrais 2018a).

4. Such polls are often commissioned by disarmament advocacy groups. The results however consistently indicate 60–70 percent or larger majorities in favor of nuclear disarmament and a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from German territory. See for example ICAN (2018).

5. The other choices were that “Germany should” forego nuclear protection (31 percent), continue to rely on the United States (22 percent), and develop its own nuclear weapons (7 percent); 7 percent of respondents did not know how to answer. Multiple answers were possible (Körber Stiftung 2019).

6. A January 2020 poll found that 57 percent of Germans absolutely do not trust the United States, while 25 percent do not trust in Russia (Politbarometer 2020).

7. In 1993, Germany tried to push back against US counterproliferation policies by emphasizing that military actions against proliferators must take place only on the basis of a UN mandate. In 1998, Berlin suggested that NATO should renounce the option to use nuclear weapons first. In both cases, Germany backed down after it was criticized by nuclear allies. See (Meier 2001, 77–78).

Additional information

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes on contributors

Oliver Meier

Oliver Meier is Senior Researcher at the Berlin office of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). Previously, he was Deputy Head of the International Security Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). He was also International Representative and Correspondent of the US Arms Control Association and has worked on the staff of Uta Zapf, former chairperson of the subcommittee on disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation in the German Bundestag. Meier has also held the position of Senior Arms Control and Disarmament Researcher with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in London and has worked as a consultant to several non-governmental organizations. Meier holds a PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin.