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Abstract
One of the most common arguments about ‘new governance’ is that it is characterised by heterarchy rather than by hierarchy, creating horizontal modes of governance among a multitude of actors – public and private – involving all relevant stakeholders. Often implicitly and sometimes explicitly, this argument is linked with a normative democratic claim that praises the particular participatory features of ‘new governance’ as compared to ‘old governance’. Using as a case study European occupational health and safety policy, characterised by a shift from ‘old’ to ‘new governance’ since the 1990s, this article warns us that one should be very reluctant in making normative claims on new governance. The analysis of new governance modes such as comitology, agency networking, and social dialogue in this field shows that more horizontal and heterarchical governance does not mean automatically more participatory governance in terms of involving civil society actors and all stakeholders.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Nieves Pérez-Solórzano for useful comments on an earlier draft.
Notes
1. See the debate on the introduction of the principle of participatory democracy in the Constitutional Treaty; Smismans (Citation2004b).
2. The aim of this article is not to provide a normative model for new governance, participatory democracy or civil society involvement. The objective is analytical in providing empirical insights which contrast with the general ‘participatory claims’ that underlie the new governance literature and discourse of policy-making. For the development of a normative framework regarding civil society participation in new governance, see Smismans (Citation2005a), Ruzza and della Sala (Citation2007), and the chapters by Magnette, Armstrong, Warleigh and Smismans in Smismans (Citation2006).
3. While the Council adopted 15 OH&S Directives from 1989 to 1992, only nine OH&S Directives saw the light of day in the following decade.
4. Heritier and Lehmkuhl (Citation2008) talk about ‘territorially bounded democratic government’, which can cast a shadow of hierarchy over ‘sectoral governance’.
5. Some authors have been more optimistic regarding the possibility to develop such a general normative framework for new governance in the EU. Sabel and Zeitlin (Citation2007), for instance, talk about a new architecture of EU governance, for which democratic experimentalism or directly deliberative polyarchy can be used as a framework. Schmitter (Citation2006) proposes generic principles to inspire European Governance Arrangements (EGAs) and guarantee their legitimacy. For a critique on such an approach, see Smismans (Citation2004a).
6. For an overview of the different comitology procedures, see Schusterschitz and Kotz (Citation2007).
7. For a detailed analysis of interest group participation in delegated regulation comparing the situation in the US with the situation under comitology in the EU, see Smismans (Citation2005b).
8. Interview with Commission officials.
9. Interviews with four Commission officials, six AC members and one representative from the European trade union confederation acting as observer in the AC.
10. Contrary to the knowledge of the opinions adopted by the EESC.
11. The normative assumptions underlying the EESC could be described in terms of deliberative democracy via a functional assembly, see Smismans (Citation2004a: 130–48).
12. EESC opinion on this programme, OJ C 039 of 12/02/1996, p.26, point 1.6.
13. As described in the Comitology Decision 87/373/EEC and revised by Decision 1999/468/EC.
14. Such basic scrutiny applies when the delegating legislative Council Directive is adopted under the co-decision procedure, which is the case for OH&S Directives.
15. Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work, OJ L 131/11 of 5.5.1998.
16. See also the critique of the EESC which complained that comitology procedures do not explicitly require the consultation of civil society actors, and expressed concern that the SCOEL would sideline the role of the social partners. EESC Opinion on the Fourth OH&S Action Programme (1996–2000), OJ C 039 of 12/02/1996, p.26, point 1.6
17. Agency Annual Report 1998, p.19.
18. Ibid., p.18.
19. E.g. Annual Report 1998, p.7.
20. AC opinion ‘comment on the Agency's Working Programme 1999’ cited online at http://fr.osha.eu.int/systems/int_eur_5.stm.
21. In this period its staff was reduced from 120 to 20. Other reasons than the creation of the Agency also played a role in this reduction, such as changing policy priorities to public health and employment rather than OH&S.
22. For a detailed description of the different procedural options for negotiation under the European social dialogue, see Smismans (Citation2008).
24. Position de la CES sur l'application du traité d'Amsterdam dans le domaine de la santé et de la sécurité sur le lieu de travail, document adopté par le comité exécutif les 16–17 septembre 1999. Commentaires de l'UNICE du 27 avril 1998 sur ‘la consultation des partenaires sociaux dans le cadre de la politique communautaire de protection de la santé et de la sécurité des salariés sur le lieu de travail’.
25. Internal document ETUC.
26. Interviews with European social partners' representatives, one from labour and one from management.