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Abstract
Generally the assumption is that legislators act to maximise their chances of re-election, with their optimal behaviour determined by the party-centred or candidate-centred nature of the electoral system in use. Existing evidence of the impact of members' actual behaviour on subsequent electoral performance is inconclusive. This research explores whether or not legislators who choose to focus on cultivating personal votes reap rewards from the electorate under the Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system. Exploring electoral reward under STV is particularly significant because some legislators face intra-party competition for votes while others do not – a key determining incentive for cultivating personal votes. This study uses a survey of Irish legislators in 2002 and 2007 to measure constituency orientation and effort. The data suggest an electoral reward for personal vote cultivation, although the relationship between intra-system incentive and reward is apparently not always as expected.
Notes
1. Under the Irish system of STV district magnitude ranges between three and five.
2. An overview and critique of this literature is provided by Crisp (Citation2007).
3. Shugart et al. (Citation2005) suggest that personal-vote-earning attributes, such as physically residing in the geographical constituency, may reduce the need for politicians to cultivate personal votes by means of constituency service. While localism is important in Ireland, personal-vote-earning attributes vary little (Swindle Citation2002).
4. These particular findings are so strong as to lead the author to caution ‘it is arguable that this evidence understates the importance of party [in the Irish electoral arena]’ (Marsh Citation2007: 510). Given that 60 per cent of voters rank 1 and 2 within party (see text above), this indicates that party matters more than the survey results would indicate.
5. Gallagher (Citation1987) points to the possibility that system-level features of the Irish political landscape other than the electoral system may contribute to a demand-side culture of constituency service in Ireland.
6. The Droop quota is calculated for each constituency by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats plus one, and adding one.
7. A benefit of the variable Vote over the variable PerQuota is that undertaking constituency work may increase overall voter turnout in the constituency, which can be captured better by Vote than by PerQuota.
8. An analysis of travel records, as used for example by Ingall and Crisp (Citation2001), is not possible in Ireland as travel to and from the constituency, while funded, is non-vouched. Other sources of data are being investigated: We are content-analysing 300,000 parliamentary questions over a four-year period to explore TDs' constituency and policy interests. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests interesting variations in the tasks assigned (policy versus constituency work) to, and the geographical location (constituency office versus parliamentary office) of, the parliamentary assistant recently allocated to every TD.
9. The number of TDs who responded to both surveys was not sufficient to perform temporal data analysis.