Conditional restraint: Why the India-Pakistan Kargil War is not a case of nuclear deterrence

ABSTRACT

In the 1999 Kargil War, India defended its territory from a Pakistani incursion but—in a departure from its historical behavior and standing war plans—chose not to expand the war with counter-attacks into Pakistan. Many observers attribute this restraint to nuclear deterrence, since India and Pakistan had become declared nuclear powers just a year earlier. In fact, India’s restraint was rooted not in deterrence, but specific strategic conditions. Those conditions no longer apply—and in a future conflict India may be encouraged to take especially risky and escalatory wartime action, which would pose an unprecedented test for nuclear deterrence.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• Kargil War
• Pakistan
• nuclear weapons

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Paul Kapur for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This article is based on research funded by the Stanton Foundation and administered through the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.

Funding

This article is based on research funded by the Stanton Foundation and administered through the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.

Additional information

Funding

This article is based on research funded by the Stanton Foundation and administered through the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.

Notes on contributors

Arzan Tarapore

Arzan Tarapore is a research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, where his research focuses on Indian military strategy and Indo-Pacific regional security. He is completing a book manuscript on the factors that shape Indian wartime strategy. He previously served in the Australian Defence Department.