Multi-level Parties in Process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their Home Parties

Abstract

Regional autonomy and European integration present national institutions with a double challenge, potentially diluting national authority from both below and above. The interaction between the two processes adds a particular dynamic, as when regions forge direct links to the EU bypassing the nation state. This article looks at three British parties from that perspective, focusing on the autonomy of party branches in Scotland and Wales in relation to their Members of the European Parliament. The empirical analysis confirms that devolution has enhanced the potential for regional autonomy in the parties. However, this has had little practical effect on European policy-making, where national unity prevails. The limited effect of devolution can be explained, first, by the hegemonic status of national party unity and, second, by the disadvantages of operating alone in the European Parliament. An interesting parallel can be drawn to the way subnational authorities relate to EU institutions.

Acknowledgements

This paper was presented to a Centre for International Policy Research seminar at the Department of Politics, University of Sheffield, on 26 February 2009. I am particularly grateful to Knut Heidar, Eve Hepburn, Ian Bache and Amund Lie for very helpful comments on a draft version of the paper, and to Elisabeth Carter for advice on sources.

Notes

1. The Scottish Parliament (with primary legislative and limited tax-varying powers) and the National Assembly for Wales (with secondary legislative and no tax-varying powers) were established subsequent to referenda in 1997 and were first elected in 1999. Northern Ireland, due to its particular historical and political context, is not investigated further in this paper.

2. In federal systems, the relationship between party unity and national integrity is more complex. Riker's (1964) view that party structures mirror the constitutional structure of the (federal) state has remained relatively uncontested. In Britain, the unitary party model has largely prevailed; the federalised structure of the Liberal Democrats (and the preceding Liberal Party) and the semi-autonomous status of the Conservative and Unionist Party in Scotland are exceptions to this rule.

3. Here, theoretical refinement could also clarify how party adaptation is not a simple question of centralised vs. decentralised allocation of power but involves different forms of detachment and varying strategies for regional empowerment (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010; Thorlakson 2009).

4. While the multi-level party can be analysed in organisational terms, it can also be approached by way of multiple (and conflicting) discourses and identities, as shown by Moon (2008).

5. A clear inspiration for the bypass thesis can be found in the public administration literature, where direct interaction between EU institutions (primarily the Commission) and autonomous governmental agencies has been theorised and researched (Egeberg 2006).

6. In Wales, the number of applicants and seats (four) corresponded perfectly. In Scotland, the number of applicants just exceeded the number of seats (seven), but all were nevertheless admitted to the all-member ballot.

7. The Conservative Party was an allied member of the EPP–ED until the 2009 EP election, after which the party broke the alliance to take part in the newly created European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG). Whether the new group will require tighter coordination of the manifestos is doubtful, as the ECRG has been explicitly formed to counter the federalist ambitions of the EPP–ED.

8. Colin Smyth, interview with author, 20 February 2009.

9. Rachel Maycock, interview with author, 25 November 2008.

10. James Temple-Smithson, interview with author, 24 November 2008.

11. Mark McInnes, interview with author, 20 February 2009.

12. Martin Hayman, interview with author, 20 February 2009.

13. As stressed by several interviewees, the link system has been developed and practised only with Labour as a governing party. How it will be adapted in opposition (for example, whether it will be organised along the briefs of shadow secretaries rather than cross-departmental policy areas) is unclear.

14. Colin Smyth, interview with author, 20 February 2009.

15. Martin Hayman, interview with author, 20 February 2009.

16. Loyalty scores of all roll-call votes in the sixth parliament (2004–09) show that MEPs from Scotland and Wales have a similar propensity as MEPs from English regions to support the majority view of (i) the state-wide party and (ii) the Europarty. In each of the cases, moreover, the state-wide party commands somewhat more support than the Europarty: this is most prevalent in the Conservative party, but even here the difference is relatively small (average values for Conservative MEPs are 88.5 per cent support of state-wide party's majority view vs. 73.6 per cent for Europarty majority). I am grateful to Bjørn Høyland, Dept of Political Science, University of Oslo, for supplying the data for these estimates.

17. In the sixth parliament, five of Scotland's seven MEPs held EP committee assignments on regional development (C 12), agriculture and rural development (C 13) and/or fisheries (C 14).

18. Wayne David was Welsh MEP and leader of the PES group 1994–98 and has since 2001 been MP for Caerphilly. Interview with author, 24 November 2008.