Do we need the concept of “splitting” to understand borderline structures?

Abstract

The author questions whether Kernberg's suggestion that the interaction between splitting and other defence mechanisms—such as primitive idealization, omnipotence, devaluation and denial [disavowal]—gives an adequate psychodynamic explanation of borderline personality structures. The author shows that the assumption of a splitting mechanism provokes contradictions and that primitive idealization, omnipotence, devaluation and disavowal cannot be seen as genuine defence mechanisms. He argues that primitive idealization is a type of reaction formation and that the omnipotence of these patients can be put down to identification with the idealized ego-functions of their objects. He also maintains that the clinical phenomena can be understood as the outcome of a combination of an “equiparant” and “disequiparant” isolation, displacement, projection and primitive idealization, making the concept of splitting as an explanatory device superfluous.

Key words:

• splitting
• disavowal
• isolation