The EU’s problem-solving capacity and legitimacy in a crisis context: a virtuous or vicious circle?

Abstract

This article focuses on which mechanisms enabled the eurozone to escape from gridlock. At present, the EU is in a state of profound and multiple crises. Nonetheless, it managed to bring about a medium-term stabilisation of its banking system and economic governance, and a systemic implosion has so far been prevented. Considering that crucial regulations in the financial markets and economic governance are not a new idea but had been politically blocked for many years preceding the crisis, it is a major political science puzzle how and why the reforms were actually possible in an acute crisis. Drawing on Fritz W. Scharpf’s theory of the joint-decision trap, the article evaluates if, how and under what conditions crisis situations actually make a difference. Can crises possibly introduce dynamics that ‒ at times ‒ help overcome stalemate? Nine EU policies are being considered. The conclusions discuss insights for the EU’s overall system development.

Keywords:

• Crisis
• joint-decision trap
• EU decision-making
• intergovernmentalism
• supranationalism
• spillover

Acknowledgements

Many thanks for helpful ideas to Fritz W. Scharpf, the EIF team, the anonymous referees, and the participants of the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre’s Horizon 2020 consortium workshop in March 2014 and special issue workshop in September 2015.

Notes

1. I draw on the findings from a collaborative project at the Institute for European Integration Research (http://eif.univie.ac.at/projekte/EUpoliciescrisis.php).

2. We should always keep in mind that we do not know as yet if the EU’s actual performance is good enough to prevent revivals of the crisis and more systematic breakdown.

3. This section is based on chapter 1 in Falkner (2011).

4. Note that this is a simplified characterisation of Scharpf’s model. Even in the original version of Scharpf’s article, it was not considered impossible for a joint-decision system to avoid these problematic consequences. Within the perspective of rational-choice institutionalism, more productive solutions can be found with the help of log-rolling, most importantly in the form of side payments or package deals (Scharpf 1988: 264). And switching from a rational-choice to a ‘constructivist’ perspective, the article also considers the possibility that the ‘joint-decision trap’ could be overcome by governments interacting in a ‘problem-solving’ as opposed to a ‘bargaining’ style of decision-making. Perceptions of common identity, common fate, or common vulnerabilities (which is a significant element regarding the present crisis) may help to bring about an orientation towards common interests, values, or norms (Scharpf 1988: 261). Outside such extraordinary circumstances, however, the problem-solving mode was regarded as be highly vulnerable and rather unrealistic for the EU context. (For a full account, see Scharpf 2011).

5. A third aspect, of less importance here due to our focus on different policy areas, is that joint-decision systems were seen to block their own further institutional evolution (Scharpf 1988: 267), although institutional change was not perceived to be impossible (Scharpf 1988: 271). In this respect, the Single Act and later Treaty reforms produced a rich literature outlining that Intergovernmental Conferences are more than just ‘intergovernmental’ in a theoretical sense ‒ i.e. not only driven by the intentional choices of governments (Christiansen and Jørgensen 1998, 1999; Christiansen et al. 1999, 2002).

6. Art. 168 Para. 7 TFEU: ‘Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them.’

7. I owe this idea and a number of following specifics to Fritz W. Scharpf who kindly commented on the project results at the Council for European Studies’ Paris Conference, 9 July 2015.

8. This has also been stressed by Renaud Dehousse in his argument around a ‘new supranationalism’ (Council for European Studies’ Paris Conference, 9 July 2015).

9. Note that Erne (2015: abstract) characterises the new EU governance regime as a ‘silent revolution from above’, with the effect of governing more like a multinational corporation than a federal state and of nationalising social conflict.

10. Klaus Götz rightly stressed this at the European University Institute in a Horizon 2020 preparatory workshop in spring 2014.