Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU's External Borders

Abstract

In 2005 the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) was founded. Contrary to the widely used principal–agent approaches, it is more promising to analyse Frontex through the lens of experimentalist governance. This paper has two lines of argument. First, it argues that Frontex may only succeed if Frontex has a sufficient degree of organisational independence and enjoys appropriate and steady support by all member states. This is especially virulent when many member states fail to provide significant contributions in terms of material and human resources as well as time, leading to a suboptimal reduction of duration, scope and operational impact of Frontex's missions. The second argument is concerned with the accountability of Frontex. Contrary to the experimental approach, this article takes a sceptical stance, arguing that important (supra-)national actors are sidelined and relevant legal rules are ignored.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Emmanuel Sigalas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and advice. As always, the usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. For a complete list of European agencies see http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm.

2. It has to be noted that experimentalist governance can occur on two levels of the EU polity at least. First, member states identify a common yet highly abstract political objective (i.e. common external border management) but are uncertain whether they are ready or able to implement it. As a consequence, they experiment by creating an EU agency such as Frontex, thereby exploring boundaries of possible cooperation in the field concerned. Secondly, in the course of implementing the framework goals, Frontex is also experimenting with different approaches and instruments, testing not only with regard to their effectiveness but also to member states' willingness for cooperation and solidarity in the field.

3. For a detailed account on Frontex's tension between politicisation and depoliticised management (see Neal 2009).

4. Like activities in other subfields of border protection, the harmonisation of training standards has been commenced within so-called ad-hoc centres prior to the establishment of Frontex, whose activities were integrated into the Frontex framework after 2005.

5. In 2006 and 2007, a total of 33 joint operations were conducted. Poseidon and Nautilus can be taken as representative cases.

6. See e.g. the detailed parliamentary inquiry into Frontex's activities conducted by the parliamentary group of the German green party and the ‘terse’ answer by the German government (Ds. 16/9898, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/098/1609888.pdf).

7. Until now (March 2009), the Ombudsman's only decision on Frontex dealt with a tender procedure organised by the agency. Since the Ombudsman did not find an instance of maladministration of Frontex, the complaint (3139/2007/RT) was rejected.

8. Considering Frontex see the two following online publications: http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/assets/commissiemeijers/Commentaren/2008/CM08007%20I%20Views%20Standing%20Committee%20on%20the%20evaluation%20and%20future%20development%20of%20the%20FRONTEX%20agency%20%28COM%282008%29%2067%20final%29.pdf (2008) and http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/assets/commissiemeijers/Commentaren/2006/CM0614%20Rapid%20Border%20Intervention%20Teams%20and%20amending%20Council%20Regulation%20_EC_%20No%202007-2004_def.pdf (2006).

9. See http://www.imi-online.de/download/FRONTEX-Broschuere.pdf.