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ABSTRACT
In this article, the author analyzes the results of a three-move space war game conducted by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in 2021. The game focused on a possible lead up to a Chinese commercial blockade of Taiwan in the 2027–29 time frame. In the game, China attempts to deter Japan and the United States from coming to Taipei’s aid by threatening and then attacking US and Japanese satellite systems. Results of the game – conducted with the assistance of current and former senior State Department, NASA, intelligence, space industry, and Defense Department officials – suggest that space combat is unlikely to be waged only between dedicated military systems. Instead, many of the ground- and space-based threats the United States and its allies face – including laser satellite trackers, commercial space surveillance systems, space debris-removing satellites, and refueling spacecraft – will have legitimate civilian uses but can be flipped to conduct military missions against critical, targeted satellites. The author provides four “takeaways” from the space war game, one of which involves much closer coordination among the United States and its allies in regard to space security.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. See Henry Sokolski (Citation2021).
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Henry Sokolski
Henry Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, Virginia, and author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (2019). He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the US Secretary of Defense during the George H.W. Bush administration.