The Dynamics of Domestic Coordination of EU Policy in the New Member States: Impossible to Lock In?

Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of coordination structures for EU policy-making in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The study maps the main features of the established EU coordination machineries, and traces the most important reforms of their organisational structures. It proposes an actor-centred, ‘politics of institutional choice’ approach to explain the rapid and far-reaching changes in EU coordination structures in all the new member states. By contrast, two alternative frameworks focusing on efficiency and historical-institutional arguments emphasising the impact of early institutional lock-in fail to explain the specific institutional forms adopted and the considerable degree of institutional dynamics.

Acknowledgements

Some of the ideas discussed in this paper emerged in earlier collaboration of one of the authors with Klaudijus Maniokas. We are especially grateful to him for his contribution and subsequent advice and helpful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. At the time of submission and review of this article Antoaneta Dimitrova was Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the EUI and gratefully acknowledges the Centre's support.

Notes

1. With the possible exception of safeguard mechanisms such as the ones adopted in the Accession treaty with Bulgaria and Romania.

2. We separate political and administrative structures, although in practice the tasks performed by the new institutions often cross the boundaries between the technical and the political.

3. In some semi-presidential systems such as Romania, the president might also claim a share in shaping EU policy at the top.

4. Since August 2006, there is a minister for European affairs also in the Czech Republic.

5. It is a potentially misleading indicator, as in most countries in the region the prime minister does not have a separate office, but is served by the government secretariat. Sometimes, however, this secretariat is de facto working more for the prime minister than for the collective government. So the separation between these two categories is still relevant in terms of political leadership and guidance of the EU policy process.

6. According to interviewed civil servants, this figure is closer to 400.

7. And Croatia, which as a candidate state is not included systematically in this analysis. So far the country seems to follow a similar pattern. The Croatian case is interesting as there the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself was merged with the Ministry of European Integration, thus European integration has quite a share of the organisational structure and work of the resulting organisation.

8. We thank Klaudijus Maniokas for advice on developments in the Baltic states.

9. Her appointment could be said to have been a happy coincidence of her expert background for the job with political deals for balancing major posts between the coalition partners.

10. Government Decree No. 85, 17 April 2007 for coordination and organisation of EU-related issues.

11. Statement of UDF member of parliament during the parliamentary debate on the new mechanism.

12. What differs, of course, is the quality of public administration and civil service. However, to equate administrative professionalisation, or stability, autonomy, efficiency, etc. with historical legacies is to confound causes and effects.

13. Dimitrov et al. (2006: 20) suggest that the frequent changes of the coordination machineries might not be an ‘indicator of a generalized institutional malaise but of provisional institution building’.