On the Politicisation of the European Union: Lessons from Consociational National Polities

Abstract

The debate on the politicisation of the EU should consider its consociational nature. Comparing the EU to Switzerland and Belgium, this article discusses S. Hix's and S. Bartolini's contrasting views on politicisation. S. Hix's recipe for bipolar politicisation is based on some incorrect assumptions. It is not obvious that the EU is evolving towards more Left–Right polarisation. Even if this were the case, the nature of the EU implies that compromises are indispensable. Therefore, Hix's suggestions would not suffice to clarify political choice, and Euroscepticism would not be reduced. The consociational nature of the EU also makes less credible S. Bartolini's fears of possible negative consequences for governability. The politicisation of constitutive issues can even help to integrate Eurosceptic segments of public opinion. The authors suggest a middle way regarding EU politicisation based on lessons from consociational polities, and the coupling of a system of ‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct popular participation.

Acknowledgements

This article is a revised version of a EUROGOV (‘European Governance’) paper (C-08-01). We are grateful to Florian Robyr for editorial assistance. We are also indebted for comments to EUROGOV and WEP anonymous reviewers. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. Discussing neofunctionalism four decades ago, Schmitter (1969) identified as an initial core element of politicisation the increased controversy of decisions, which he correctly expected to lead to a widening of the interested publics.

2. This paper, which constitutes the apex of the ongoing debate, is in fact composed of a paper by Simon Hix (‘Why Does the EU Need (Left–Right) Politics? Policy Reform and Accountability are Impossible Without It’), followed by a rejoinder by Stefano Bartolini (‘Should the Union be “Politicised”? Prospects and Risks’). If not specified, quotes are from this ‘double’ paper. Meanwhile Hix (2008) published a book and Bartolini (2006) an article with similar arguments, to which we also refer if necessary. Follesdal and Hix (2006) formulate recommendations similar to those in other works by Hix.

3. For references on works emphasising the prevalence of the Left–Right cleavage in European politics, see Hooghe and Marks (2008: 15 n. 48).

4. Hix (2008: 111) cites bi-partisan deals in the case of divided government in the United States.

5. Or the cleavage between integration and demarcation as put by Kriesi et al. (2006).

6. One may also think of the opposition to the Constitutional Treaty that manifested itself from the Far Left during the French referendum. The cleavage pattern in new EU members is again different: ‘Tan’ parties such as agrarian or populist movements opt together with the Left (of Communist origin) for redistributive policies (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 18).

7. See also Hix (2008: 57–63), who mentions himself the prevalence of cost–benefit calculations among the mass public.

8. See also Bartolini (2006: 52) for a critique of this idealised view on the contribution of policy debate to citizens' ‘enlightenment’.

9. Hix (2008: 59–63) is aware of the gap between mass and elite and of the relevance of social inequalities as a predictor of EU support, but does not make the link with the success of Eurosceptic parties.

10. This point was emphasised by one of the reviewers.

11. Actually, this was already the case on some very sensitive questions such as the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in 2002: when different Commissioners defend different options publicly, this helps the public understand the issues at stake.

12. The suggestions made in the Commission's White Paper in order to clarify the framework of EU deliberation go in the direction of such a strategy of politicisation. Cross-cutting policy agendas would broaden the issues instead of fragmenting them; the organisation of key events that would reduce the number of occasions and places where deliberation takes place would also help to simplify the process of expression of oppositions and compromise thereafter.

13. Hix (2008: 105–6) believes that party competition is the crucial variable to create a ‘demos’ and a public sphere. He considered the option of Europe-wide referendums (Hix 1999: 184–5), but believed that they would in reality be about national concerns. In his 2008 book, however, Hix (2008: 50) refers to studies of voting behaviour on more recent referendums revealing that it is attitudes towards the EU that are the strongest predictors of people's choice in referendums on European integration. In the same book, Hix (2008: 5) argues that ‘referendums are a crude and ineffectual mechanism for expressing citizens' preferences on EU policy issues’, but he does not explain why he thinks this is so.