The (unintended) consequences of ineffective corruption control on populism in Europe

Abstract

The literature on populism in European politics contends that the inability of mainstream parties to address effectively economic challenges and immigration issues fosters protest voting for anti-establishment figures. This article proposes an alternative perspective centred on corruption control and delineates two pathways through which corruption influences support for populist parties in Europe. First, populists exploit growing public discontent with mainstream policymakers’ incapacity to advance sustainable corruption mitigation measures. They espouse an anti-corruption stance and pledge to rectify what ‘the establishment’ fails to address. The second connection arises from the European Union’s (EU) approach to combating corruption. The EU employs an ineffective anti-corruption strategy and attributes unfavourable outcomes to member states and their citizens. This flawed approach contributes to nationalist sentiments across Europe, which populist politicians leverage by adopting an anti-EU rhetoric. Drawing from an original dataset encompassing every national election across 28 European nations from 1990 to 2020, this study probes the circumstances under which populist parties expand their electoral support. Various statistical analyses reveal that the rise in corruption is a fundamental factor driving support for populism. Not only does the EU fail to assist in tackling national corruption, but its anti-corruption strategy inadvertently bolsters public approval of populist politicians. This effect is accentuated in member states where corruption becomes more pronounced post-EU accession.

Keywords:

• Corruption
• good governance
• populism
• the European Union

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 For thorough reviews of the populism literature, see Guriev and Papaioannou (2022) and Rodrik (2021).

2 The EU Commission has recently self-reflected on these shortcomings and revealed a new proposal in May 2023 to fight corruption more effectively: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/joint-communication-fight-against-corruption_en.

3 The EU has been criticised for its selective implementation of this ad hoc approach, as noted by Warner (2007). It has primarily targeted ‘the usual suspects’, including Bulgaria and Romania in the 2010s, and Hungary and Poland in the 2020s, while adopting a more lenient stance towards other member states, especially those in the EU-15.

4 ‘Eurogroup statement on Greece’: https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2012-02-21_eurogroup_statement_bailout_for_greece.pdf.

5 Reuters, 8 September 2012: https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-protests/thousands-of-greeks-protest-against-new-round-of-austerity-cuts-idUSL6E8K81C120120908.

6 The Guardian, 31 May 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/31/italy-cancelled-league-rallies-signal-political-impasse-may-soon-end.

7 See https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2247.

8 The Telegraph, 1 June 2018: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/01/italys-new-populist-government-reacts-furiously-juncker-suggesting/.

9 Ibid.

10 The Economist, 5 March 2018: https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/03/05/anti-eu-parties-make-big-gains-in-the-italian-general-election.

11 The New York Times, 4 March 2018: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/europe/italy-election.html.

12 The substantive findings do not change when the analyses are limited to EU members only.

13 For more information about the measurement process, see https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators.

14 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS.

15 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.

16 See https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock.

17 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.

18 See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI.

19 See https://population.un.org/wpp/.

20 See https://fsi.stanford.edu/global-populisms/content/vote-populists.

21 See http://cwed2.org.

22 See https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/dmsgmnwsd2ko4hmsuqtwtg?locale=en.

23 My main findings do not change when I use robust standard errors as a robustness check.

24 ‘Corruption Control’ maintains statistical significance when all control variables are excluded from the analyses.

25 My main findings do not change when this variable is excluded from the analyses.

26 For comparison, Estonia had a score of 0.66 in 1998, which increased to 0.99 in 2010.

27 A less conservative estimate, as indicated by Model 7, proposes that the decline in Fidesz’s vote share in 2010 would have exceeded a substantial 11 percentage points.

28 Available at: https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/.

29 Although the choice of the 0.6 cutoff point is arbitrary, my primary results remain consistent when employing alternative cutoff points, including 0.4, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.8.

30 For example, I control for various age groups, namely those aged between 18 and 24, those aged 25 and above, those aged between 25 and 49, and those aged 50 and above. My findings remain consistent.

31 See https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism_en.

32 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2516.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mert Kartal

Mert Kartal is Associate Professor of Political Science at St. Lawrence University. His research focuses on good governance and corruption control in the current and prospective members of the European Union. He has published in several journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, the Journal of European Integration, and Comparative European Politics, among ­others. [[email protected]]