The Political Economy of Unmediated Democracy: Italian Austerity under Mario Monti

Abstract

This article explores the political economy of reform under the technocratic government of Mario Monti. Unlike the technocratic governments of the 1990s, the Monti interregnum was an experiment in unmediated democracy, in which a government is actively supported neither by political parties nor by encompassing social groups. Italian political leaders adopted unmediated democracy because of the underlying interest group conflicts in the Italian political economy. Unmediated democrats such as Monti can impose bitter medicine on a stalemated society when it is in a stage of acute crisis, but the passage of longer-term reforms requires a social coalition to support those reforms beyond the critical stage of crisis. Thus the government implemented budget cuts, but liberalisation and institutional reform stalled in the face of opposition. Italy is unlikely to be durably reformed by a government that is not anchored to society through political parties or interest groups.

Acknowledgements

For comments that improved this article I thank Mary Louise Culpepper, Stefano Guzzini, Randall Hansen, Duncan McDonnell, Victoria Murillo, two anonymous reviewers, and participants in the conferences on ‘Economics and Democracy: Are They Still Compatible?’, held at the European University Institute, 1–3 July 2013, and ‘Europe’s Crisis: Backgrounds, Dimensions, Solutions’ held at the University of Toronto, 12–13 October 2012. Andrea de Angelis and Fabio Bulfone provided invaluable research assistance.

Notes

1. This definition obviously distinguishes what I have in mind by unmediated democracy from Max Weber’s concept of unmittelbare Demokratie, which we might translate into English as unmediated democracy but by which he meant what is conventionally referred to as direct democracy (Breiner 1996: 186).

2. This is not to say that the Monti government was undemocratic. It depended for its survival on governing parties in parliament, and Monti himself was able to maintain a relatively high level of popularity in Italian public opinion, even when his austerity plan was unpopular (D’Alimonte 2013).

3. During the Latin American economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, when these countries faced internationally imposed pressures similar to those confronting Italy and the other members of the eurozone periphery, they too chose party governments to distribute the pain of economic reform (Roberts 2013).

4. Even The Economist, typically a voice in favour of neoliberal reform in Italy, observed at the time that Monti’s tax increases fell disproportionately on the lower income groups (http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/12/italys-budget; accessed 23 April 2014).

5. The Monti government enjoyed a honeymoon high of 68 per cent approval when it first took office. Even with the 16-point drop in December the government still therefore enjoyed majority approval in December 2011. Thanks to Andrea de Angelis and Paolo Bellucci for government approval ratings data, which is based on a monthly average of nine different polls.

6. The consumer confidence index is a composite of individual questions asking about the general state of the economy, the state of particular households, and the employment situation in Italy (Bellucci and De Angelis 2013).