https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1114-1883
Abstract
The European Parliament (EP) constitutes a prime site of contemporary party politics in Europe. Its seven political groups represent political interests and ideologies beyond specific national interests. Within the groups, national delegations exert considerable power. The research objective of this article is to generate new knowledge about the role of national delegations within political groups. The research material consists of 140 elite interviews with MEPs and staff. The data allow the article to analyse the construction of the role and the importance of national delegations and to focus not just on formal institutions, but also on informal ones which are often outside the reach of quantitative methods and data. The findings suggest that political groups can be divided into different categories. The role and influence of national delegations are strongly governed by informal institutions, in particular when it comes to distribution of leadership positions and policy making.
The European Parliament (EP) is a prime site of contemporary party politics in Europe. Among European Union (EU) institutions, it represents both supranational and national politics and defies easy classification (Hodson et al. Citation2022). On the one hand, the EP political groups represent political interests and ideologies beyond specific national interests, yet, on the other hand, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected from national electoral lists, where national, rather than EU, concerns dominate EP elections. Within the political groups, MEPs from the same member state or the same national party constitute national delegations. Like the political groups, national delegations are organised entities that have their own structures and staff. They act as a bloc within the group, and often exert considerable power within and over the political group leadership (Corbett et al. Citation2016).
National delegations and their relationship to the supranational political groups have elicited a range of questions. Using quantitative methods, scholars have sought to establish whether the national delegations or the political groups determine how MEPs vote (e.g. Hix et al. Citation2007; Kreppel Citation2002; Raunio Citation2000). Others, using quantitative and qualitative methods, have studied dynamics between the national delegations and the political group leadership and among the delegations, notably regarding internal organisation, policy-making processes and leadership positions (e.g. Bressanelli Citation2022; Whitaker Citation2011). Qualitative research has explored the power dynamics of some big national delegations, politicisation of issues through national politics and the negotiations with the parliament’s political group level in relation to specific policy fields (Busby Citation2013; De Ville and Gheyle Citation2023).
Research on national delegations evidently matters for European integration and democracy. We contend that more research is required on the institutional norms which shape the roles of national delegations within political groups, and their potential variation by the groups representing political ideologies from green, left and liberal to conservative, right populist and far right.
Through a constructivist approach, we generate new knowledge about the role of national delegations by analysing the way they, as well as the formal and informal institutions which shape the powers of national delegations, are constructed. Our specific research questions are: how do MEPs and political group staff construct the role of national delegations within political groups? What formal and informal institutions shape the dynamics between national delegations and the group leadership as well as between national delegations? How do these constructions and institutions differ by political group? Our research material is uniquely positioned to address these research questions. In this article, we use 46 elite interviews with MEPs, as well as group and EP staff, conducted in Brussels, Strasbourg and online, between 2018 and 2022, originating from a larger interview data set of 140 interviews. The data allow us to analyse constructions of national delegations and to shed light on informal institutions which are often beyond the reach of quantitative methods and data. Covering all political groups of the parliament, the data allow us to analyse the whole political spectrum and not just selected political groups.
The article confirms that national delegations remain key power players within the European Parliament and its political groups. By showing how their role varies by group, we suggest that political groups can be divided into four categories based on their constructions of this role and the formal and informal institutions that shape it. The role of national delegations within political groups impacts on chances to build internal cohesion and policy outcomes, it has repercussions for democracy, and it reflects the groups’ approach to European integration. The role and powers of national delegations are strongly governed by informal institutions when it comes to policy making and distribution of leadership positions.
What are the national delegations?
The EP Rules of Procedure state that a political group must have at least 23 MEPs, represent at least seven member states and demonstrate political affinity. The political groups vary substantially in terms of the number of member states and national parties they represent, ranging from all 27 member states and 48 national parties for the largest group, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), to 10 countries and 10 national parties for the Eurosceptic, radical right Identity and Democracy (ID) group ().
Table 1. Political groups and national delegations in EP 2019–24 (without the UK).
Before the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) enlargements, the largest political groups, the EPP and the centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), were dominated by two national delegations that accounted for almost 50% of the group membership (Kreppel Citation2002: 204). As illustrated in , this is no longer the case. Germany remains the largest nationality in the EPP, but represents only 17% of MEPs, followed by Poland with 9%. By contrast, two nationalities hold a majority in three smaller groups: the radical right and populist ID (Italy and France), the increasingly radical right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (Poland and Italy) and the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) (Germany and France). Moreover, a single nationality represents more than a quarter of the MEPs in four groups: Poland dominates the ECR with 42.3% of MEPs, Italy the radical right ID with 36.9%, Germany the Greens/EFA with 35.2% and France the liberal, centre-right Renew Europe with 25.3%. Germany belongs to the three largest nationalities in five out of the seven political groups. Other large member states that wield power in several groups are Italy and France (in four each), followed by Spain, Poland and Romania (in two each).
The delegations of national parties elected to the European Parliament vary in size from single-person delegations to those of around 30 MEPs, reflecting the size of the member states and of the national political parties. The size of the delegations play a key role in political group formation, because most groups aim to maximise group size in the interests of power and influence in the EP (Ahrens and Kantola Citation2022). Within the political groups, MEPs from the same national political party, or several parties from the same member state, form organised entities – national delegations – that have regular meetings, take collective decisions and act as a bloc in group discussions (Corbett et al. Citation2016: 139–41). In the EPP and the S&D, several MEPs from the same member state typically constitute one delegation. In other groups, delegations are party-based. Most national delegations have their own offices and staff, partly financed through group funds (Corbett et al. Citation2016: 139–41). National delegations often serve as the ‘first port of call’ to MEPs, which means that, on one hand, information about the political groups’ legislative positions and daily business is passed through national delegation leaders to MEPs and, on the other hand, MEPs can first talk to their national delegation leaders when wanting to influence decisions of a political group (Busby Citation2013). They also serve as a link to national parties, although their relationships to national parties vary by country and party (Dafydd Citation2019), and are led by Heads of Delegations (HoDs), who wield considerable power within the political groups (Kreppel Citation2002). Despite the good gender balance among the MEPs (39.3% women in the 2019–2024 term), these positions remain heavily dominated by men, and constitute a hidden gender structure within the political groups (Kantola and Miller Citation2022). As shows, men chair almost all major delegations in the political groups.
National delegations matter for political group decision making and leadership
The diversity of the national delegations requires attention to their roles in the functioning of the political groups. By drawing on the extant research that has directly and indirectly addressed this topic, we identify two core issues: (a) intra-group decision making, and (b) distribution of leadership positions.
Scholars have explored the role of national delegations in intra-group decision making from the perspective of policy outcomes and policy processes. Findings regarding policy outcomes, based on quantitative analysis of voting patterns, suggest that national delegations have a greater influence on MEPs than political groups, even if group cohesion is high. The MEPs are more likely to vote with their national delegations than with their political groups and voting cohesion within national delegations is greater than within groups (Faas Citation2003; Hix et al. Citation2007). Explanations are linked to the better abilities of national delegations and parties to reward and sanction MEPs, as well as their increased attempts to supervise and control MEPs (Bressanelli Citation2022; Ripoll Servent Citation2018: 193; Whitaker Citation2011). The power of national delegations to shape voting patterns varies by member state, by political party and by the salience of the issue (Klüver and Spoon Citation2015; Ripoll Servent Citation2018: 195–6). MEPs are expected to vote differently from their political group line if the policy distance between the national party and the political group is big. They are also expected to defect in cases of high levels of politicisation of the policy issue in their home countries (De Ville and Gheyle Citation2023; Koop et al. Citation2018; Mühlböck and Yordanova Citation2017).
The political groups’ practices regarding the role of national delegations in the groups’ internal decision making have received slightly less attention. Based on qualitative analyses of interviews and ethnographic data, scholars have stressed that political group positions are rarely imposed by the group leadership or national delegation leadership (Ringe Citation2010: 49–50). If MEPs from different national delegations in the responsible committee find common ground, the rest of the group tends to follow (Ringe Citation2010: 33). When intra-group conflict at the plenary stage is expected, more coordination between national delegations is needed. In such cases, national delegation leaders are often in contact with their national parties and promote a common position within the delegation (Roger and Winzen Citation2015: 402–3). Political groups have created horizontal policy-making structures to manage the growing number of national delegations and the increased legislative workload, where compromises between national delegations are sought on issues that are divisive at the committee level (Bressanelli Citation2014; Elomäki et al. Citation2022). Also meeting routines consider delegations: national delegation meetings precede working group, Bureau and group plenary meetings in a manner that allows delegations to identify concerns and raise problems (Busby Citation2013).
Tensions and conflicts emerge in decision making between national delegations and the group leadership. Amie Kreppel has suggested that ‘unwritten rules that function within both of the largest groups shift power away from the group elite to the national delegations’ (Kreppel Citation2002: 202). Other scholars have observed increased centralisation in the internal structures and decision-making processes within the largest groups that have increased their autonomy from national delegations (Bressanelli Citation2014, Citation2022). For example, Bressanelli (Citation2014) shows how the leadership of the S&D group used the enlargement process strategically to centralise decision-making powers, thereby making its organisation more supranational. Power struggles emerge between the delegations too. In previous literature, delegation size has appeared as a main factor shaping the influence of specific delegations within the groups: the largest delegations have a disproportionate influence over the groups, and the groups are dependent on their largest delegations (De Ville and Gheyle Citation2023; Ripoll Servent Citation2018: 193–6).
National delegations have also been shown to matter for the distribution of EP and group-level leadership positions. Although political groups formally make appointments to most positions (e.g. EP presidency, committee chairs, group presidency), in practice groups allocate positions to national delegations proportionally to their size, and the posts are filled by delegations’ nominees (Bressanelli Citation2022; Kreppel Citation2002; Whitaker Citation2011). In coordinator positions, national delegations should technically have a smaller role, as coordinators are elected by the groups’ committee members (Daniel and Thierse Citation2018). Yet big delegations dominate; for instance, German MEPs have been over-represented among EPP coordinators (Chiru Citation2023: 7–8).
The extant literature has thus sought to identify where power lies within the political groups and eventually within the EP: with the political group leadership or the national delegations. It has also shown conflicts and tensions between the national delegations and the group leadership and among the delegations. Nevertheless, one could approach delegations in a different way and thereby shed new light on the processes and conflicts described above. Little research has been conducted on the constructions and perceptions about national delegations and their power, and the informal rules and practices shaping the role of the delegations in internal decision-making processes and distribution of leadership positions. Moreover, previous research has focused on the largest groups, where less is known about the smaller groups and the differences among them.
Constructivist approaches to power and institutions
The theoretical approach of this article is informed by social constructivism. Knowledge is thus seen as situated, context specific and constructed by interaction between and within actors and institutions. These constructions matter because they are shot through with power relations and sometimes institutionalised in practices. Epistemologically, this signifies that the ‘reality out there’ is subject to constant discursive struggles informed by power relations (Kantola and Lombardo Citation2017: 34–5). Empirically, it means that the analytical focus shifts to the ways in which policy problems are constructed in discourses and practices, and how these constructions shape the ways in which people think and act (Lombardo et al. Citation2009: 10). Accordingly, we approach issues, such as the ‘power of the national delegations’, as open and contested (Bacchi Citation2009). We analyse what political actors themselves have to say about the relationships between the political groups and national delegations, and we scrutinise which constructions matter and how this relates to institutional practices. The extant literature on political groups and national party delegations has mainly relied on positivist, realist or critical realist theoretical approaches; we contend that diversifying the theoretical approaches is useful. Qualitative constructivist research such as ours will generate insights which can then be tested and applied to research using other theoretical approaches.
We also employ the concept of ‘institutions’, following the debates on new institutionalism, including historical and feminist institutionalisms, as a way of discussing formal as well as informal institutional forms (see Chappell and Mackay Citation2017; Waylen Citation2017). In this sense, formal institutions are codified rules about, for example, internal decision making and distribution leadership positions that, in turn, shape the roles and powers of national delegations. Informal institutions, by contrast, are more opaque and not directly observable. Rather, they constitute the hidden norms, customs and practices, the ‘usual ways of doing things’, the subtle knowledge which has to be passed on from one actor to another in an organisation or political institution (Chappell and Mackay Citation2017; Waylen Citation2017). These ‘institutions’ consolidate certain power relations and may freeze or solve conflicts in specific ways. They make power relations stable and more durable and may involve sanctions for those who do not follow the written or unwritten institutional rules. They are also relational: informal institutions can either support or undermine the power of formal institutions. Formal institutions around national delegations have been studied and observed in the extant literature as discussed above. We are particularly interested, however, in the informal institutions and the ways in which they shape political group politics around national delegations, particularly as regards intra-group decision making and leadership positions (see also Kantola et al. Citation2022).
The bigger data set, which we draw upon, consists of ethnographic fieldwork and 140 interviews conducted during the 2014–2019 and 2019–2024 parliamentary terms in the context of a research project that assessed the policies and practices of EP political groups (see Berthet et al. Citation2023). The interviewees included MEPs, their assistants, political group staff and EP staff, and covered all political groups (see ). Of this data set, we use interview citations from 46 interviews in particular in this article but the whole data set has been analysed and provides the background for the article. The interviews were semi-structured, with questions about political group work, leadership, gender equality and policy-making practices, as well as the lives of MEPs and staff. Interviews are particularly well-suited to analysing actors’ constructions, and they can also help to understand informal institutions when they are interpreted and contrasted (Lowndes Citation2014: 688). Although the interviews were conducted during two parliamentary terms, they do not allow for straightforward comparisons due to their timing at the end and the beginning of the terms. We complemented the interviews with an analysis of the statutes of the political groups, and the rules of procedures as documents regulating the role of the national delegations within the groups. The documents were downloaded from the websites of political groups or obtained directly from the groups. The political groups’ statutes and rules of procedure provide insights to political groups’ formal institutions.
Table 2. Research interviews 2018–2022.
Team members coded the interviews using the qualitative analysis software ATLAS.ti. The codes were developed jointly, and the team coded extensively to maximise the empirical material (see Berthet et al. Citation2023). In this way, we analysed the ‘national party delegation’ code, which we defined to cover all references to national delegations (207 pages). Although the interview questionnaire did not contain direct questions about national delegations, this was the code with the most quotations. The prominence of this theme illustrates the importance of the national delegations for the interviewees. The coded excerpts included reflections on interviewees’ own delegations, the role of national delegations in group work, and the policies and ways of working of other delegations.
Consistent with the constructivist approach (Bacchi Citation2009; Lombardo et al. Citation2009), we treated the interviews as narratives and constructions of reality and identified patterns and differences between the groups. Guided by the previous literature, the analysis of the interviews and the political group documents focused on intra-group decision-making processes and distribution of leadership positions, as well as the power between the group leadership and national delegations and among the delegations as the broad overarching theme. In line with our theoretical approach, we have divided the analysis into two parts: (i) constructions of the role and power of national delegations and (ii) formal versus informal institutions in shaping the role and power of national delegations within the groups.
Constructions of the role of national delegations
An analysis of our interview data indicates that political groups construct the role of national delegations very differently. These constructions also differ regarding the emphasis put on conflicts and power struggles between different national delegations and between the national delegations and group leadership.
At one end of the spectrum, the Greens/EFA interviewees emphasised working as a group over delegations, perceiving this as a characteristic distinguishing them from other groups: ‘We don’t work by delegations, we work by group’ (Interview 1). The interviewees systematically put forward constructions of the importance of the group level, individual expertise and competence as opposed to nationalities and the size of particular national delegations (Interviews 2 and 3). As one MEP put it: ‘So I have to say, it’s almost like a big family’ (Interview 4). Throughout, interviewees emphasised the equal value of all delegations in shaping group positions. This construction downplayed potentially uneven power relationships between different national delegations and conflicts between national delegations and the group leadership.
In contrast, for radical right populist groups, opposed to European integration, national delegations are ideologically important actors. This was visible in how the interviewees from the ECR and the ID (and its predecessor the Europe of Nations and Freedom, ENF) emphasised that ‘everything in our group is about the delegation’ (Interview 5). An ECR MEP explained that the ‘European position is always subordinate to the national issues’ and saw this as a ‘big difference to the other big groups in that they think the group position is more important than the delegation’ (Interview 5). Similarly, an ID interviewee saw national politics as the most important aspect for democracy:
How am I supposed to speak to a Greek person or a Spanish person or a Portuguese or a Swedish? […] So, yes, I am part of a group, but it is on a rather shallow basis and I’m being very frank and honest here, so we are not really discussing in depth, policies and strategies, like you would in a national parliament as a group there. (Interview 6)
[a former group leader] represented a big, those days the big delegation, the French delegation, dominating the whole group with the rest entirely composed of smaller delegations. Now we have more balance in it. We have an East–West balance. We have a North–South balance, and we also have a balance of big groups: Italians, Germans, French. (Interview 37)
Although the interviewees from the Eurosceptic Left group were not as explicit about the priority of the national delegations as the radical right, they did emphasise the confederal character of the group and how national delegations consequently shaped the group:
The group is a confederate as you know. So we are in a certain way mirroring political positions of left-wing parties, their member states, and the member states and their home and motherland influences of course the participation and forming and shaping a common line and the common principles of the functioning of the group. (Interview 7)
The constructions among the interviewees from the three largest political groups, the EPP, the S&D and Renew (and its predecessor the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group in the 2014–2019 term), were more ambivalent. As political groups, their ideologies and affinities were pro-integration, which signified support for ‘European interests’ and norms about supranationalism in political group politics. The three groups valued group cohesion and unity, which results in downplaying or muting potential conflicts within the group. Interviewees from the EPP and the S&D, in particular, referred to their political group as a ‘family’. At the same time, they constructed the importance of national delegations along the lines of power struggle and conflict. Delegation size was a constant concern that structured narratives of their work and the role of delegations within their groups.
EPP interviewees mainly approached national delegations in terms of their uneven power relations regarding policy making and the distribution of positions. Several interviewees from smaller countries commented on the strength of the German EPP delegation. The Germans were constructed as power-hungry, with one interviewee calling them the ‘German mafia’ (Interview 10). The interviewees believed that passing positions without the Germans was difficult and that the German delegation had freedoms others did not:
In our group the role of Germans is really strong. It is in many ways a problem too in my view, because it is very difficult to get things through if the Germans do not support them. On the other hand, when one has worked on something for a long time, the Germans might come at the last moment and say they cannot accept it, changes have to be made. It is the only delegation that can come at the last moment and require all sorts of changes and everyone will give in. (Interview 29)
The constructions of S&D interviewees were less focused on size-related conflicts and power struggles than those from EPP and Renew, reflecting the more equal power balance between large delegations in the group (). Although the Spanish delegation was the largest, one of our shadowed S&D MEPs recommended observing ‘the Italians’ because, according to her, this was where the power and action was (Fieldnote 1). One S&D interviewee explained how the political power balance between national delegations had shifted after the 2019 European elections, but that path dependency had assured the group secretariat was still led by the ‘old’ dominant nationalities:
The Germans, the French and the Brits were the major powers in the group and now the powers shift towards Spain, Portugal and Italy, I would say. The German, the UK and French influence, you feel it in the secretariat but not within the members. Now there is this gap between the priorities of the group being dictated by Spanish, Portuguese members, or Italian, and then you have the secretariat, that major leadership positions are with Germans and French, so this brings some kind of problems as well as tensions. (Interview 25)
In sum, the political groups construct the role and powers of national delegations differently: the Greens/EFA emphasise supranational politics and the Eurosceptic groups from the left and the right place greater emphasis on national delegations. These constructions confirm that delegation size is seen as the main factor influencing intra-group power relations. They also reveal power struggles between national delegations and political group leadership.
Formal and informal institutions shaping the role and power of national delegations
This section provides further nuance to these constructions by examining the formal and informal institutions that shape the role and power of national delegations. We have structured the analysis around the two main themes addressed by previous research on the topic: (i) intra-group decision making and (ii) distribution of EP and group leadership positions. We will address the first theme through two complementary angles, group decision-making bodies and intra-group decision-making processes. Whereas representation of national delegations in group decision-making bodies was mainly regulated through formal institutions, decision-making processes and distribution of leadership positions were mainly regulated through informal institutions, revealing the persistence of unofficial practices that can either strengthen or weaken the role of national delegations.
Limited formal institutions
The European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure contain no reference to the role of national delegations within the political groups, and political groups are free to design their own rules. The visibility of national delegations in the statutes and/or rules of procedure of the political groups is equally limited, and the groups vary largely in terms of how they formally regulate their role (see ).
Table 3. Political group formal rules on representation, leadership positions and policy making.
Regarding intra-group decision making, the representation of national delegations in group decision-making bodies is heavily regulated through formal institutions in all groups. However, there was variation across the groups regarding how the rules balanced European and national interests and big and small delegations. Most groups guarantee delegation-based representation in the Bureau – the main executive body of the group. The ID, the ECR and the Left give all national delegations the same weight (ID 2019, Rule 11; ECR 2017, Rule 21). By contrast, the EPP and Renew confer greater power on larger delegations. The EPP allows an additional Bureau representative for every 10 MEPs (EPP 2021, Article 15), and in the Renew Bureau, each party delegation has as many votes as it has MEPs (Renew 2022, Rule 10). The MEPs constructed delegation-based representation as democratic. As a Left interviewee stated, ‘I think since all delegations are represented, it’s quite transparent. Every delegation has a direct link into this decision-making body and know[s] what is happening’ (Interview 8).
By contrast, the S&D and the Greens/EFA Bureaus are centralised, supranational structures that consist of the elected leadership, comparable to the presidencies of the other political groups (cf. Bressanelli Citation2022). Instead of seeking delegation-based representation, the S&D and the Greens/EFA take a different approach to ensuring democratic representation: formal rules which guarantee gender balance in the Bureau (S&D 2014, Rule 11; Greens/EFA 2020, Rule 2). In addition, the Greens/EFA have a formal rule about gender balance in all representation (Greens/EFA 2020, Rule 7). The interviewees prioritised the importance of competence over nationality and stressed that the group did not ‘go for delegations’ over equal gender representation (Interview 3). By comparison, the groups with formal rules about delegation-based representation in the Bureau had either weak rules about gender balance or none at all (e.g. EPP 2021, Rule 16). For instance, the ECR has an all-male Bureau because all Heads of Delegations are men.
The EPP and the S&D have formal rules on regular meetings between the executive body and the HoDs (EPP 2021, Article 8; S&D 2014, Rule 33). In the EPP, the meetings of the HoDs constitute a formal organ of the group, constructed by interviewees as an important forum to discuss new and conflictual issues (Interview 9). The meetings were described as an egalitarian forum, with all delegations having an equal voice irrespective of their size (Interview 10).
There were fewer formal rules in place regarding internal decision-making processes, and the existing rules focused on voting in group plenary and other decision-making bodies. Currently, all groups, apart from the confederal Left, use mainly simple majority voting. When decisions are made by simple majority, large delegations working together can sway the decisions of the entire group (Kreppel Citation2002: 207). To pre-empt this, some groups stipulate that for specific decisions, such as the acceptance of new members, a majority, or at least a certain proportion of national delegations, is required. The Left is the only group that still makes decisions based on consensus. The issue of how decisions should be made, and how they ought to affect the disagreeing delegations, was constructed as a conflictual issue during the ongoing development of statutes for the group (Interview 7).
The distribution of EP and political group leadership positions is the second theme that illustrates the role of national delegations within the groups (Bressanelli Citation2022; Corbett et al. Citation2016: 139; Kreppel Citation2002: 240). Interestingly, the formal political group rules also say little on this topic, even if some groups make vague references to regional or national balances for both types of positions. Only the ECR and the S&D have rules about nationality and group leadership, both designed to ensure the same delegations do not accumulate a greater number of positions. For instance, the ECR rules state that the two co-chairs of the group cannot come from the same member state (ECR 2017, Rule 41), portrayed by interviewees as a way to prevent one member state (Poland) from automatically dominating the group (Interviews 11 and 12). Only the S&D and Renew formally acknowledge that positions are distributed according to the D’Hondt method – one that benefits the largest delegations (S&D 2014, Rule 16; Renew 2022, Rule 4). All groups formally state that the coordinators are elected by the group members belonging to the same committee.
Informal institutions complement formal rules
We contend that the minimal formal institutions around national delegations provide space for informal rules and analysing these is a key contribution our data allows for. Informal rules are important in all political groups, yet they function in different ways. In some groups, they balance European and national interests and large and small delegations, whilst in others they solidify the power of large delegations. Given the lack of formal institutions in this regard, informal institutions acquire a particular relevance for intra-group decision-making processes and the distribution of leadership positions.
With regard to the intra-group decision-making process, the formal rules about voting were often complemented by informal behind-closed-doors deals. The informal agreements on policies strengthened the position of national delegations vis-à-vis the political groups. Examples of such backroom deals were described by interviewees from both large and small, mainstream and Eurosceptic groups (except for the Greens/EFA). Bargaining about policy could become a complex exercise involving different files, where national delegations might refuse to accept something until they have secured a win on another issue. This dynamic was explained by an ECR interviewee:
Different delegations want different things and different deals are done, different negotiations. And sometimes right at the very last minute, you’ll find people pull back, because they’re able to achieve a number of other deals, which allow them to say ‘Okay, we’ll accept that, we’ll pull back’. So it can be used as a tactic as well as to get other things. (Interview 18)
The informal institutions regulating the intra-group decision-making process often benefited big delegations. For instance, the large EPP national delegations sometimes made deals behind closed doors, further reducing the influence of the smaller delegations (Interview 29). Yet size was not the only factor that mattered. One Greens/EFA interviewee described how her national delegation was seen as ‘moderate’ within the group, which resulted in ‘confidence’ and political influence: ‘So our voice usually is listened to’ (Interview 4). In addition to ideological position, national politics also played a role. If a national delegation was in government or had governmental aspirations, this could lead to perceptions of ‘influence’ and ‘good consideration of initiatives’ within the political group (Interview 39).
Our data also point towards different internal decision-making practices within the national delegations. Confirming the findings in earlier literature (e.g. Dafydd Citation2019; Ripoll Servent Citation2018: 194–5), some delegations were portrayed as more dependent on national parties than others. For instance, the Spanish S&D chair was described as having to call Madrid before taking decisions (Interview 22; Interview 24), whilst the Polish ECR delegation was perceived as waiting to ‘get told by Warsaw how to vote’ (Interview 23). One explanation was the national election system: members from countries with closed lists decided by party leadership were seen as more dependent on national parties (Interview 24). Also the national party being in government was seen to increase the responsibility to represent national interests and stay close to the party (Interview 46). Dependence from national parties impacted group-level decision making, particularly when the group leader came from a delegation with strong ties to national party, as in the S&D in the 2019–2024 term (Interview 22).
Interviewees from most groups described the distribution of leadership positions as a process of informal bargaining, where national interests transcended those of the group. For instance, an ID interviewee described the distribution of positions within the group as deal-making: ‘you make deals, “if you get this, I get this”, basically, that’s how it’s done’ (Interview 6). Similarly, an S&D interviewee described the formation of the group’s Bureau as a trading process where other EP positions were used as bargaining chips: ‘It’s horse-traded in a single process, in which they’re also horse-trading positions in the Parliament’ (Interview 21). Previous literature has also shown how the distribution of different positions within the groups is dominated by informal deals between national delegations (Whitaker Citation2011: 92–4). Like the informal deal-making in decision making, informal bargaining favours national interests over group interests and may solidify the power of large delegations. Bargaining expanded to coordinators who formally are elected by committee members. An S&D interviewee described how her delegation had asked for coordinator positions of certain committees and got them (Interview 38). One EPP interviewee related how a competent candidate from a small delegation had withdrawn two days before the election because big delegations had agreed to support a candidate from a big delegation (Interview 10).
In contrast, the Greens/EFA interviewees emphasised that delegations had only a minor role in nominations and that ‘everything is by election’ (Interview 15). In addition to putting the interests of the group above national interests, this system limited the powers of large delegations and ensured better representation for small delegations in leadership positions. The following citation from a German Greens/EFA interviewee illustrates the equalising outcomes:
If I compare us German Greens as 21 to the CDU, German conservatives – they are 24, so they’re not massively more – if you look at what, the kind of positions that they have, we each have one of the group … Well, they have the group leader; we have one of the two chairs. Then the conservatives, they have a vice-president as well, which we don’t have, [and] they have four committee chairs. We as German Greens have no committee chair, and then they have 11 coordinators, the conservatives. I think that might be roughly what we also have as German Greens. So they’re still doing much better, since they just distribute everything by the D’Hondt system. (Interview 15)
The S&D and the Greens/EFA were the only groups that had a formal commitment to gender balance in their statutes. The other political groups operated through informal institutions or considered gender equality norms unnecessary. When looking at the interplay between informal gender norms and those that coalesce around nationality, the concern for national or regional balance often overshadowed the norms of gender equality. The system where national delegations propose candidates for positions led to situations whereby delegations, due to their internal selection processes, proposed men only – a factor also discernible in groups committed to gender equality such as the Left (Interview 8). In other pro-equality groups, such as Renew and its predecessor ALDE, gender equality was not always respected if national balance was threatened. One interviewee described how gender balance was overlooked during the allocation of coordinator positions because there was a greater need to represent national delegations fairly: ‘so, gender plays a role but it’s not the first criterion. It cannot be the first criterion. The first criterion is only one for each nationality. That is important’ (Interview 13). However, during the selection of the first presidency of the Renew group, the group extended the number of vice-presidents to bring in more women and ensure a better regional balance (Interview 14).
Informal institutions regarding intra-group decision making and leadership positions that shaped the role and power of national delegations often weakened transparency. The backroom deals about policy were equally difficult to understand for those not involved in them, and the unformalised processes of distributing leadership positions were unclear to some interviewees. This lack of transparency was pointed out by an S&D interviewee:
You can question how certain decisions are taken because I believe that the national issue, the national interest still weighs a lot on the decision making. That’s when things are more apart and you don’t really understand why certain decisions are taken. (Interview 25)
Conclusions
The power of the national delegations has been a constant, albeit under-researched, theme in the scholarship on the EP and its political groups. Our research data has allowed us to analyse the constructions of the role and power of national delegations within political groups as well as the formal and informal institutions in intra-group decision making and distribution of leadership positions. We have built on extant research on national delegations, adding to it a focus on all political groups’ constructions, and formal and informal institutions.
The main contribution of the article has been to show the significance of informality in both the internal politics of political groups, and the way in which the role and power of national delegations are regulated. The scarcity of formal rules governing the role of national delegations provides a rich context for informal norms and practices to become embedded in political groups; this is especially so in the distribution of leadership positions and policy making. Informal rules function in different ways, often reflecting the political groups’ ideologies. They can either strengthen delegation-centredness or emphasise supranational collaboration, equally they can solidify the power of large delegations or balance large and small delegations. In most political groups, however, the reliance on unofficial decision making further solidified the role of larger delegations and emphasised national interests over those of the group. The reliance on informality and backroom deals in the internal politics of political groups raises significant questions about transparency and therefore about democracy.
The article confirms many earlier findings that national delegations are key power players within the EP and its political groups. Yet we also find significant variations between the political groups, which can enhance scholarly understanding of their internal politics. Based on constructions and formal and informal institutions, we divide the political groups into four broad categories in terms of the roles of national delegations. First, the Eurosceptic political groups on the left and the right (the Left, the ID and the ECR) are the most delegation-centred groups. They emphasise the importance of national delegations in constructions as well as formal and informal rules. Secondly, the centre-right EPP and Renew Europe have greater supranational constructions, yet formal and informal institutions play a significant role for national delegations in representation, leadership positions and policy making where big delegations are favoured. Thirdly, the S&D is the only large political group without delegation-based representation in its decision-making bodies, and tries to separate group interests from national interests. Despite the supranational approach, decision making within the political group is driven by informal backroom deals between national delegations. Finally, the Greens/EFA is the most supranational political group. National interests are set aside, in both constructions and formal and informal institutions.
These findings illustrate that the role of national delegations relates to political groups’ position towards European integration. Regarding the power of specific delegations within the groups, our analysis confirms that size remains a key factor, even if ideology and relationship to government and national parties also matter in policy making. The varied constructions and institutions tell us about how the groups conceptualise and manage power conflicts between the delegations and the group leadership as well as between delegations. Overall, the role granted to national delegations within the political groups impacts on policy outcomes and chances to build internal cohesion.
Cited research interviews
1. Greens/EFA group staff, Brussels, 21.03.2019
2. Greens/EFA MEP, Brussels, 30.09.2019
3. Greens/EFA group staff, Brussels, 04.03.2019
4. Greens/EFA MEP, Brussels, 13.03.2020
5. ECR MEP, Brussels, 31.01.2019
6. I&D MEP, Brussels, 11.03.2020
7. GUE/NGL MEP, online interview, 23.10.2020
8. GUE/NGL MEP, Brussels, 16.03.2020
9. EPP MEP, online interview, 08.04.2020
10. EPP MEP, Brussels, 29.11.2018
11. ECR group staff, Brussels, 18.03.2019
12. ECR MEP, national capital, 19.12.2019
13. ALDE group staff, Brussels, 05.04.2019
14. Renew MEP, Brussels, 13.12.2019
15. Greens/EFA MEP, Brussels, 03.03.2020
16. ECR group staff, Brussels, 20.02.2019
17. GUE/NGL group staff, Brussels, 15.05.2019
18. ECR MEP, Brussels, 05.12.2018
19. I&D group staff, Brussels, 11.03.2020
20. I&D group staff, Brussels, 28.02.2020
21. S&D MEP, Brussels, 16.10.2018
22. S&D MEP, Brussels, 06.03.2020
23. ECR MEP, Brussels, 21.02.2019
24. S&D group staff, Brussels, 04.03.2020
25. S&D group staff, Brussels, 26.02.2020
26. GUE/NGL group staff, Brussels, 07.02.2020
27. ECR MEP, Brussels, 04.03.2020
28. I&D MEP, Brussels, 13.03.2020
29. EPP MEP, Brussels, 10.03.2020
30. EPP MEP, online interview, 18.03.2020
31. EPP MEP, Brussels, 04.03.2020
32. Renew MEP, Brussels, 24.02.2020
33. Renew MEP, Brussels, 06.02.2020
34. ALDE group staff, Brussels, 30.11.2018
35. ECR MEP, online interview, 12.05.2021
36. EPP MEP, telephone interview, 27.03.2020
37. I&D MEP, Brussels, 12.03.2020
38. S&D MEP, Brussels, 22.01.2020
39. GUE/NGL MEP, Brussels, 10.03.2020
40. Greens/EFA group staff, online interview, 25.03.2021
41. EFDD group staff, Brussels, 07.02.2019
42. Non-attached MEP, Brussels, 22.01.2020
43. GUE/NGL staff, Brussels, 16.03.2020
44. Non-attached MEP, Brussels, 27.01.2020
45. GUE/NGL group staff, Brussels, 24.02.2022
46. S&D MEP, Brussels, 06.03.2020
Ethnographic fieldnotes
1. S&D MEP shadowing day, Brussels, 18.10.2018
Documents
ECR (2017) ECR Constitution of the Group as amended 25 November 2014 and 4 July 2017.
EPP (2021) Rules of Procedure of the Group of the European People’s Party (Chistian Democrats) in the European Parliament. October 2013, amended 3 March 202.
Greens/EFA (2020) Greens/EFA Group Statutes (adopted on 08 November 2006, changed on 5 October 2016 and 15 July 2015) and annex.
ID (2019) Statutes of the Identity and Democracy (ID) Group in the European Parliament.
Renew Europe (2022) Rules of Procedure. Adopted on 16 February 2022.
S&D (2014) Rules of Procedure. Adopted on 15 October 2014.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Anna Elomäki
Anna Elomäki is Academy Research Fellow at Tampere University. Her research focuses on economic policy and economic governance from gender and democracy perspectives. She has published in numerous international political science and gender studies journals. Her books include the co-edited volumes Social Partners and Gender Equality (Palgrave, 2022) and European Parliament’s Political Groups in Turbulent Times (Palgrave, 2022). [[email protected]]
Johanna Kantola
Johanna Kantola is Professor of European Politics at the University of Helsinki. She is the Project Director of the European Research Council Consolidator Grant project EUGenDem: ‘Gender, party politics and democracy in Europe: A study of European Parliament’s party groups’. Her research focuses on gender and politics, EU institutions and policies, European Parliament and political groups, and has been published in leading journals such as the American Political Science Review, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Integration and Politics & Gender. [[email protected]]
Petra Ahrens
Petra Ahrens is Academy of Finland Research Fellow at Tampere University. She focuses on gender equality in the European Union and Germany, gender-sensitive parliaments and transnational civil society. She is the author of Actors, Institutions, and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) and has published in Party Politics, Journal of European Integration and Journal of Common Market Studies, amongst others. [[email protected]]
Valentine Berthet
Valentine Berthet is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for European Studies at the University of Helsinki. In the Horizon Europe CCindle project (2022–2026), her research focuses on anti-gender actors in the European Parliament. Her recent work appears in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Social Politics and the American Political Science Review and she is the co-author of Guide to Qualitative Research in Parliaments (Palgrave, 2023). [[email protected]]
Barbara Gaweda
Barbara Gaweda is Senior Researcher at the Centre for European Studies, University of Helsinki. Her research focuses on the gendered analysis of political discourses and institutions in parliamentary politics, social policy and gender (in)equality, and nationalism and post-state socialist transformations. Her research has been published in the American Political Science Review, Social Politics, Politics & Gender, Party Politics and Journal of European Integration, and she is the co-author of Guide to Qualitative Research in Parliaments (Palgrave, 2023). [[email protected]]
Cherry Miller
Cherry Miller is an Academy Research Fellow at the Centre of European Studies, University of Helsinki, and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Glasgow. Her current research is on gendering parliamentary diplomacy in EU–UK relations. Her research has been published in Politics and Gender, the Journal of Common Market Studies and Parliamentary Affairs, amongst others. [[email protected]]
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