Inside the Iraqi State Records: Saddam Hussein, ‘Irangate’, and the United States

Abstract

This article uses captured Iraqi state records to examine Saddam Hussein's reaction to US arms to sales to Iran during the Iran–Iraq War (the Iran/Contra scandal). These records show that ‘Irangate’ marked a decisive departure in Saddam's relations with the United States. Irangate reinforced Saddam's preexisting suspicions of US policy, convincing him that Washington was a strategic enemy that could not be trusted. Saddam concealed his anger to preserve a working relationship with the Reagan administration, but this episode nevertheless cemented his negative views of the United States and forged a legacy of hostility and mistrust that would inform his strategic calculus for years to come.

Key Words:

• Iraq
• Saddam Hussein
• Ronald Reagan
• Iran/Contra

Notes

¹This article was written at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Alexandria, VA, as part of a project sponsored by the US Department of Defense. This paper represents only the author's views; it does not represent the views of IDA or the Department of Defense.

²Ronald Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy’, 13 Nov. 1986, American Presidency Project, Univ. of California at Santa Barbara.

³President Saddam Hussein Discusses Iraq's Historical Right to Kuwait’, 15 Dec. 1990.

⁴Unless otherwise noted, the Iraqi records cited in this study are held in an electronic database managed by the Department of Defense. Here they are cited by title and date. For Saddam's remark, see ‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials’, early 1987.

⁵See, for instance, Kevin Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2008).

⁶This assertion is common in both popular and scholarly literature. See Adam Tarock, The Superpowers' Involvement in the Iran–Iraq War (Commack, NY: Nova Publishers 1998) 224; Gary Sick, ‘The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment’, in David Lesch (ed.), The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2007), 297; Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982–1990 (New York: Norton 1994), 200–1; Michael Klare, ‘Arms Transfers to Iran and Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88 and the Origins of the Gulf War’, in Andrew Bacevich and Efraim Ibar (eds), The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (New York: Routledge 2003), 4; Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Grove 2002), 214; Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1999), 38–9; Steven Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: US Decision-Making and the Persian Gulf War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 2003), 23–6; Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: Norton 1994), 348. For exceptions to this tendency, see Woods, Mother of All Battles, Chs 3–4; F. Gregory Gause, ‘Iraq's Decisions to go to War, 1980 and 1990’, Middle East Journal 56/1 (Winter 2002), 47–70.

⁷Special National Intelligence Estimate 34/36/2–82, June 1982, Electronic Briefing Book (EBB) 167, National Security Archive (NSA).

⁸Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge Press 1991), Chs. 2–6.

⁹Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 56.

¹⁰Aziz's remark is recalled in Woodrow Wilson Center, Towards an International History of the Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Critical Oral History Workshop (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 2004), 70.

¹¹Steven Metz, Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy (Washington DC: Potomac Books 2008), 5.

¹²Defense Estimative Brief, ‘Prospects for Iraq’, 25 Sept. 1984, in Woodrow Wilson Center, The Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988: A Cold War International History Project Document Reader (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 2004). On Soviet–Iraqi ties, see Oles Smolansky and Bettie Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, NC: Duke UP 1991), 276–8.

¹³Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 33–56; Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House 2002), 18–20; Department of State Memorandum, ‘Notifying Congress of Truck Sale’, 5 March 1984, EBB 82, NSA.

¹⁴Quoted in Howe to Shultz, 1 Nov. 1983, EBB 82, NSA; also Joost Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New York: Cambridge UP 2007), 43–56.

¹⁵Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 45; Steven Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 2008), 51–5.

¹⁶Hiro, Longest War, 120; Pollack, Threatening Storm, 18–19.

¹⁷‘Talking Points for Amb. Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein’, 14 Dec. 1983, EBB 82, NSA.

¹⁸Bernard Gwertzman, ‘Iraq Gets Reports from US for Use in War with Iran’, New York Times, 16 Dec. 1986.

¹⁹Quoted in Towards an International History of the Iran–Iraq War, 73. On these issues, see State to Baghdad, 13 Sept. 1986, in Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran–Iraq War; Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 160–1; State to Khartoum, 24 March 1984, EBB 82, NSA; Sasan Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment (New York: Routledge Press 2008), 46.

²⁰SNIE 36.2–83, ‘Prospects for Iraq’, 19 July 1983, EBB 167, NSA; Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, 57– 8.

²¹Secretary of State to Khartoum, 24 March 1984, EBB 82, NSA.

²²Woods, Mother of All Battles, 307. On Saddam's worldview, see also Ofra Bengio, Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (New York: OUP 1998), passim; Jerrold Post, ‘Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile’, Political Psychology 12 (1991), 279–89.

²³‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Military Commanders’, undated.

²⁴Bengio, Saddam's Word, 35–7, 70–3; Post, ‘Saddam Hussein of Iraq’, 284–5.

²⁵Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 2–3.

²⁶Woods, Mother of All Battles, 50.

²⁷Bengio, Saddam's Word, 131–45.

²⁸‘Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] Meeting Headed by Saddam Hussein’, 27 March 1979; ‘Meeting with the Cabinet to Discuss the Iran–Iraq War’, late 1986.

²⁹US officials accidentally delivered the wrong type of Hawks, leading Iran to return all but one of the missiles. On the arms sales, see Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran/Contra Affair (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1989).

³⁰Yetiv, Absence of Grand Strategy, 57.

³¹Stephen Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2009), 273; Michael Wines and Doyle McManus, ‘US Arms May Be Essential to Iran’, Los Angeles Times, 15 Nov. 1986; Charles Mohr, ‘Experts Say US Arms Sent to Iran Can Provide Major Striking Power’, New York Times, 21 Nov. 1986; Rosemary Hollis, ‘The US Role: Helpful or Harmful’, in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary Sick (eds), Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 198.

³²Reagan, ‘Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy’.

³³‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

³⁴‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran-Iraq War', mid-Nov. 1986.

³⁵‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials,’ early 1987.

³⁶‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

³⁷‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986.

³⁸‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986. It is not clear whether Saddam was talking about the US-made weapons supplied to the Shah in the 1970s or the weapons delivered in 1985–86.

³⁹‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986.

⁴²‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁴³‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the General Command of the Armed Forces’, 27 and 29 Nov. 1986; also Kevin Woods and Mark Stout, ‘Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of Desert Storm,’Journal of Strategic Studies 33/1 (Jan. 2010), 12–13.

⁴⁴‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986; ‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War,’ mid-Nov. 1986.

⁴⁵‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁴⁶Quoted in FBIS Daily Report, ‘US-Iran Arms Deal “Scandal of 20th Century”’, 17 Dec. 1986; see also FBIS Daily Report, ‘Arms to Iran “Will Not Affect Balance of Power”’, 15 Dec. 1986.

⁴⁷‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986; ‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986.

⁴⁸‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials’, early 1987.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran-Iraq War', mid-Nov. 1986.

⁵³‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986; ‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁵⁴‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986; ‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986. Saddam may have feared that the United States would pressure him into accepting a ceasefire that left Iran in possession of the Fao peninsula.

⁵⁵‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁵⁶‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials’, early 1987.

⁵⁹‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986.

⁶⁰‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁶¹‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials’, early 1987.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁶⁴‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War’, mid-Nov. 1986.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶‘RCC Meeting with Ministries’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁶⁷‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986; ‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War,’ mid-Nov. 1986.

⁶⁸‘RCC Meeting with Ministries,’ 15 Nov. 1986; ‘Cabinet Meeting regarding the Iran–Iraq War,’ mid-Nov. 1986.

⁶⁹‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁷⁰Murphy to Armacost, ‘US-Iraqi Relations: Picking Up the Pieces’, 5 Dec. 1986, in Woodrow Wilson Center, Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran–Iraq War.

⁷¹FBIS Daily Report, ‘Information Minister on Gulf War, Iran “Scandal”’, 9 Dec. 1986.

⁷²Quoted in David Shipler, ‘Envoy Asserts US Misled the Iraqis on Iran Shipments’, New York Times, 23 Nov. 1986; also FBIS Daily Report, ‘Ambassador to US Interviewed on Iran Arms Deal’, 6 Jan. 1987.

⁷³John Kifner, ‘Arabs Bitter over Shipments to Iran’, New York Times, 23 Nov. 1986; FBIS Daily Report, ‘Radio Cites Foreign Media Reaction to “Arms Deal”’, 17 Nov. 1986; ‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁷⁴Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair, 77.

⁷⁵Murphy to Armacost, 5 Dec. 1986, in Woodrow Wilson Center, Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran–Iraq War.

⁷⁶Colin Powell's Notes on National Security Council Meeting, 21 Jan. 1987, in Woodrow Wilson Center, Origins, Conduct, and Impact of the Iran–Iraq War.

⁷⁷On the gassing issue, see Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair, 78–9. On post-Irangate US support for Saddam, see NSD 26, 2 October 1989, National Security Directives File, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, TX; Parnell to Brady, 8 Nov. 1989, Box 10, FOIA 99-0461, Bush Library.

⁷⁸Kifner, ‘Arabs Bitter over Shipments to Iran’; Tarock, The Superpowers' Involvement in the Iran–Iraq War, 91–122.

⁷⁹On the evolution of US views toward Saddam, see ‘Thinking about a Policy for Iraq,’ 12 Jan. 1990, Iraqgate Collection, NSA; Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (Lexington: UP of Kentucky 2008), 48–9.

⁸⁰‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials’, early 1987.

⁸¹‘RCC Meeting to Discuss a Speech by President Reagan’, 15 Nov. 1986.

⁸²‘Saddam Hussein Meeting with Ba'ath Officials’, early 1987.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵‘Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the General Command of the Armed Forces’, 27 and 29 Nov. 1986.

⁸⁶ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, 30 Sept. 2004, 31, <www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/pdf/duelfer1.pdf> accessed 23 June 2009.

⁸⁷Donald Neff, ‘The US, Iraq, Israel, and Iran: Backdrop to War’, Journal of Palestinian Studies 20/4 (Summer 1991), 35.

⁸⁸‘Oral History: Tariq Aziz,’ <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html> accessed 15 June 2009.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰ Comprehensive Report, 31. This point is also developed in Gause, ‘Iraq's Decisions to go to War, 1980 and 1990’, 54–8.

⁹¹‘Meeting with Yasser Arafat before the Gulf War,’ undated, in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 50–1.

⁹²‘The Glaspie Transcript’, in Micha Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Iraq War Reader (New York: Simon & Schuster 2003), 62.

⁹³‘President Saddam Hussein Discusses Iraq's Historical Right to Kuwait’, 15 Dec. 1990. Saddam's use of ‘Irangate’ rather than ‘Iran/Contra’ illustrates another interesting point regarding the differing US and Iraqi perspectives on this incident. In the United States, it was the ‘contra’ aspect of ‘Iran/Contra’ that stirred the most controversy. In Iraq, the ‘Iran’ half of ‘Iran/Contra’ was far more troubling.

⁹⁴See, among others, Pollack, Threatening Storm, Ch. 2; Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, 48–50; Jentleson, With Friends Like These, Chs. 3–4; Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990–91: The Iraq–Kuwait Conflict and its Implications (New York: OUP 2001), 97–100; Amatzia Baram, ‘US Input into Iraqi Decision-Making, 1988–1990’, in Lesch, The Middle East and the United States, 297; Christian Alfonsi, Circle in the Sand: Why we Went back to Iraq (New York: Doubleday 2006), 12–22.

⁹⁵See the sources cited in the introduction to this article.