What Happened to Israeli Military Thought?

Abstract

This article addresses the following question: how can one explain the neglect of the intellectual aspects of the profession on the part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)? The explanations offered for that neglect are a mixture of cultural and societal factors. The cultural explanation focuses on Israeli strategic culture; the traditional Israeli perception of the combination of rich experience and experience-based intuition as a winning ticket; the tendency to extol improvisation; a cult of material strength; and a strong belief in technology. The social explanation stresses the declining attractiveness of a military career for qualitative young Israelis. The article contends that change can take place only if the IDF undergoes a process of institutional intellectualism – if not willingly then one imposed by the political echelon.

Key Words:

• Israeli Military Thought
• History-based Military Theory
• ‘Practical Soldiers’

Notes

¹See for example, Carl von Clausewitz, On War [1832] (ed. and trans.) Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1976), 102, 145, 164; Antoine-Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War [1838] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1947), 14–15.

²For literature on Liddell Hart's influence on Israeli military thinking see Jac Weller, ‘Sir Basil Liddell Hart's Disciples in Israel’, Military Review 54/2 (Jan. 1974), 13–23; Brian Bond, ‘Liddell Hart's Influence on Israeli Military Theory and Practice’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 121/2 (June 1974), 83–9; Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London: Cassell 1977); John J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1988), 201–4; Tuvia Ben-Moshe, ‘Liddell Hart and the Israel Defense Forces: A Reappraisal’, Journal of Contemporary History 16/2 (April 1981), 369–91.

³Basil H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber 1943), 96–7; Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1986), 116.

⁴Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive (New York: Public Affairs 1998), 263.

⁵This trend is reflected in Yehuda L. Wallach, Israeli Military History: A Guide to the Sources (New York: Garland 1984); Avner Yaniv, ‘The Study of Israel's National Security’, in Ian Lustick (ed.), Books on Israel (Albany: State University of New York Press 1991), 63–82; Moshe Grundman (ed.) Israel's Security 1967–1991: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1992).

⁶Avi Kober, ‘Israeli Military Thinking as Reflected in Maarachot Articles, 1948–2000’, Armed Forces & Society 30/1(Fall 2003), 141–60.

⁷Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (Jerusalem: Edanim 1976) [Hebrew]; Ezer Weizman, On Eagle's Wings (London: Weidenfeld 1976); Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sharut (Tel Aviv: Maariv 1979) [Hebrew]; Raphael Eytan, Story of a Soldier (Tel Aviv: Maariv 1985) [Hebrew]; Ariel Sharon (with David Chanoff) Warrior (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky 1989); Mordechai Gur, Chief of the General Staff 1974–1978 (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 1998) [Hebrew].

⁸Eliot Cohen, ‘An Intellectual Challenge’, Haaretz, 20 Sept. 1998

⁹ Haaretz Weekend Supplement, 12 April 1996, 28 March 1997.

¹⁰<www.toravoda.org.il/14hisdai.html>.

¹¹Eviatar Ben-Tzedef, ‘The Israel Defense Forces, 1996’, Outpost (Sept. 1996), <www. afsi.org/OUTPOST/96SEP/sep4.htm>.

¹²Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1998), 74–6.

¹³The Winograd Commission's final report, <www.vaadatwino.org.il/pdf/%20.pdf>, 323, 397.

¹⁴Moshe Shamir, ‘On Changes in the Inter-Arm Command and Control Training’, Maarachot 396 (Sept. 2004), 20–5.

¹⁵Kober, ‘Israeli Military Thinking as Reflected in Maarachot Articles, 1948–2000’.

¹⁶Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press 1991); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity 1999); Special Issue on Fourth Generation Warfare, Contemporary Security Policy 26/2 (Aug. 2005), 185–285; Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare’, Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, 6 Jan. 2006; Jeffrey B. White, ‘Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare’, <www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/iregular.htm>; James N. Mattis and Frank Hoffman, ‘Future Warfare: The Rise in Hybrid Wars’, Proceedings 132/11 (Nov. 2005), 18–19; Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Preparing for Hybrid Wars’, Marine Corps Gazette 91/3 (March 2007), 57–61; Frank Hoffman, ‘Lessons From Lebanon: Hezbollah And Hybrid Wars’, The Evening Bulletin, 5 Sept. 2006, <www.theeveningbulletin.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=17152236&BRD=2737& PAG=461&dept_id=574088&rfi=6>.

¹⁷Eytan Gilboa, ‘Educating Israeli Officers in the Process of Peacemaking in the Middle East Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 16/2 (1979), 155–62; Yehoshafat Harkabi, War and Strategy (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 1990) [Hebrew], 587–8; Michael Handel, Masters of War (London: Frank Cass 2001), 353–60; Uri Milstein, ‘Wearing the Officer's Badge, Symbolically’, Politika 26 (May 1989), 40–3; Dov Tamari, ‘Is the IDF Capable of Changing in the Wake of the Second Lebanon War?’ Maarachot 415 (Nov. 2007), 26–41.

¹⁸ The State Comptroller's Annual Report 57A, Dec. 2006, 52. <www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/contentTree.asp?bookid=474&id=57&contentid=&parentcid=undefined&sw=1024&hw=698>. See also <http://themarker.captain.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=877770>; <www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/796743.html>.

¹⁹The Committee's report is available at <http://my.ynet.co.il/pic/news/3.7.2007/hub.doc>.

²⁰<www.nrg.co.il:80/online/1/ART1/603/588.html>.

²¹Testimony by General (ret.) Amatzia Chen, a former instructor at the National Defense College, <www.kav.org.il/100994/647>.

²²Gabriel Ben-Dor, ‘The Interface between the Military and the Academic World in Israel’, paper presented at an International conference on ‘The Decline of the Citizen Armies in Democratic States: Processes and Implications’, Bar-Ilan University, 18–19 June 2008.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles, 74–6.

²⁵Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane 1975), 126–32; Haim Laskov and Meir Zorea, ‘Should One Wage War’, Maariv, 10 Oct. 1965.

²⁶Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 121.

²⁷Ibid., 318.

²⁸Yehuda L. Wallach, ‘Obits for the Tank’, Maarachot Shiryon 23 (July 1971), 40–1; Moshe Bar-Kochva, Chariots of Steel (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 1989) [Hebrew], 573–6; Israel Tal, ‘The Tank at Present and in the Future’, Maarachot 281 (Nov. 1981), 2–7; Micha Bar, ‘The Tank's Obscure Future’, Maarachot 339 (Feb. 1995), 2–9.

²⁹The staunchest offense advocates were Israel Tal and Dov Tamari. Israel Tal, ‘Israel's Security Doctrine’, Maarachot 253 (Dec. 1976), 2–9; ‘Offense and Defense in the Wars of Israel’, Maarachot 311 (March 1988), 4–7; Dov Tamari, ‘Offense or Defense: Do We Have a Choice?’ Maarachot 289–290 (Oct. 1983), 5–11. For a balanced approach, see Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 1988).

³⁰Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep (Tel-Aviv: Zmora-Bitan 2001) [Hebrew], 22–7.

³¹Amnon Yogev, ‘Israel's Security in the 1990s and Beyond’, Alpayim 1 (June 1989), 166–85.

³²Aaron S. Klieman, ‘Lavi: The Lion Has Yet to Roar’, Journal of Defense and Diplomacy 4 (Aug. 1986), 22–9; Gerald M. Steinberg, ‘Lessons of the Lavi’, Midstream 33 (Nov. 1987), 3–6.

³³Arieh Stav and Baruch Koroth (eds), Ballistic Missiles: The Threat and Response (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot 1999) [Hebrew]; Yiftah S. Shapir, ‘Non-Conventional Solutions for Non-Conventional Dilemmas?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 24/2 (June 2001),153–63; Reuven Pedatzur The Arrow System (Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies 1993).

³⁴For the various opinions on this issue, see Stuart Cohen (ed.), The New Citizen Armies (London: Routledge 2010).

³⁵Isaac Ben-Israel, ‘The Military Buildup's Theory of Relativity’, Maarachot 352–353 (Aug. 1997), 33–42; Dan Schueftan, ‘Beyond the Relative Advantage’, Maarachot 356–357 (March 1998), 70–9.

³⁶Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles; Chris C. Demchack, ‘Technology's Burden, the RMA, and the IDF: Organizing the Hypertext Organization for Future “Wars of Disruption”?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 24/2 (June 2001), 77–146.

³⁷Dima P. Adamsky, ‘The Conceptual Co-Influence: the Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the Western Military Innovations’, paper presented at the IAIS annual meeting, Hebrew University, 6 June 2006.

³⁸To use late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century Jewish intellectual Ahad Haam's distinction in his seminal essay, ‘Imitation and Assimilation’ (1893), in Ahad Ha'am, Essays, Letters, Memoirs (Oxford: East and West Library 1946), 71–5.

³⁹Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell, ‘The Digital Battlefield: What Army Transformation Efforts Say about its Professional Jurisdiction’, in Don M. Snider and Gayle Watkins (eds), The Future of the Army Profession (New York: McGraw-Hill 2003), 155–78; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000), 303. For Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz's perception of the technological opportunities, see: Stella Koren-Lieber, ‘A Small but High-Tech Military’, Globes, 29 Aug. 1999. Mofaz was the Chief of Staff under whose command the IDF completed Aviv Neurim.

⁴⁰Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (Washington DC: Dept. of Defense Command and Control Research Program 2002); Allen W. Batschelet, Effects-Based Operations: A New Operational Model? (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 2002), 2.

⁴¹Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000); Amir Rapaport, Friendly Fire (Tel Aviv: Maariv 2007) [Hebrew], 81; Haim Assa and Yedidya Yaari, Diffused Warfare (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot 2005) [Hebrew].

⁴²See Maarachot's special issue 358 (April 1998).

⁴³Shimon Naveh, Operational Art and the IDF (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment 2007), 3.

⁴⁴<http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2006/09/why_the_israeli.html>; Eyal Weizman, ‘Israeli Military Using Post-Structuralism as Operational Theory’, Infoshop News, 1 Aug. 2006 <www.infoshop.org/inews/article.php?story=20060801170800738>.

⁴⁵ Tziklon 8 (May 1981).

⁴⁶Halutz's testimony before the Winograd Commission, <www.vaadatwino.org.il/pdf/%20%20.pdf>, 16.

⁴⁷Alex Fishman, ‘The Five-Day War’, Yediot Aharonot Weekend Supplement, 17 April 2007.

⁴⁸Avi Kober, ‘The IDF in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?’ Journal of Strategic Studies 31/1 (Feb. 2008), 3–40; Isaac Ben-Israel, The First Missile War (Tel Aviv: The Security Studies Program, May 2007).

⁴⁹Aharon Zeevi, ‘Aviv Neurim: The Vision and its Implementation’, Maarachot 358 (April 1998), 3–6.

⁵⁰The Winograd Commission's final report, 274–5, 318, 321–2.

⁵¹<www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/books/532/9900/76.htm>.

⁵²Oz Almog, Sabra: The Creation of a New Jew (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1997) [Hebrew].

⁵³Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia (Tel Aviv: Am Oved 1990) [Hebrew], 145, 181; Yaacov Hisdai, ‘Ideologue versus Performer: IDF's Priest and Prophet’, Maarachot 279–280 (May-June 1981), 41–6.

⁵⁴On the concept, see, for example, Frederick II (the Great), The King of Prussia's Military Instruction to his Generals (1747), Article VI, ‘Of the Coup D'Oeil’, available at <www.kw.igs.net/∼tacit/artofwar/frederick.htm#VI>; Clausewitz, On War, 102.

⁵⁵Ben-Moshe, ‘Liddell Hart and the Israel Defense Forces’; Bond, Liddell Hart, 246, 252; Anita Shapira, Yigal Allon, Native Son: A Biography (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2007).

⁵⁶Williamson Murray, ‘The Army's Advanced Strategic Art Program’, Parameters 30 (Winter 2000–01), 31–39.

⁵⁷Opinions have ranged from defense advocates (e.g. Clausewitz), a mixed approach proponents (e.g. Bernhardi, Liddell Hart) and offense advocates (e.g. Napoleon, Jomini, Moltke, Schlieffen, Fuller)

⁵⁸Avi Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition (New York: Routledge 2009).

⁵⁹Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2010).

⁶⁰Gen. Gershon HaCohen, ‘Educating Senior Officers’, in ‘Is the IDF Prepared for Tomorrow's Challenges?’ BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy 24, July 2008, 28, <www.biu.ac.il/Besa/coll24.pdf>, 33–4.

⁶¹Norwell De Atkine, ‘Why Arabs Lose Wars?’ Middle East Quarterly 6/4 (Dec. 1999), 17–27; Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 2002).

⁶²Dayan, Story of My Life, 244; Ben-Moshe, ‘Liddell Hart and the Israel Defense Forces’.

⁶³Emanuel Wald, Kilelat Hakelim Hashvurim [The Curse of the Broken Vessels] (Tel Aviv: Shoken 1987) [Hebrew], 183.

⁶⁴The Winograd Commission's final report, 425.

⁶⁵Meir Finkel, On Flexibility (Tel Aviv: MOD 2007) [Hebrew], 194–207.

⁶⁶Ibid., 208–22.

⁶⁷John T. Nelsen II, ‘Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle’, Parameter 17 (Sept. 1987), 21–34; Daniel Hughes, Moltke On the Art of War (New York: Presidio 1995), 231; Hajo Holborn, ‘The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff’, in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton UP 1986), 289–91.

⁶⁸Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes (New York: The Free Press 1990), 124; Hanoch Bartov, Dado (Tel Aviv: Maariv 1978) [Hebrew], Vol. I, 235–6; Professor Avi Ravitzky, Interview to Maariv for Israel's 53rd anniversary, <www.nrg. co.il/online/archive/ART/138/748.html>; Avraham Rotem, ‘Is a Small and Smart Military a Vision or a Legend?’ in Haggai Golan (ed.), Israel's Security Web (Tel Aviv: Maarachot 2001) [Hebrew], 92

⁶⁹Rotem, ‘Is a Small and Smart Military a Vision or a Legend?’ 92.

⁷⁰Niel Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology(New York: Vintage Books 1993); Theodore Roszak, The Cult of Information (Berkeley: University of California Press 1994); James W. Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 1986); Williamson Murray, ‘Military Culture Does Matter’, FPRI Wire 7/2 (Jan. 1999), <www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0702.199901.murray.militaryculturedoesmatter.html>.

⁷¹Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier, 175; Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks, and Missiles, 63–5.

⁷²This is reflected in Ben-Israel, ‘The Military Buildup's Theory of Relativity’, 33; Isaac Ben-Israel, ‘Security, Technology, and Future Battlefield,’ in Golan, Israel's Security Web, 279; Shmuel Gordon, The Bow of Paris (Tel Aviv: Poalim 1997) [Hebrew], esp. 320–2.

⁷³Kober, ‘Israeli Military Thinking as Reflected in Maarachot Articles, 1948–2000’, 156.

⁷⁴Yagil Levy, ‘Materialist Militarism’, Alternative Information Center, 8 Aug. 2006, <www.alternativenews.org/news/english/materialist-militarism-20060808.html>; Yagil Levy, Israel's Materialist Militarism (Madison, WI: Lexington Books 2007); Levy, ‘The War of the Peripheries: A Social Mapping of IDF Casualties in the Al-Aqsa Intifada’, Social Identities 12/3 (May 2006), 309–24.

⁷⁵Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger 1966).

⁷⁶Adamsky, ‘The Conceptual Co-Influence: the Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the Western Military Innovations’.

⁷⁷Murray, ‘The Army's Advanced Strategic Art Program’; Murray, ‘Military Culture Does Matter’; Michael Evans, ‘From the Long Peace to the Long War: Armed Conflict and Military Education and Training in the 21st Century’, Canberra, Australia, <www.defence.gov.au/jetwc/docs/publications%202010/PublcnsOccasional_310310_ FromtheLongPeace.pdf>.

⁷⁸Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad 1968) [Hebrew), 303.

⁷⁹Jennifer G. Mathers, ‘Reform and the Russian Military’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002), 161–84.

⁸⁰David J. Bercuson, ‘Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces After the “Somalia Affair’'’, in Stuart Cohen (ed.), The New Citizen Armies (London: Routledge 2010), 159–69.

⁸¹Clausewitz, On War, 183, 484, 577–8. For an excellent discussion of Clausewitz's theory as a Geschtalt – a systemic theory, see Handel, Masters of War, 345–51.

⁸²Tamir Libel and Joel Hayward, ‘Adding Brain to Brawn: The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and its Impact on Air Power Thinking’, Airpower Review 13/2 (Summer 2010), 69–80, <www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/APR-2010-13%20No%202_ Final%20.pdf>.