EU Decision-Making on Inter-Institutional Agreements: Defining (Common) Rules of Conduct for European Lobbyists and Public Servants

Abstract

The introduction of a provision in the Lisbon Treaty allowing European Union institutions to forge binding inter-institutional agreements (IIAs) draws attention to the limited research that exists on these instruments of EU governance. This article contributes to the development of this literature by presenting empirical evidence on two cases of decision-making on IIAs: on lobby regulation; and on the regulation of the conduct of EU public servants. In the first case the proposed IIA was successfully concluded; in the second, it was not. In contrasting these cases this article explains these differing outcomes with reference to the relevance of shared inter-institutional values and the mutual benefits of agreement. The findings suggest that both shared values and mutual interests are likely to be important in shaping successful IIA decision-making.

Notes

1. The research in this section of the article is drawn from joint work conducted with Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán.