Functional stakes and EU regulatory governance: temporal patterns of regulatory integration in energy and telecommunications

Abstract

One of the most fiercely debated questions about EU regulatory governance is the respective role played by functional and political factors in regulatory integration. This article contributes to this debate by focussing on the functional factor. Based on a refined conceptualisation of functional stakes, it finds that they vary across sectors, evolve over time, and that these variations are reflected in the degree of regulatory integration observed. When member states perceive regulatory integration as a solution to one of their most pressing problems of the moment, they value – and sometimes even actively push for – the delegation of regulatory powers to the EU. This argument is subject to a credibility probe based on two within-sector analyses of temporal patterns of regulatory integration in energy and telecommunications. The empirical analysis lends support to the conditioning role of the functional factor in the design of EU regulatory governance.

Keywords:

• EU agencies
• EU integration
• EU regulatory governance
• functionalism
• political agenda
• regulatory networks

Acknowledgements

This manuscript has benefited from insightful comments from and discussions with many people to whom I am very grateful. In particular, I would like warmly to thank the participants at the 2018 Barcelona workshop on EU studies, the members of the Institut de Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) research cluster on globalisation and public policy, my closest colleagues at the University of Lausanne and the anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For the purpose of this article, ‘member states’ refers to national governments.

2 Interview with an official of the Council, February 2013.

3 Euractiv, ‘Blair Calls for Stronger EU Energy Policy Cooperation’, 31 October 2005.

4 Interview with an official of the Council, February 2013.

5 This interpretation contrasts with the one offered by Kelemen and Tarrant (2011), who emphasise the low level of regulatory integration in the telecommunications sector. Their interpretation is essentially based on the regulatory agent created (EU regulatory network or agency), so they tend to overlook the regulatory powers delegated to the European Commission, which, in telecommunications, is the main channel through which regulatory integration takes place (Mathieu and Rangoni 2019).

6 Interview with a former official of the Commission, June 2012.

7 Euractiv, ‘Commission Spells out Plans for Radical Telecoms Shake-Up’, 14 November 2007.

8 Euractiv, ‘Opposition to Proposed EU Telecoms Authority Grows’, 29 February 2018.

9 Euractiv, ‘MEPs Discard Plan for Single EU Telecoms Watchdog’, 9 July 2008.

10 Euractiv, ‘Commission Threatens to Withdraw Telecoms Package’, 20 November 2008; and Euractiv, ‘Telecom Sector Gears up for ‘Battle of Reding’ at Council meeting, 18 November 2007.

11 Interview with a former official of the Commission, June 2012.

12 Interview with a former official of a national representation, May 2012.

13 Interview with an official of a NRA, June 2012.

14 Interview with a staff member of a regulated company, May 2012; Interview with a former official of the Commission ‒ DG Information Society, June 2012.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Emmanuelle Mathieu

Emmanuelle Mathieu is a lecturer in European politics at the University of Lausanne. Her research interests include regulatory governance in the EU, in multilevel settings and in developing countries as well as law and politics. Her work has appeared, among others, in journals such as Regulation and Governance, Public Administration and West European Politics. [[email protected]]