https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2393-3757
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Abstract
This article assesses the extent to which European governments’ legal strategies (i.e. the choices of and changes in the legal foundation(s) authorising executive action) to address the COVID-19 pandemic enhanced executive autonomy to the detriment of parliamentary policy-making power, defined as the formal ability of parliaments to constrain executive rule making. Approaching the reduction in parliamentary policy-making power as one indication of ‘executive aggrandisement’, it contrasts the prominent claim in the literature that populist governments tend to use emergencies to weaken formal checks on executive power with a hypothesis derived from research on crisis policy making, associating such tendencies with unified executives lacking internal checks and balances. Assessing six European governments’ legal strategies between January 2020 until the present (spring 2021), the formal weakening of parliaments’ role in law making was – overall – more pronounced among ‘unified executives’ than governments including major populist parties, pointing to a source of ‘democratic vulnerability’ in emergency situations transcending Central Eastern Europe.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks go to the two WEP referees and the editors of the journal for their helpful input on how to improve the manuscript. Many thanks go to Fabrizio di Mascio and Andrea Fumarola for their advice on the Italian case study and Stephan Weltzer for his research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Nicole Bolleyer: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2393-3757
Orsolya Salát: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4003-9017
Notes
1 This article is based on a collaborative effort to which Nicole Bolleyer contributed the introduction, theory and analytical framework, methodology, the case studies of Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and UK as well as the overall analysis and conclusion. Orsolya Salát contributed the case studies of France and Hungary.
2 See on the role of parliamentary opposition during the pandemic Louwerse et al. (Citation2021).
3 This was the case when countries were exposed to terrorism, the sovereign debt crisis, the ‘rule of law crisis’ associated with populist governments in Central Eastern Europe and the migration crisis (Bolleyer, Citationforthcoming).
4 While first rulings have been issued, even strong, unquestionably independent courts with high standing appear cautious to challenge executives as could be expected on the basis of literature. For instance, the German Constitutional Court rejected several requests for preliminary injunctions as ungrounded, and even when it recognized the severity of rights limitations, it emphasized that in light of the importance of the state’s duty to protect life and limb, stakes are too high for a decision to be taken in accelerated procedure. See, for more detail on this point, the Online Online Appendix (1).
5 Müller, 04.04.2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28663/how-populists-will-leverage-the-coronavirus-pandemic; Sierakowski 02.04.2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/02/why-populists-love-the-pandemic/, accessed 08.08.2020.
6 Mudde, 27.3.2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/27/coronavirus-populism-trump-politics-response, accessed 14.7. 2020.
7 Though Fidesz forms a party alliance with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), the latter is not considered an autonomous party for lack of own electoral support (Ilonszki Citation2020: 212; Ondré Citation2012).
8 PM Conte stepped down in late January 2021 to be replaced by another independent-led government in February, supported not only by the populist 5Star Movement but also by the right-wing Lega Nord as well as Forza Italia.
9 In contrast to the cross-national party literature as well as UK-focused comparative work (e.g. March Citation2017; Mudde Citation2007; Norris and Inglehart Citation2019; Rooduijn et al. Citation2019; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel Citation2018), some case-oriented work classify the UK as a ‘populist government’ given the populist rhetoric of its current leader Johnson (e.g Bale Citation2018; Tormey Citation2020). Backed up by the comparative literature, we classify the UK Conservative as non-populist for two reasons: First, we define populism as ideology, not as a style of communication and second, the ‘populist government hypothesis’ theorizes how a shared ideological orientation held by members of the core executive as members of the same political party has a unifying effect which transcends the characteristics of the PM as individual, closely aligning with the chosen operationalization.
10 Filippov (n.d.), https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020, accessed 23.01.2021.
11 Whether – when combined – the (potential) effect of the two properties on parliamentary policy-making power is reinforcing or additive would require a systematic comparison of several cases that bring the two together, while our design was directed towards separating them.
12 Filippov (n.d.), https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020, 23.01.2021.
13 All our cases except for Hungary have second houses of parliament, with Germany and Switzerland (with their (relatively) symmetrical powers and incongruent composition) being the most powerful. This variation is unlikely to play a role for the evolution of parliaments’ formal power during the pandemic as first and second houses were similarly affected, both in their ability to operate and in terms of policy-making power granted to them. In terms of strong second chambers constituting potential veto players, the German case study shows that especially the Bundesrat (one of the most powerful second houses covered) particularly lost out as a result of legislative reforms, while not necessarily even having a formal veto even when powers were centralized as illustrated by the last round of reform in April 2021. Relatedly, while the difference between federal and unitary systems might shape the extent to which reforms invite centralization, whether executive power (on the regional or national level) is made subject to parliamentary control is separate from how much power different governmental tiers retain.
14 We provide links to all primary sources in footnotes, while details on online sources used are provided in the Online Appendix.
15 This is echoed by our empirical analysis, as legal revisions curtailing initially granted executive powers have taken place in several of our cases.
16 ‘State of exception’ is used as umbrella (not a legal) term for the period in which normal checks and balances are relaxed during a crisis. It can be regulated through normal legislation or be based on specific constitutional provisions.
17 While only presents the final categorizations, Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides the same information underpinned by detailed footnotes including rationalizations and core sources.
18 It is important to stress that centralization of power from regional to national executives is not equivalent to the formal weakening of parliaments examined here.
19 40/2020. (III. 11.) Korm. rendelet
20 2011. évi CXXXVIII törvény a katasztrófavédelemről és a hozzá kapcsolódó egyes törvények módosításáról.
21 1997. évi CLIV törvény az egészségügyről
22 2020. évi XII. törvény a koronavírus elleni védekezésről
23 2020. évi LVII. törvény a veszélyhelyzet megszüntetéséről (Termination Act) 2020. évi LVIII. törvény veszélyhelyzet megszűnésével összefüggő átmeneti szabályokról és a járványügyi készültségről (Transition Act).
24 The analysis focuses on nation-wide regulation and, where separate regimes were adopted, English regulation applicable to approx. 84% of the UK population.
25 Department for Health and Social Care (UK) 23.03.2020, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/58-01/110/5801110-DPMsupp.pdf, accessed 20.07.2020.
26 The Act was confirmed by a parliamentary vote last on March 25 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-56521358, accessed April 5 2021.
27 Cowie, 25.03.2020. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/insights/coronavirus-bill-amended-time-limits-and-post-legislative-review/, accessed 20.07.2020.
28 Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence.
29 Letteron, 21.03.2020, http://libertescheries.blogspot.com/2020/03/letat-durgence-sanitaire-objet.html ; Gaillet &Gerhold 27.03.2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/etat-durgence-sanitaire/ , accessed 10.08.2020.
30 Loi n° 2020-290 du 23 mars 2020 d’urgence pour faire face à l’épidémie de covid-19.
31 Letteron, 21.03.2020, http://libertescheries.blogspot.com/2020/03/letat-durgence-sanitaire-objet.html; Haguenau-Moizard, 01.04.2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/governing-through-fear-in-france/; accessed 10.08.2020.
32 Loi n°2020-1379 du 14 novembre 2020 autorisant la prorogation de l’état d’urgence sanitaire et portant diverses mesures de gestion de la crise sanitaire.
33 Loi n° 2021-160 du 15 février 2021 prorogeant l’état d’urgence sanitaire.
34 In July the government prolonged this initial state of emergency for another six months til October 31, 2020.
35 Despite numerous constitutional court rulings requesting compliance with the constitution requiring that such decrees are only to be used in special circumstances, Italian governments have frequently used such law-decrees (Capano and Vignati Citation2008: 37).
36 No relevant changes have taken place since the Conte government was replaced by the Draghi government.
37 The German constitution allows for a national emergency (‘innerer Notstand’) to be declared (Art. 91) which, however, requires a hazard to the free democratic order or the existence of the federation.
38 Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite vom 27.03.2020.
39 Gesetz zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung von Infektionskrankheiten beim Menschen (Infektionsschutzgesetz – IfSG). See also https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/265/1926545.pdf, accessed 30.04.2021.
40 Wissenschaftliche Dienste Deutscher Bundestag, 2020, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/690262/cb718005e6d37ecce82c99191efbec49/WD-3-080-20-pdf-data.pdf, accessed 05.08.2020.
41 E.g. Keul et al., 21.04.2020, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/187/1918712.pdf, accessed 10.08.2020.
42 Drittes Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite vom 18.11.2021.
43 Jacobsen, 18.11.2020, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020-11/infektionsschutzgesetz-bundestag-reform-coronavirus-pandemie-befugnisse-grundrechte, accessed 05.04.2021.
44 Viertes Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite vom 22.04.2021.
45 Klafki, 05.03.2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/coronavirus-und-reformbedarf-des-pandemierechts/ , accessed 05.08.2020.
46 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/dokumentation/gesetzgebung/berichtnotverordnungen.html, accessed 04.07.2020.
47 This law is challenge by a referendum scheduled for June 21, 2021. https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/oc/2020/711/de; https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/abstimmungen/20210613/covid-19-gesetz.html#:∼:text=Um%20die%20Massnahmen%20weiterf%C3%BChren%20zu,Covid%2D19%2DGesetz%20erarbeitet.&text=W%C3%BCrde%20das%20Gesetz%20abgelehnt%2C%20w%C3%BCrde,Jahr%20nachdem%20es%20beschlossen%20wurde.; accessed 04.04.2021. Incidentally, the new law was most contested among the populist SVP, https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/das-covid-19-gesetz-auf-einen-blick-ld.1623528, accessed 08.05.2021.
48 See for a quantitative study on the use of emergency powers and executive empowement in established democracies in early stages of the pandemic Engler et al. (Citation2021).
49 Whether current German legislation stays in place will be determined by parliament in 2022 after an expert review by the German National Academy of Sciences due end of 2021.
50 This was the case regarding the Act of October 30, 2017 on reinforcing internal security and the fight against terrorism. See Gaillet and Gerhold 27.03.2020, https://verfassungsblog.de/etat-durgence-sanitaire/; accessed 07.08.2020.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Nicole Bolleyer
Nicole Bolleyer is Chair of Comparative Political Science at the Geschwister-Scholl Institute of Political Science, LMU Munich (Germany). She is the author of several monographs including The State and Civil Society: Regulating Interest Groups, Parties and Public Benefit Organisations in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford University Press 2018). Her research has appeared in a wide range of leading journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Politics and the European Journal of Political Research. [[email protected]]
Orsolya Salát
Orsolya Salát is Assistant Professor at ELTE University Budapest (Hungary). She is the author of articles and chapters in the fields of human rights and comparative constitutional law. Her monograph The Right to Freedom of Assembly. A Comparative Study was published by Hart/Bloomsbury in 2015. [[email protected]]