Islamic communication in Asia has a distinctive colour, style, and practice

The socio-economic communication of Muslim communities in Asia may be described as a mix that is unique, profound, commodified and collective. Although in some places outside Asia socio-economic barriers in employment, income, career opportunities, home ownership, and general economic performance (Peucker et al., 2014; Weng & Mansouri, 2021) pose a significant challenge, but in at least a few places in Asia, the conditions offer qualified socio-economic feasibility. These socio-economic conditions affect the existence of Islamic communication in Muslim communities when they aim to adapt to global developments. Muslim communities are no longer just in villages with a rural lifestyle of savings, income and consumption (Scupin, 2007). They seem to develop the resilience of Islamic community networks, such as those in China, that develop the power of financial donation circles into a solid and strong network of information exchange and text circulation (Brown, 2013). They do not isolate themselves from the development of society (Peucker & Ceylan, 2017), but they seem to engage in various socially promotive behaviours, participating in cross-community communication. They are now on a communication trajectory that is urban, metropolis, and up-to-date with various global devices. They now communicate between communities through social media gadgets, with topics of life style issues, fashion, and other modern gadgets.

This urban Islamic communication can be seen in the context of the Muslim fashion world. In the view of Che Nooryohana Zulkifli’s “Islamic Fashion on Instagram: The Commodification of Religious Values”, the fashion world becomes a collectivist identity of Muslims in energising the culture of their society, as well as a means of industrial commodification. In the Instagram display of Muslim women, Islamic communication is incorporated into the contemporary lifestyle, which is urban, metropolis, and global. The display of information on their social media seems to communicate a collage of the rise of Muslimah fashion, in various catalogues of variations and expressions of Islamic women’s clothing (Gray, 2018). They display contemporary Muslimah culture with its various communication messages. Their content and themes offer two-way communication: conveying the Islamic message of contemporary fashion, and receiving messages for invitations to discuss the various fashion accessories that are in accordance with the sharia laws.

In this neoliberal market environment, the lives of young Muslims adapt to the tools of global consumerism. Their Islamic communication is filled with its own challenges. From a cultural point of view, since the 2000s, there has been an assimilation of pop culture with Islamic themes, such as religious hip hop, streetwear with Islamic slogans, and others, which gave rise to the expression of Muslim youth in Germany, France, and the UK (Herding, 2013). The movement of virtual artifacts of the Muslim youth becomes the growth of Islamic youth culture. And continues to explore them to apply halal life in the midst of the siege of neoliberal capitalism market. The young Muslim generation must try to sort out the messages of “Western” consumerism, in terms of the “halalness” of various products that will be used in everyday life. In the end, the young generation of Muslims in Jakarta, for example, as stated by Inaya Rakhmani in “The Meaning of Halal Culture for Indonesian Muslims”, must struggle to find and shape the meaning of halal in the material reality of global market capitalism. They must define halal messages offered by halal products and consumption and services in the neoliberal market environment in big cities.

The neoliberal market world even brings an invitation for Islamic piety to be commodified. This piety implies a religious figurehead who has high charisma in the Muslim community. The invitation duplicates Islamic rules, which are substantial, into political discourse. His political discourse is also in a position that is quite important for a country, namely during the contestation of the 2019 Indonesian presidential and vice presidential elections. In other words, there is a lifting power of Islamic teachings on the matter of the pious figures of political leaders. There is the revealing power of Islamic piety for the figures of state leadership. However, everything is mobilised in commodification activities, trading activities, or activities such as buying and selling. And, in this context, it is not about selling products or goods or services but votes.

Karman questions this in “Commodification of Instrumental Islamic Piety in Indonesian Political Contestation 2019”. In his study of the social media posts of presidential and vice presidential contestants, he found various messages containing piety in political discourse. The commodifying of Islamic piety through the language of Twitter (now X) is a symptom of immaterial commodification in social media. Piety becomes an instrumental tool for political candidates. The immaterial value of piety becomes a commodity mediator, to be negotiated and constructed in value (as an object), in the mechanism of buying and selling political votes. Piety becomes a value that is actively traded on the figures of political candidates. Piety does not become a static value but a dynamic value to be reframed to the political contestants of the presidential and vice presidential elections (Berger, 2017).

On the socio-political side, the nuances of Islamic communication have unexpected differences. The government, media, religious leaders (ulama), and da'wah organisations, as well as various Islamic communities, communicate persuasively on Islamic issues, and various Islamic events.

The fear of Islamic terrorism is not always easily erupted. This can be seen in the unremarkable reaction of the government and media in Indonesia to the movie “Nussa and Rarra Carton movie”, which was accused of carrying extremist propaganda. Islamic radicalism and extremism are not synonymous with Arab men's clothing (gamis), or the white hajj skullcap featured in the cartoon movie. The government and media are not always easily ignited by the fire of Islamophobia, which is hot, violent and punitive.

Heksa Biopsi Puji Hastuti in “Evoking Islamophobia: An insight into Indonesian Netizens’ tweets to Nussa and Rarra carton movie”, explains. Nussa and Rarra Carton Film (NRCF) is a Muslim cartoon film that appeared in 2018. After receiving a positive response from the public, there were those who said this cartoon film conveyed hidden messages of radicalism and extremism. Various costumes of the players, for example, are suspected of identifying the colours of terrorism, and are associated with the Taliban. The film is also said to have links to hardline Islamic groups and figures in Indonesia.

The accusations, however, did not further Islamophobia. The presence of the cartoon film did not increase the fear of Islam, nor heightened a racist and discriminatory phobia. There is no spatial furtherance carried out at the scale of the state, city, neighbourhood, body and emotions (Najib & Teeple Hopkins, 2020). The government and media in Indonesia did not bother. Without a socio-spatial response to the attempt at Islamophobia (Itaoui, 2020), the accusations catapulted ratings and audience interest in the film in Indonesia.

This moderate attitude can also be observed through the attitude of the ulama in Indonesia. The ulama are the experts in Islamic religious knowledge. In Indonesia, the ulama occupy a special position as a reference and role model for the community. This position has been disturbed by various terrorism news. However, the disturbance does not bring disaster, such as calling out loudly for protest and violent actions.

As Darajat Wibawa, in “Ulama and Terrorism in Media: Phenomenology Research About The Perceptions of Ulama to Terrorism News In Indonesia Mass Media”, shows, the disturbance has fostered a sense of concern. For ulama, news linking terrorism and Islam damage the image of Islam, create negative stereotypes, and giving opportunity to ignite anti-Muslim sentiments. The ulama are harmed by the construction of terrorism and Islam in the media. This is because the link between terrorism and the media has been widely considered to have a symbiotic relationship - even though, in a game-theoretic perspective, terrorism in the media is related to the level of religiosity of a country, and public attitudes towards various terrorist groups (Pfeiffer, 2012).

This persuasiveness also appears in the Jamaah Tabligh proselytisation model, in Yala Province, Southeast Thailand. This Muslim community is considered to have carried out persuasive da’wah methods, successfully overcoming accusations of religious and political radicalism in an organised manner. They are not violent in the display of activities and the expression of various views. Catur Nugroho (2023), in “Deradicalization Of Moslem Community With Da'wah Model Of The Jamaah Tabligh In The Province of Yala South Thailand” conveyed it. The Jamaah Tabligh community, as a fundamentalist Islamic movement, is considered to carry out apolitical and non-violent da’wah. This model is attractive to moderate and conservative Muslims (including former members of violent Islamic movements) throughout the Yala province, and neighbouring countries. Its proselytising recipe cultivates religious views, beliefs and spirituality at the individual and congregational levels, focuses on verbal and physical non-violence, and succeeds in deradicalising religious and political views in an organised manner.

This study differs from other research assumptions. Jamaah Tabligh, for example, has been called “Proselytising Missionaries or Trojan Horse?” Its organisational flexibility is considered to be a refuge for various members of hardline organisations. Jamaah Tabligh has long been monitored by the security radar of Western countries despite declaring itself as an apolitical organisation that respects state authority, and rejects terrorism or other violent movements. The tentacled nature of the organisation, which has gone global, is considered a cause for concern (Burki, 2013).

In another perspective, this community of worshippers is considered to have successfully spread its membership to small towns, and villages, in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand. Its membership no longer contains only the blue-collar working class in the cosmopolitan urban landscape, such as Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Singapore. Its congregations are adapting to local norms and cultures in different countries. They expand their membership base to various local indigenous communities, entering into their daily life cycle. Its non-political and non-partisan nature made many governments open to its presence (Noor, 2010).

The persuasiveness of non-political and non-partisan communication also comes in other forms. In urban centres, various Islamic communities operate in social communication spaces. Social media such as Facebook and Instagram become a means of da’wah, as well as exchanging Islamic messages. Muslim women's narratives emerge, accentuating their da’wah identity. They produce Islamic narratives, through cell phones and the internet, about various discourses of piety.

Andina Dwifatma (2023), in the article “Cadar Garis Lucu” and the Mediated Political Subjectivity of Muslim Women in Indonesia, discusses this. Through the Instagram account Cadar Gadis Lucu, this Muslim women community communicate their da’wah: as a Niqab group (wearers of a long hijab covering the head, face, neck, and under the chest, and only showing the eyes). This group was formed in 2020. Dwifatma's research found that the Cadar Garis Lucu Instagram account is about gender equality and religious tolerance. They reject the stereotype of Muslim women being oppressed and voiceless. They state that wearing the Niqab is their own choice. They call for Islamic moderation. They collaborate their moderate accounts with others, as part of moderate Islam in Indonesia.

These are the articles published by the Asian Journal of Communication, in this Special Issue on “Islam in Asia: in Communicology Studies”. We the Guest Editors of the Special Issue hope that they offer a perspective from Islam on some aspects of the government, media, ulama, and da'wah in their communication.