Conclusion: Towards a Model of (European) Referendums

Abstract

This conclusion evaluates the causal models set out in the introduction to this collection and considers whether, in the light of the 2003 accession referendums, they require modification. On the basis of this examination we argue that the results of EU accession referendums appear to demonstrate that the key factors determining the results are the consequences of: (a) underlying mass attitudes in combination with (b) cues provided by elites. The variance in the levels of turnout in the EU accession referendums appears to be predominantly the consequence of: (a) the general levels of electoral turnout specific to countries in combination with (b) the level of contestation of the European issue. Consideration is then given to the generalisability of the models to other referendums, on both European and non-European issues. Finally, we look ahead to whether these countries are likely to repeat the experience of direct democracy when determining their attitudes towards other European issues.

Notes

Basically, for referendum result we use the figures derived from quantitative variables (Eurobarometer, country opinion polls) as a ‘first cut’ and then adjust these upwards or downwards to account for the more qualitatively derived variables. Similarly, for referendum turnout we derive a ‘range’ of possible turnouts using previous national election turnouts and then try to locate our ‘guesstimate’ along this range by measuring the impact of more qualitatively derived variables.

data on trust in institutions found that 71.1% of respondents did not trust the church and 86.6% did not trust political parties. This compares with 62.3% who did not trust the government, 57.2% who did not trust the President and 55.3% who did not trust the mass media. We are grateful to Alenka Krasovec and Damjan Lajh for this data.

As Hanley points out, Klaus was the only head of a post-communist candidate state not to call publicly for a Yes vote or state how he would be voting in the referendum.

In Poland both previous referendums had obtained less than 50% but for the second of these, to ratify the new Constitution in May 1997, the minimum threshold did not apply.

Although the very high 1990 figure may have reflected initial high mobilisation due to the nature of the transition and polarised politics, with Czech participation in the 1990s tending to cluster around the mid-70% mark.

See for example Aylott (2002) on the September 2002 Swedish EMU referendum.

Evidence also suggests that the Catholic Church played a significant role in the Lithuanian referendum (Mazylis and Unikaite 2002: 5).

As in the case of the 1999 Australian referendum on the monarchy. Here the minority pro-monarchist camp was able to ‘frame’ the question in such a way that it was about whether or not to accept a particular (unpopular) model of (indirectly elected) president as an alternative to the status quo (LeDuc 2002: 726).

Van der Eijk and Schmitt (2004) also make this argument in the context of European Parliament elections.

Although we should note that the extremely limited variance on this variable means we should be cautious in knowing how far we have tested it in a more generalisable sense.