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Abstract
There is a joint development towards Europeanisation of public policies and an increasing visibility and politicisation of European issues in EU member states. In this context, the degree of fit between individuals’ policy preferences and European norms could be expected to influence support for the EU: this support might increase when Europeanisation makes the desired policies more likely, and decrease when it hinders these policies. Multilevel analyses of the 2014 wave of the European Election Study confirms the existence of such instrumental support for the EU. The findings demonstrate that this support is shaped by policy preferences on state intervention, immigration, moral issues and environmental protection. The results also show that the impact of these policy preferences is modulated by the level of integration of the designated policy, by the weight of the policy issue in the country and, in some cases, by the level of individual political knowledge.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Michael Becher, Bruno Cautrès, Frédéric Gonthier, Thomas Meyer, Nicolas Sauger, Vincent Tiberj and the anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank the CITAE team (Duchesne et al. Citation2013) for giving us acces to their focus group transcriptions. A previous version of the article was presented in May 2015 at the Sciences Po Quanti seminar in Sciences Po Paris. The usual disclaimer applies.
Notes
1. For Easton, ‘instrumental’ and ‘utilitarian’ support are two forms of ‘specific support’. The former derives from the fulfilment of individual policy preferences and the latter from the individual benefits gained from a political system.
2. If there is an effect, it is curvilinear: extremist parties and their sympathisers are more likely to be Eurosceptic than actors located nearer the political centre. However, it is not clear if this pattern is due to the strategic use of EU issues as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ (Taggart Citation1998), or to substantial policy-related considerations (Hix Citation2007).
3. Many thanks to Sophie Duchesne and Virginie van Ingelgom for giving us access to the focus groups transcriptions.
4. In 1974 (EB 2), for example, more than 80% of respondents were ‘attached’ to the economic aspects of the European community. In 2014 (EB 81), ‘developing the EU’s economy and boosting growth’ was most cited in response to the question about the main objectives of integration. In the same survey, 61% of respondents considered the EU ‘responsible for austerity in Europe’, while 64% thought that it made ‘doing business easier in Europe’. See also, among many others (Gabel Citation1998).
5. Respondents agree on the economic motivations for European integration, in particular ‘to build a free market’ (Patrice, 22 years, French, history student, 1996) and ‘to foster international trade’ (Claire, 19 years, French, student, 1996). Many of them associate the EU with liberalisation, ‘free trade’ (William, 21, British, political science student, 1995) and ‘State retrenchment’ (Guy, 57, French, coach in personal development, Green activist, 2006). César (35 years, French, lawyer, unemployed, 2006) even sees it as ‘the flagship of liberalism’.
6. In response to a question about the meaning of the EU, ‘freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union’ is the first answer (cited by about half of European citizens, before ‘peace’). About 15% consider that the EU means ‘Not enough control at external borders’ (EB 57, 2002 to EB 80, 2013).
7. Other respondents evaluate the consequences of European integration on mobility much more positively, like for instance Mathieu (18, French, Baccalaureat student, 1996), who supported the EU border policy, or David (29, British, apprentice mechanic, 1995): ‘that it’s still pointless anyway having all these borders […]. Like I say, I’d like it to just open up globally, but that’s, that’s a long way away when we can’t even open up European ones ... But I mean I think it’s a good thing, I mean I’m glad that you know I can drive from France to Belgium, to Holland to Germany, without having to have a passport I think it’s a right piss take that England is still lagging’.
8. When asked about the role of the EU in environmental protection, the vast majority think that it has played a role, either positive or negative (62% in 2003, 74% in 2005 and 73% in 2006). In 2014, 12.3% of the respondents even cited the environment as one of the two most important issues for the European Union (33% cited the economic situation, alongside other macro-economic matters, while 25% cited immigration). Moreover, the historical success of green parties at European elections is sometimes analysed as expressing the citizens’ demands to reinforce the EU’s competences in this domain (Carrubba and Timpone Citation2005).
9. Interviewed in Oxford focus groups (2005–2006; CitationDuchesne et al. 2013).
10. For instance, in the EB59 in 2003, 39% of the respondents considered that the EU plays a ‘positive role’ in protecting the environment, while 21% considered to this role to be ‘negative’.
11. In a French employee focus group, people underline the EU’s positive role as it forces ‘other countries’ to adopt laws which had already been adopted in France.
12. In a British political activist focus group, a virulent discussion opposed those who saw the EU as protecting the environment and those who believed that environmental protection can only be decided at the global level.
13. This action was mentioned in several focus groups (2005–2006). Annabel’s awareness, as a British activist who declared herself a lesbian, is not surprising. More noticeable was a group of French employees who cited ‘moral evolution’ as one of the benefits gained from the EU and another group of French workers who considered the adoption of same-sex marriage in different countries as a consequence of European integration.
15. Effects of high levels of extra-EU immigration are more difficult to predict as European integration could be considered both as responsible for such immigration and as providing resources to fight it.
16. This is also in line with recent work by Toshkov and Kortenska (Citation2015) who have hypothesised that immigration from Eastern European countries following the open border policy may be a cause for the decrease in support for European integration in older member states since the mid-2000s. This would also corroborate findings on identity-related determinants of EU support showing that negative attitudes towards immigrants increase Euroscepticism (Boomgaarden et al. Citation2011; de Vreese and Boomgaarden Citation2005; McLaren Citation2002).
17. The positions on these single issues are uncorrelated (less than 0.1 except for the item on productivism, which features a low correlation with the question on intervention (R = 0.15) and on homosexual marriage (R = 0.12).
18. Specifically, the questions asked respondents to confirm or to invalidate the four following statements: ‘Switzerland is a member of the EU’; ‘Each member state elects the same number of representatives to the European Parliament’; ‘There are (150% of correct number) members in the (lower house of national parliament)’; and ‘(Head of government) belongs to (right party)’.
19. Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not allow us to control for identity-related factors.
20. In 2014, nine countries had not adopted any form of partnership for homosexual couples ‒ Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria. Such partnership had been adopted between 2004 and 2014 in 12 member states ‒ UK and Luxembourg in 2004, Spain in 2005, The Czech Republic and Slovenia in 2006, Greece in 2008, Hungary in 2009, Portugal and Austria in 2010, Ireland in 2011, Malta in 2013 and Croatia in 2014. Seven countries introduced legislation prior to 2004, Denmark as early as 1989, Sweden in 1995, the Netherlands in 1998, France in 1999, Belgium in 2000, Germany in 2001 and Finland in 2002. Specifying alternative years as tipping points (2000, 2002, 2006) does not alter the outcome of the analysis.
21. As noted by Brambor et al. (Citation2006), each constitutive term indicates the effect exerted by the variable when the other variable included in the interaction is equal to zero (or to the reference category).
22. However, the interaction term shows that knowledge affects the impact of preferences on immigration and same-sex marriage. Preferences in these cases exert a stronger influence on knowledgeable individuals. In contrast, knowledge does not make a difference to EU support deriving from environmental protection considerations.
23. This can be inferred (in line, again, with the instructions by Brambor et al. Citation2006) from the insignificant effect of the constitutive term Demand for state intervention: this variable does not exert a significant effect when the other constitutive term (Eurozone member) is equal to zero.
24. The solid line in the figure represents the marginal effect. The error bars display the confidence intervals: the inclusion of the 0 line of the y-axis in the confidence interval denotes that an effect is not statistically significant (while effects are significant whenever the confidence interval does not include the 0 line).
25. This is the case for 15 member states, from Spain (63% of intra-EU trade) to Slovakia (83%).
26. We should however note that, as Figure shows, and due to confidence intervals for high levels of EU external immigration, the difference is significant only between very low and very high levels of immigration.
27. This is the case in Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia and in the Baltic States. In contrast, the contribution to EU agricultural production exceeds 10% in Spain (11%), Italy (12%), Germany (13%) and France (18%).
28. Qualitative data suggests that 20 years ago, promoters of this European ‘project’ inferred policy preferences from the pacific and universal political values advocated by European institutions (Belot Citation2000).
29. Controlling for government support, the assessment of the economy, self-placement in the social hierarchy and education.
30. The demand for more integration exerts a predominant influence only over the vote for some right-wing populist parties (FPÖ, Jobbik, Attack, Finns and UKIP) and three mainstream (right-wing) parties (the Gerb in Bulgaria, the Finnish National Coalition and the British Conservative Party).
31. ‘I don’t think the working time directive is a joke’, ‘I’m […] bloody pleased that my staff can’t be made to work more than thirty-five hours a week, I think it’s wrong and I think, I wish, I wish it had been a Labour government that had brought in those things for our country but in the absence of them doing that I think they have done quite a lot’.
32. See for example Garry and Tilley (Citation2015) on the impact of the economic national context on the relationship between economic policy preferences and attitudes towards the EU.