Far left and far right party reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Abstract

Several studies have underscored the recent emergence of ‘Russia-sympathizing’ parties, particularly within the European far left and far right party families. This study aims to shed further light on the conceptions of Russia within these families by examining party positions regarding Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Utilising content analysis of party standpoints, and employing both cross-sectional quantitative and case-based qualitative analytical techniques, the research underscores the importance of ideology in shaping extreme and radical parties’ attitudes towards Russia. Specifically, the findings suggest a connection between populism and Russia sympathy, with far left and far right parties more inclined to express sympathy with Russia also exhibiting higher levels of populism. Euroscepticism emerges as another factor influencing Russia sympathy, however only among far right parties. Taken together, the study offers valuable insights into the complex landscape of party politics, foreign policy and contemporary Russia.

Keywords:

• Far left
• far right
• Russo-Ukrainian war
• populism
• Euroskepticism

Acknowledgements

I thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the 2023 ECPR General Conference (Prague, Czech Republic, 4–8 September) and at the 2023 CBEES Annual Conference (Huddinge, Sweden, 23–24 November).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Another position, occupying something of a middle ground between the dominant (liberal) narrative and the alternative perspectives cited above, focuses on the role of both security concerns and status aspirations (Götz and Staun 2022). For nuanced overviews of the possible causes of Russia’s recent policies both towards Ukraine and towards its post-Soviet neighbours more generally, see Götz (2016) and Götz (2017), respectively.

2 This study uses the label Russia sympathy as an umbrella term for a range of more or less benign views on current Russia and its policies. It is a rough translation of the German Russlandversteher (or Russland-Versteher), meaning someone who ‘understands’ Russia and its behaviour. While not perfect, it is preferred to (the too narrow, categorical and definitive) ‘pro-Russian’ and (the too personified) ‘Putin-sympathizing’ (de. Putinversteher or Putin-Versteher). The antithesis of Russia sympathy is Russia antipathy, covering feelings of fear, contempt and disregard for the country. (In the West, Russia antipathy has generally been a more common phenomenon than Russia sympathy. See Smith (2020) for a detailed historical survey of Western anxieties regarding Russia and Sakwa (2023b) for a discussion on contemporary examples of ‘Russia scare’.)

3 Other academic studies dealing with Russia-sympathizing elements among European parties and electorates are Ishiyama et al. (2018) and Onderco (2019) on conceptions of Russia in electoral manifestos, Braghiroli (2015) on voting patterns on Russia-related votes in the European Parliament, Snegovaya (2022) on voting for Russia-sympathizing parties and Fisher (2021) on Russia and public opinion. Studies focusing explicitly on European far right parties and their (alleged) sympathies with Russia are, above all, Laruelle (2015), Shekhovtsov (2018), Diesen (2020) and, most recently, Ivaldi and Zankina (2023) and Wondreys (2023).

4 Russian and Ukrainian proper names are transliterated following conventional practice. Names of Ukrainian places (cities and regions) are hence transliterated from Ukrainian. This transliteration choice is not indicative of any political or cultural preferences by the author.

5 The literature on the Ukraine conflict (2014–) is abundant. The following summary is based mainly on readings of authoritative book-length treatments by Wilson (2014), Menon and Rumer (2015), Sakwa (2015), Charap and Colton (2017) and Arel and Driscoll (2023). Wilson provides a Ukrainian/Western perspective on the crisis while Sakwa shows understanding also of the Russian mindset. The other studies strike a balance between different perspectives. For a detailed analytical summary of the events in 2021–22 leading up to the war, see Roberts (2022). A more critical assessment of the Russian claims about Ukraine on the eve of the war is provided by Savelyev (2023).

6 I define the far left as a diverse family consisting of radical (democratic, but sceptical towards (some elements of) liberal democracy) and extreme (anti-democratic) parties located distinctly to the left on a socioeconomic dimension (Mudde 2005; see also March 2008; 2012). In a similar vein, the far right family is defined as a broad class of parties consisting of radical (democratic, but sceptical towards (some elements of) liberal democracy) and extreme (anti-democratic) parties located distinctly to the right on a sociocultural dimension (Mudde 2005; see also Mudde 2007; 2019).

7 I follow the ideational approach and define populism as a ‘thin’ (limited, restricted) ideology that ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the [general will] of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543; Mudde 2017: 29).

8 For constructivist and realist views on contemporary Russian foreign policy, see Tsygankov (2022: chs 4–5) and Donaldson and Nadkarni (2023: chs 10–12), respectively. The liberal view of international relations has recently been forcefully defended by Ikenberry (2020: chs 1, 9), and criticised by Mearsheimer (2018: chs 1, 4–7).

9 I use Euroscepticism as a ‘generic, catch-all term encapsulating a disparate bundle of attitudes opposed to European integration in general and opposition to the EU in particular’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2018: 12). For an overview of earlier understandings of Euroscepticism within the leading Sussex (Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart) and North Carolina (Chapel Hill Expert Survey team) schools, see Mudde (2012).

10 The reliability of the scale was assessed using McDonald’s omega (ω_total), yielding a value of 0.82. This indicates good reliability. (A different scaling technique is used in the regression models reported in Table A13 in Online Appendix E, with largely similar results.)

11 CHES data is preferred to the competing Manifesto project data mainly because it provides more straightforward measures of Euroscepticism and – above all – populism. A CHES special edition focusing on policies related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was published after the work with this article (see Hooghe et al. 2024).

12 The set of included parties is rather similar to the set of parties classified as either far left or far right in the 2.0 version of PopuList. Data limitations and recent changes in party identity and status lead, however, to some discrepancies between PopuList and my data set. (A new version of PopuList was launched after the completion of this article, see Rooduijn et al. 2023) For further details on included and excluded parties, see Online Appendix B.

13 Bivariate relationships are reported in Online Appendix C.

14 While the non-significant nature of the Status variable goes against the inclusion–moderation thesis (Downs 1957), it is more in line with recent empirical observations emphasising that ‘inclusion or exclusion are not sufficient to explain (non-)mainstreaming’ (Akkerman 2016: 279) and that ‘changes are not uniform’, with several parties retaining radical positions (Keith and March 2023: 754).

15 On the role of public opinion and geopolitics (i.e. whether the party operates in a country sharing borders with Russia or not), see Online Appendix E (Tables A14 and A16).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andreas Fagerholm

Andreas Fagerholm is a researcher in political science at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. His research focus on political parties, especially radical and extreme parties. His recent articles have appeared (or are forthcoming) in journals such as Acta Politica, Europe-Asia Studies, and Government and Opposition, amongst others. [[email protected]]